Edwards v. Mashego
| Decision Date | 13 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:18-cv-01954-RDP |
| Parties | BOBBI EDWARDS et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIM MASHEGO et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on Defendants Kim Mashego, Corrine Matt, and Yolanda Barnes's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 47) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. # 46). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. After careful review, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion (see Doc. # 47) is due to be granted.
This case involves a dispute surrounding a Dependency Petition filed by Defendants (who are each Shelby County Department of Human Resources ("SCDHR") employees), after receiving information about a potential child abuse case. Plaintiffs, Bobbi Edwards and Christopher Edwards (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), filed this action after their two children, K.E. and A.E., were removed from their home following an investigation by the SCDHR. Plaintiffs have sued each of the Defendants in their individual capacities. The facts set out in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint areaas follows:
On February 22, 2016, Alyssa Partridge ("Partridge"), an employee of the SCDHR, contacted Plaintiffs at their home to inquire about an allegation of child abuse and/or neglect upon A.E. (Doc. # 46 at ¶ 8). The report stated that the father (Christopher) had slapped A.E. "on the face and hit her in the head because he was upset with her." (Doc. # 47-1 at 2). At the time Partridge made contact with Plaintiffs, the father was arrested and charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. (Doc. # 46 at ¶ 8).
During that same interaction, on February 22, 2016, Partridge and Plaintiffs executed2 a "Safety Plan." This Safety Plan was an agreement between the SCDHR and Plaintiffs "with respect to certain terms and conditions regarding further activity and involvement" of both parties. (Id. ¶ 9). The Safety Plan mandated that K.E. and A.E. "would reside in the home with their mother [Bobbi] . . . and maternal grandmother," and the maternal grandmother would "supervise all contact." (Id.). The father "would not reside in the home with the children." (Id.). The Safety Plan further provided that the supervised contact between the mother and the children would continue until she completed a drug screen, and the father would be required to complete a substance abuse assessment. (Id.).
Plaintiffs further allege that on February 23, 2016 (the day after the Safety Plan was executed), Defendants, along with Partridge, held a "staffing meeting" and decided that the Safety Plan was not valid. (Id. ¶ 13). Defendants decided to file a Dependency Petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court ("SCJC") in order to remove K.E. and A.E. from the custody of Plaintiffs and place them into a foster home. (Id.). Defendants authorized Partridge to file this petition with the SCJC requesting an emergency pick-up order, "which would allow the children to be takeninto emergency protective custody and placed into a foster home." (Id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants did not notify them of their decision and failed to disclose material facts regarding that decision. (Id. ¶ 15). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made untrue, false, misleading, and fraudulent misrepresentations to the SCJC in the Dependency Petition. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiffs allege that such misrepresented statements include: (1) "The worker attempted a Safety Plan with the mother stating that Mr. Edwards [the father] could not reside in the home and that all contact between the children and their mother would be supervised by maternal grandmother;"3 (2) "Mrs. Edwards [the mother] was not agreeable in taking a drug screen and has not still screened;"4 (3) "It was found on 2/23/16 that she (Bobbi Edwards) [the mother] had allowed the children to stay at their grandmother's, Johnnie Gernaat's house;"5 (4) "Due to this, the agency has concerns that Ms. Edwards [the mother] is not protective;"6 and (5) "Mrs. Gernaat [the maternal grandmother] also violated the Safety Plan by allowing this to happen and has not been protective."7 (Doc. # 46 at ¶¶ 16(a)-(e)).
According to the Amended Complaint, based upon these misleading and fraudulent statements in the Dependency Petition, the SCJC entered the emergency pick-up order, and Defendants removed K.E. and A.E. from the custody of Plaintiffs and placed them into a temporaryfoster home. (Id. ¶ 17).
Subsequently, the cases involving K.E. and A.E. were litigated in the SCJC. (Id. ¶ 18). During the proceedings, K.E. and A.E. were placed in the temporary custody of their maternal grandmother. (Id. ¶ 18). On August 30, 2016, the SCJC Ordered the return of K.E. and A.E. to the custody of Plaintiffs. (Id.). On August 17, 2017, the SCJC dismissed the petitions filed by SCDHR. (Id.).
On October 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County. (Doc. # 1 at 10). On November 28, 2018, Defendants removed this case to this court. On January 7, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 46). Plaintiffs advance eight counts against Defendants in their individual capacities: (1) negligence and wantonness; (2) suppression of material fact; (3) negligent/wanton training and supervision (against Defendants Mashego and Matt); (4) outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) malicious prosecution; (6) abuse of process; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8) damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 7-24).
Defendants' Motion seeks dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). But, the court only addresses the standards of review that apply under Rule 12(b)(1) because it does not address Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), an attack on subject matter jurisdiction is either facial or factual. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks "require[ ] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Id. at 1259; Ex Parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Ala, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 349 (Ala. 2008) .
Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings." Id. at 1529. When the challenge is a factual attack, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Id. (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)); Ex Parte Safeway, 990 So. 2d at 350 () (quotation omitted).
Here, Defendants advance a factual attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 20 at 7). Both Plaintiffs and Defendants seek to rely on Partridge's Dependency Petition and the Safety Plan in an effort to further their arguments. Both documents are extrinsic evidence. Generally, a "district court . . . must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint." Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)). However, in Horsley v. Feldt, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).
Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of the Dependency Petition or the Safety Plan filed by Defendants, and it is obviously central to their claims. Accordingly, the court mayconsider and rely on this extrinsic evidence to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction does in fact exist.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by: qualified immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, state-agent immunity, and statutory immunity for child abuse removal. (Doc. # 47). Defendants also assert that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and fails to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). (Id.).
The court need not address every defense asserted by Defendants, nor must it address the merits of Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) because it concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim. Therefore, the federal claim against Defendants is due to be dismissed, and, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the state claims are due to be remanded to state court.
With respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. After careful review, the court agrees.
"The Supreme Court has stressed that qualified immunity represents an immunity from suit rather than a defense to liability, and that it should therefore be addressed in the earliest possible stage of a case." Tomberlin v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1223-24 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). "The doctrine of qualified...
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