Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co.

• Citation: 796 F. Supp. 966
• Decision Date: 19 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 89-1697-LC.,89-1697-LC.
• Parties: Dalton EDWARDS v. LOUISVILLE LADDER COMPANY, d/b/a Emerson Electric Company.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

796 F. Supp. 966

Dalton EDWARDS v. LOUISVILLE LADDER COMPANY, d/b/a Emerson Electric Company.

No. 89-1697-LC.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.

June 19, 1992.

William H. Goforth, Lafayette, La., for Dalton Edwards.

John E. McElligott, Jr. and Stacey L. Knight, Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott & Swift, Lafayette, La., for Louisville Ladder Co. d/b/a Emerson Elec. Co.

L. Paul Foreman, Lake Charles, La., for Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

Terry Thibodeaux, Carmouche Law Firm, Lake Charles, La., for Boeing Louisiana, Inc.

JUDGMENT

TRIMBLE, District Judge.

For the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein and after an independent review of the record and any objections filed therein, and having determined that the findings are correct under the applicable law;

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment on behalf of Boeing Louisiana, Inc. be and the same is hereby GRANTED dismissing the third-party complaint of Louisville Ladder Company with prejudice.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALONZO P. WILSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Now before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Boeing Louisiana, Inc. (Boeing). It has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Dalton Edwards has filed this suit alleging that a defective ladder caused him to fall while he was in the course and scope of his employment at Boeing. He further claims that Louisville Ladder Company (Louisville) bears responsibility for his injuries as the manufacturer of the ladder. Louisville has filed a third-party complaint against Boeing seeking to recover damages from Boeing including any amounts they might be found liable for to Mr. Edwards and the cost of defending Mr. Edward's suit.

The ladder involved in Mr. Edward's accident has apparently disappeared. Louisville has alleged that this disappearance was the result of Boeing either intentionally or negligently destroying or misplacing the ladder. Thus, Louisville is asserting a claim based on what commentators and other courts have referred to as negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence.

Boeing previously filed a motion for summary judgment on June 6, 1991. Neither party was able to cite any Louisiana law pertinent to the issue. In his memorandum ruling denying Boeing's first motion for summary judgment Judge Hunter stated: "summary judgment is not an appropriate mechanism for disposing of Louisville's third-party complaint at this time. This motion may be renewed at a later date." (See Judge Hunter's Memorandum Ruling dated August 9, 1991). Boeing filed the present motion for summary judgment on February 10, 1992. Considering the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Louisville and after careful consideration this court concludes that Louisville's claims have no legal merit.

The undersigned is aware of no Louisiana jurisprudence addressing claims for negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence. According, this court's responsibility is to determine, to the best of its ability, how Louisiana's Supreme Court would rule if the issue were before it. Ladue v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 920 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1991); reh. en banc den. 925 F.2d 1461 (5th Cir.1991).

When addressing delictual responsibility Louisiana law starts with the basic precept "that every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." La. Civ.Code art. 2315; LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 566 (La. 1990); 9 To 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228, 231 (La.1989); Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So.2d 1151, 1156 (La.1988). "The framers conceived of fault as a breach of a preexisting obligation for which the law orders reparation, when it causes damages to another, and they left it to the courts to determine in each case the existence of an anterior obligation which would make an act constitute fault." 9 To 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, supra at 231; Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, supra at 1156.

Thus, for torts based both in negligence and intent the court is required to make a determination of whether the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the type harm claimed. 9 To 5 Fashions v. Spurney, supra at 231; LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, supra at 566; Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, supra. These obligations or duties are "designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 60 (1956); LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, supra at 569; Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, supra at 1155; PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So.2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984). In determining the existence and scope of such obligations and duties policy considerations including the moral, social and economic values involved must be examined. Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, supra at 1156; PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging, supra at 10061; Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146 (La.1983). Additionally, Louisiana's Supreme Court wisely considers relevant decisions from other states as a valuable resource to be used when examining the policy implications involved in expanding areas of liability. LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, supra at 564; 9 To 5 Fashions v. Spurney, supra at 231; Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, supra at 1154. This court will begin with an examination of how other jurisdictions have addressed similar claims.

Despite the fact that the origins of a tort for spoliation of evidence trace back to at least 1973¹ no general consensus has developed as to the basis, essential elements, or even existence of such a tort. T. Fischer, Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering with Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 ALR 4th 984; J. Thompson, Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37 U.Kan.L.Rev. 563 (1989) (hereafter Thompson); L. Solum and S. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 Emory L.J. 1085 (1987).

The tort for intentional spoliation of evidence has its roots in a 1984 California Court of Appeal decision. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (2nd Dist.1984). The plaintiff had been injured when a wheel came off of a van and crashed into the plaintiff's vehicle. Abbott Ford had customized the offending van with "deep dish mag wheels." The van was towed to Abbott Ford for repairs. Abbott Ford agreed with the plaintiff's attorney to maintain parts of the vehicle for use as evidence. Thereafter, Abbott Ford lost or destroyed the parts making it impossible for plaintiff's expert to inspect and test the parts to pinpoint the cause of failure of the wheel assembly.

The plaintiff in Smith alleged that Abbott Ford had intentionally and maliciously disposed of the evidence which they had promised to maintain for the plaintiff. The damage claimed was "significant prejudice" of plaintiff's opportunity to obtain compensation for her injuries. The aspect of this claim that most troubled the court in Smith was the uncertainty of damages. It was noted that the case had not yet gone to trial and that it was possible that the plaintiff might prevail despite the loss of evidence. The court overcame this obstacle by analogizing the claim to one for intentional interference with a prospective business advantage concluding that a "prospective civil action in a product liability case is a valuable `probable expectancy' that the court must protect from the kind of interference alleged." 198 Cal.Rptr. at 837.

Alaska joined California in recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence in Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986). In Hazen the plaintiff was arrested for prostitution after an undercover officer taped a meeting with the plaintiff. Criminal charges were dropped and the plaintiff brought a civil suit for malicious prosecution and false arrest. At the time the criminal charges were dismissed the plaintiff's attorney's, anticipating the civil litigation, asked that the arrest tape be preserved. Later the tape became inaudible and plaintiff alleged that exculpatory material had been intentionally edited from the tape. Relying on the Smith case, the court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence.

In both Smith and Hazen it was claimed that the plaintiff dishonored a promise to the plaintiff to preserve the potential evidence. Later cases have indicated that such a promise is a necessary element. In fact, even the court that decided Smith has suggested that such is the case. Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 173 Cal.App.3d 557, 580-81, 218 Cal.Rptr. 913, 927 (2nd Dist.1985). Cf. County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App.3d 1232, 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1st Dist. 1989); review den. See also Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1987); Spano v. McAvoy, 589 F.Supp. 423 (N.D.N.Y.1984); Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate, 687 F.Supp. 475, 480-81 (N.D.Cal.1987); Coley v. Arnot Ogden Memorial Hosp., 107 A.D.2d 67, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1985).

Few jurisdictions have recognized the tort of intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. See Murphy v. Target Products, 580 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind.App.1991). But see Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 113, 597 A.2d 543, certif. den. 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 375 (1992) (willful concealment of evidence).

California recognized an action for negligent spoliation of evidence in Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Company, 169 Cal.App.3d 874, 215 Cal.Rptr. 504 (2nd Dist.1985). Relying on the Smith case the court analogized negligent spoliation with the tort of negligent interference with a prospective economic...