Edwards v. Lateef

• Decision Date: 09 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-50.,88-50.
• Citation: 558 A.2d 1144
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: Frances A. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. Kamau A. LATEEF, Appellee.

Page 1144

558 A.2d 1144

Frances A. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. Kamau A. LATEEF, Appellee.

No. 88-50.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 28, 1989.

Decided May 9, 1989.

Susan S. McDonald, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Natalie O. Ludaway, with whom Frederick A. Douglas, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, TERRY and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.

NEWMAN, Associate Judge:

The issue presented by this case is whether the District of Columbia's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) may be used as a mechanism to recover arrearages in child support that accrued prior to February 24, 1987, the date when URESA was amended to specifically include arrearages within the definition of a duty to support. Because this amendment provides nothing more than an additional remedy to collect child support under URESA, we disagree with the trial court's holding that application of the amendment to the claim in this case would constitute an impermissible, retroactive application of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I.

Frances Edwards and Kamau Lateef were married in 1968 and divorced in Ohio in 1971. One child was born of the marriage. Pursuant to the final divorce decree, Lateef was to pay $20 per week in child support. Sometime after the divorce, Lateef moved to the District of Columbia.¹ Lateef stopped making child support payments and on December 31, 1984, an Ohio court granted Edwards a judgment in the amount of $8,560 for arrearages through November 30, 1984. Arrearages continued to accrue until the end of 1985, totalling the $9,520 now in dispute.²

Edwards initiated a reciprocal support action in Ohio to recover arrearages through December 31, 1985. On October 8, 1986, a judge sitting in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas certified that Lateef owed $9,520 in arrearages and that Edwards' petition set forth facts indicting that Lateef owed a duty of support. The petition was transmitted to the District of Columbia and was filed by the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia in Superior Court pursuant to URESA, D.C.Code § 30-314 (1981), on June 4, 1987.

A hearing was held on July 16, 1987. Lateef argued that the arrearages which had accrued prior to the 1987 amendment of URESA were not recoverable thereunder.³ The trial court held that Edwards would not have been able to recover arrearages under the law prior to the amendment in light of our decision in Schlecht v. Schlecht, 387 A.2d 575, 578-79 (D.C.1978) (URESA does not encompass recovery for arrearages accrued prior to filing of URE-SA petition). Edwards v. Lateef, 116 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 69, 72 (Jan. 13, 1988). In this ruling, the trial court was correct. The trial court further ruled that the amendment applied prospectively only since there was no showing of legislative intent to the contrary, citing Wolf v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, 414 A.2d 878, 880 n. 8 (D.C.1980). Id. It is in this latter ruling that the trial court erred.

II.

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was adopted by the District in 1957; it was based on the model act of 1950 that was revised in 1968. See D.C.Code §§ 30-301-326 (1988). See generally Unif. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968 Revised Act), 553 (1950 Act) (1987). The District did not amend its version of URESA until recently, when it enacted the District of Columbia Child Support Enforcement Amendment Act of 1985, D.C. Law No. 6-166 (Amendment Act), creating an "improved procedure for the establishment and collection of debts due and owing for the support of minor children." Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia, on Bill No. 6-134, Dec. 4, 1985, at 2 (Committee Report). Among other things, the Council enacted this legislation to meet the requirements imposed on the District and the states under the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (Supp.1987), which requires jurisdictions to adopt measures to facilitate interjurisdictional enforcement of child support duties in order to receive federal funds for their child support programs. Id.

URESA sets forth certain procedures to enforce child support duties across jurisdictional lines. Under one such process, a petition is filed in the initiating state and, upon certification, transmitted to the responding state where jurisdiction over the other parent can be obtained. See D.C. Code § 30-314 (1988). After the petition is transmitted to the District of Columbia Superior Court, the court must make an independent determination as to whether a duty of support is owed, and if so, "may order the defendant to pay such amounts under such terms and conditions as the Court may deem proper." D.C.Code § 30-315 (1988); see also Rittenhouse v. Rittenhouse, 461 A.2d 465, 466 (D.C.1983); Harris v. Kinard, 443 A.2d 25, 27-28 (D.C. 1982). The advantage of this procedure is that counsel is provided for the petitioning parent. See D.C.Code § 30-308 (1988).

The Amendment Act altered the definition of a duty to support, Prior to the amendment, the duty to support did not include the duty to pay arrearages. D.C. Code § 30-302(5)(A) (1981). The duty to support now specifically encompasses the duty to pay arrearages. The revised definition includes:

Any duty of support imposed by statute or by common law, or by any court order, decree, or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial separation, separate maintenance, or otherwise, and the duty to pay arrearages of support past due and unpaid.

D.C.Code § 30-302(5)(A) (1988) (amendatory language emphasized). This provision became effective on February 24, 1987.

III.

The availability of the URESA petition mechanism to collect arrearages that accrued prior to the amendment of URESA constitutes the dispute in this case and centers on whether the amendments to the statute should be applied prospectively or retroactively. The Superior Court, citing Wolf supra, held that in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, statutory amendments are to be applied only prospectively and on that basis dismissed Edwards' petition.

The rule favoring the prospective application of legislation applies where substantive rights are affected by a change in legislation. As this court stated in Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781, 789 n. 22 (D.C. 1978) (en banc), "statutes which amend settled law of substantive rights are to be applied prospectively only unless there is a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary." See also Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639-40, 105 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 84 L.Ed.2d 572 (1985); Greene r. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160, 84 S.Ct. 615, 621, 11 L.Ed.2d 576 (1964); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199, 34 S.Ct. 101, 102, 58 L.Ed. 179 (1913); Wolf supra, 414 A.2d at 880 n. 8; Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115, 117 (D.C.1951); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.04 (Sands 4th ed. 1986); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 415 (1953 & 1988 Supp.). That rule is inapplicable to this case.

It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that "[c]ivil laws retroactively adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations are valid." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.09 (Sands 4th ed.1986). This rule applies as long as vested or substantive rights are not altered or created by the statutory amendment. See, e.g., French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir.1981) (statute that set forth additional definitions, established a limitations period and enumerated defenses and indemnification remedies, could be applied retrospectively and created no new substantive rights or liabilities); Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir.1978) (interpreting Ohio law that prohibition against retroactive legislation applies only to statutes affecting substantive rights and not to laws relating to remedy or procedure); Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 144 U.S. App.D.C. 263, 271, 445 F.2d 739, 747 (1970) (en banc) (finding change of tribunal constitutes change in remedy that does not impair vested rights), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013, 91 S.Ct. 566, 27 L.Ed.2d 627 (1971); Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 625 F.Supp. 1579, 1581 (E.D.Wis.1986) (procedural or remedial statute will not apply where vested right is affected), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir.1987); Grenier v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 449 F.Supp. 834, 842 (D.Md.1978) (statutes which relate to remedies apply retrospectively unless vested right is destroyed); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F.Supp. 817, 820 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (rejecting argument that application of 1972 legislative enactment of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to 1968 grievance is unconstitutional and finding that "if there exists a right, a subsequent legislative enactment creating a remedy for the deprivation of or interference with that right is constitutionally unobjectionable."). Thus, statutes that create additional remedies,⁴ relate to the modes of procedure⁵ or confirm or clarify existing rights⁶ do not contravene the general proscription against the retrospective operation of legislation. See generally Federal Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 99 U.S.App.D. C. 820, 328, 289 F.2d 941, 944 (1956) ("If the amendment is either procedural or remedial in character the settled rule permits its retroactive application"); 73 AM.JUR.2d Statutes § 354 (1974) (although contrary authority exists, generally "statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation...