Edwards v. Nat'l Vision Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-12876,D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-01449-WMA,13-12876 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
| Parties | ARETHA M. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL VISION INC., Defendant-Appellee, AMERICA'S BEST CONTACTS & EYEGLASSES, Defendant. |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of AlabamaBefore TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
I.
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Aretha Edwards against her former employer, National Vision, Inc. ("NVI").1 Her complaint, framed in seven counts, alleged the following. Count One, entitled "Race Discrimination and Harassment Claims" and brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleged that Edwards, who is black, was qualified to perform her job duties and for the promotion she sought, the Assistant Contact Lens Manager ("Assistant Manager") position, and that NVI denied the promotion, filling it with a less-qualified white person. Count One also alleged subjected her to a hostile work environment due to her race.
Count Two, entitled "Retaliation," brought under § 1981 and Title VII, alleged that NVI retaliated against her after she complained about promotion and hiring practices based on race and age.
Count Three, entitled "Negligent and Wanton, Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention" and brought under Alabama law, alleged that NVI knew aboutEdwards's complaints and failed to discipline the employees who were discriminating and retaliating against her.
Count Four, entitled "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" and brought under Alabama law, alleged that the NVI employees discriminatory and retaliatory conduct caused her emotional distress.
Count Five, entitled "Family and Medical Leave Act" ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a), alleged that NIV opposed her leave under the Act and then retaliated against her for taking leave.
Count Six, entitled "Invasion of Privacy and brought under Alabama law, alleged that NIV's employees' conduct invaded her privacy, and
Count Seven, entitled "Constructive Discharge" and brought under Alabama law, alleged that NIV's employees' conduct effectively caused the termination of her employment.
II.
Following extensive discovery, NIV filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, and the District Court granted the motion. Edwards appeals, arguing that the summary judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for trial because the district court (1) abused its discretion by concluding that statements made to her by her supervisor, Louise Moore, concerning a racial motive for promoting Victoria Alberson rather than her to the position of Assistant Manager,were inadmissible hearsay; (2) abused its discretion by striking Victoria Alberson's declaration; (3) erred by relying on NVI's argument that she could not establish that Alberson was equally or less-qualified for the Assistant Manager position, despite the fact that the District Manager indicated that she was not promoted because she did not apply for a promotion; (4) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her Title VII race discrimination claims for NVI's failure to promote her in December 2007 and February 2008 because she failed to timely file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); (5) erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her race discrimination claims, pursuant to U.S.C. § 1981, because she failed to file within the statute of limitations; (6) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her FMLA claim; (7) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her retaliation claim; (8) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her racial harassment claim; (9) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her state law claims of negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision, and claim of invasion of privacy.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence and factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2002). We can affirm a district court's decision on any adequate ground. Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d1198, 1203 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Cuddeback v. Florida Bd. Of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004) ().
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party meets its burden of production, demonstrating that no genuine issue of any material fact exists, and the non-moving party fails to present evidence showing that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). "[M]ere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). With these standards in hand, we address the arguments listed above by number.
(1) Statements made by Moore to Edwards concerning a racial motive for failing to promote Edwards
A district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Proctor v. Fluor Enter., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). As a general matter, the court should not consider inadmissible hearsay in passing on a motion for summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-25 (11th Cir. 1999). The court may consider a hearsay statement, though, if the statement could be "reduced to admissible evidence at trial." Id. at 1323. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing,offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). "Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." Fed. R. Evid. 805.
Under Rule 801(d)(2), admissions of a party opponent are admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). "[A] statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship [ ] is deemed an admission by a party opponent." Zaben v. Air Products & Chemical, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). "[S]tatements made by a supervisory official who plays some role in the decision making process are generally admissible." Zaben, 129 F.3d at 1456.
The statements in question here constitute hearsay within hearsay. Edwards offered statements in her deposition and declaration that were made by Moore. Moore's statements referred to unidentified third parties who said they wanted to hire someone white for the Assistant Manager position. These third-party statements were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. Because Moore's statement (based on what the third parties said) and the third parties' statement did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rules, the statements werenot admissible, and the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the statements as inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to this issue.
(2) Striking Victoria Alberson's declaration
We review a district court's ruling regarding discovery for abuse of discretion. Benson v. Tocco, 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), a party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) or who has responded to a request for admission must supplement or correct its disclosure in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure is incomplete, and if the additional information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). "If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
Edwards concedes that she did not produce Alberson's declaration and does not offer any explanation for her failure to produce it. The declaration was not harmless because it contained significant information that was relevant to whether NVI discriminated and retaliated against Edwards. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to strike the declaration and therefore affirm with respect to this issue.
(3) Reliance on NVI's Argument that Edwards cannot establish that Alberson was equally or less-qualified for the Assistant Manager position
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on the basis of that individual's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where a Title VII claim relies on circumstantial evidence, courts often apply the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Brooks v. Cnty. Comm'n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1162. In the failure-to-promote context, the prima facie case consists of showing the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3) that she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) that another equally or less- qualified employee outside her class was promoted. Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010).
Edwards misunderstands the nature of NVI's arguments on appeal and the requirements for establishing a prima facie case...
To continue reading
Request your trial