Edwards v. Khalil
Decision Date | 22 November 2021 |
Docket Number | 18-CV-5138 (CS) |
Parties | COLLEEN EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. ESSAM KHALIL, individually, RAMON BETHENCOURT, individually, and THE CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, NEW YORK, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
COLLEEN EDWARDS, Plaintiff,
v.
ESSAM KHALIL, individually, RAMON BETHENCOURT, individually, and THE CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, NEW YORK, Defendants.
No. 18-CV-5138 (CS)
United States District Court, S.D. New York
November 22, 2021
Drita Nicaj Law Offices of Drita Nicaj Poughkeepsie, New York Counsel for Plaintiff
Alex Smith Corporation Counsel of the City of Middletown Middletown, New York Counsel for Defendants
OPINION &ORDER
CATHY SEIBEL, U.S.D.J.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Colleen Edwards. (ECF No. 46.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
I accept as true the facts, but not the conclusions, set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) The parties' knowledge of the factual and procedural background of this case - including the allegations in and history of the parties' previous case, Edwards v. Khalil, No.
12-CV-8442 (S.D.N.Y.) (“Edwards I”), discussed herein - is presumed. I recite only those facts from this case and Edwards I[1] relevant to this opinion.
A. Facts
Plaintiff began her employment with the City of Middletown Police Department (the “Department”) in October 2007. (ECF No. 1-1, (“Edwards I Compl.”) ¶¶ 3, 11.) During her employment, Plaintiff was one of the only female members of the Department. (See id. ¶ 11.) In 2008, Defendant Essam Khalil, a fellow officer, made sexual advances towards her. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff rejected Khalil's advances and subsequently distanced herself. (Id.) Khalil, therefore, allegedly “harbored animus towards Plaintiff.” (Id.)
Ramon Bethencourt, the Acting Police Chief in 2010, was close friends with Khalil, and the two were also business partners. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 13; Compl. ¶ 5.) As Acting Police Chief, Bethencourt promoted Khalil to Sergeant. (Edwards I Compl. ¶ 13.) Shortly after Khalil's promotion, he began targeting Plaintiff professionally. (Id. ¶ 14.) For example, in or about summer or fall 2010, Khalil allegedly shared “so-called confidential information” with other members of the Department about discipline of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 19; see id. ¶¶ 15-18.) On another occasion, Khalil allegedly ordered Plaintiff to “mark off the arrest box” on a form, contrary to a Lieutenant's instructions to Plaintiff to leave the box blank “when there were no arrests.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Further, on a tour that lasted from 4:00 p.m. on October 30 to the early morning hours of October 31, 2011, Khalil allegedly “berated Plaintiff” and made “her cry in front of a suspect, ” after which Plaintiff complained to a Lieutenant about Khalil's “ongoing harassing,
discriminating and demeaning behavior.” (Id. at ¶ 42.) Khalil, for his part, claimed Plaintiff was insubordinate. This incident resulted in an internal investigation into Plaintiff's conduct. (Id. ¶ 44.)
On or about November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed the Edwards I Complaint, claiming violations of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and the New York State Executive Law § 296. (Compl. ¶ 7.) In the Edwards I Complaint, Plaintiff detailed facts pertaining to her gender discrimination and retaliation claims. (Id.) The Edwards I trial was “slated” to begin on October 24, 2016. (Id. ¶ 13.) About two months before, however, Defendants made a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. (Id.) Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' offer on or about September 8, 2016, and the court entered judgment on September 12, 2016. (Id.)
Over the course of Plaintiff's employment, three disciplinary hearings - all seeking to terminate her on grounds of misconduct and insubordination - took place. (See id. ¶ 8.) The first disciplinary hearing lasted seven days, and on November 8, 2012, the Board of Police Commissioners (“Board” or “Commission”) found Plaintiff guilty of charges of insubordination relating to the incident on October 31, 2011 and terminated her employment. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff challenged her termination by filing an Article 78 petition in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Orange. (Id. ¶ 10.) “[T]he state court reinstated Plaintiff's employment and annulled the Board's decision” on April 9, 2013. (Id.)[2]Thereafter, Bethencourt issued additional disciplinary charges relating to the October 31, 2011 incident, as well as new charges pertaining “to Plaintiff's request to receive overtime pay for two
dates in which she was required to attend the first disciplinary proceeding.” (Id. ¶ 11.) The second disciplinary hearing was terminated for unstated reasons after two days of hearings in April and May 2014. (Id. ¶ 11.) The third disciplinary hearing spanned twenty-two days between November 12, 2014 and August 17, 2016. (Id. ¶ 12.) On December 16, 2016, “the Board found Plaintiff guilty of most [of] the disciplinary charges, and terminated her position effective immediately.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff challenged the termination by filing another Article 78 petition (the “Petition”) in Orange County Supreme Court. (Id. ¶ 15.) In her Petition, Plaintiff alleged that the Board's “determination was arbitrary and capricious, affected by error of law, ” and “not supported by substantial evidence, ” and that the penalty imposed was “shocking to the conscience and excessive.” (ECF No. 47-5 at 38.) The Petition attached the Edwards I Complaint as an Exhibit, (id. ¶ 40), and detailed alleged acts of gender discrimination and retaliation on Khalil's part, (see id. ¶¶ 4, 76, 78-82, 87-92, 102-106). Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the Board in its decision to terminate had not given adequate consideration or weight to the personal conflict between Khalil and Plaintiff and his targeting of her. (Id. ¶ 195.)
On November 6, 2017, the state court “issued a Decision and Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Article 78 petition.” (Compl. ¶ 15; see ECF No. 47-6.) The court found, among other things, that the penalty of termination was not so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of fairness, and thus the Board did not abuse its discretion in terminating Plaintiff. (ECF No. 47-6 at 15.) Plaintiff appealed the court's decision in May 2018, (Compl. ¶ 16), and the Appellate Division affirmed it earlier this year. See Edwards v. City of Middletown, 141 N.Y.S.3d 103 (App. Div. 2021).
B. Procedural History
On June 8, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this suit, alleging: (1) violation of Plaintiff's right to Equal Protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; (2) violation of Plaintiff's right to a workplace free from discrimination based upon sex pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the City of Middletown; (3) violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from retaliation for opposing discrimination in the workplace based upon gender pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the City of Middletown; (4) violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender pursuant to § 296 of the Executive Law of the State of New York against Defendants Khalil and the City of Middletown; and (5) violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from retaliation for opposing discrimination in the workplace based upon gender pursuant to § 296 of the Executive Law of the State of New York against all Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-27.) The instant action “is limited to tangible and intangible damages [Plaintiff] suffered following” her December 16, 2016 termination of employment. (Id. ¶ 14 n.1.) On March 4, 2021, the Court held a pre-motion conference to discuss Defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss, (Minute Entry dated Mar. 4, 2021), and this motion followed, (ECF No. 46).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Preclusion
A motion to dismiss on grounds of preclusion is treated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), not as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1994).
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, codepleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “begin[s] by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” and then determines whether the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Deciding whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the...
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