Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 August 1968
• Docket Number: No. 68-87.,68-87.
• Citation: 291 F. Supp. 199
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Earline EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORP., Defendant.

291 F. Supp. 199

Earline EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORP., Defendant.

No. 68-87.

United States District Court C. D. California.

August 9, 1968.

Monroe E. Price, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff.

Stephen E. Tallent, Los Angeles, Cal., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel, for defendant North American Rockwell Corp.

Russell Specter, Senior Atty. for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., as amicus curiae.

DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and ORDER FOR DISMISSAL

HAUK, District Judge.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against her employer, the defendant, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964¹ and seeking assignment to a job classification in accordance with skill and seniority, money damages, attorneys fees, costs, and injunctive relief as a result of alleged unlawful employment practices on the part of defendant.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1),² 12(b) (6)³ and 8(a)(2)⁴ of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction over subject matter of the Complaint and that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Defendant filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits in support of its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed Points and Authorities. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a Brief as amicus curiae.

The jurisdiction of this Court was asserted pursuant to Section 706(f) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).⁵

The facts as set forth in the Complaint, defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits thereto, defendant's Affidavits, plaintiff's Points and Authorities and as admitted by plaintiff in oral argument are now recited.

Plaintiff is an employee of defendant covered by a collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (hereinafter "UAW") which governs the wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment. During the summer of 1967, plaintiff was transferred from defendant's Downey facility to its Seal Beach facility. Thereafter, in early July of 1967, plaintiff was suspended for twenty-seven working hours pending an investigation of the suitability of the working conditions at the Seal Beach facility concerning which plaintiff had complained. Plaintiff filed a grievance under Article IX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as a result of said suspension.

On July 10, 1967, plaintiff filed a Charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") dated July 7, 1967 alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Charge specified on its face that the alleged discrimination was based upon race (a matter subject to initial mandatory utilization of the California Fair Employment Practice Commission machinery under Section 706(b) of the Act⁶) and sex; that plaintiff had filed the Charge in question with a state or local government agency (in this instance with the California Fair Employment Practice Commission); and that the alleged discrimination in question had been continuous from June through July 7, 1967. Plaintiff had not filed with the California Fair Employment Practice Commission (hereafter "Cal FEPC").

The Charge disclosed two basic material allegations. Plaintiff alleged that the company violated "Article XI, pg. 55" of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by transferring her from the Downey to the Seal Beach facility of the defendant's Space Division without giving her the option of taking a layoff rather than accepting the transfer. Plaintiff further alleged that she was suspended by the company. This suspension was allegedly discriminatory for a number of reasons: the entire Seal Beach facility was unsafe (ventilation, lighting, climbing devices and a "50 ton overhead risk"); one member of supervision implied a "criminal intent" and sought to intimidate and coerce her into working under unsafe working conditions; the company demonstrated an "unwillingness to accept women" by requiring women to perform climbing duties while permitting males to perform floor work; and the company violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement by suspending plaintiff while the suitability of the working conditions at the Seal Beach facility were being investigated.

On September 17, 1968, plaintiff was transferred back to the Downey facility, remaining in the same job classification which she had held throughout the entire period referred to in her Charge.

Plaintiff filed a grievance under Article IX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as a result of her suspension in July of 1967. The grievance was settled on the basis that plaintiff would receive full payment at her straight-time rate for the period she spent on suspension. Plaintiff did receive and cash the check representing the amount of the grievance settlement.

Plaintiff was notified on January 15, 1968 that more than 60 days had elapsed since the filing of her Charge. The EEOC at no time made a determination that reasonable cause existed to believe that plaintiff's Charge was true nor did it attempt conciliation. The present action was filed on January 19, 1968.

The Complaint filed by plaintiff in this Court alleged that on or about July 7, 1967 a cluster of events involving plaintiff's transfer, the assignment of dangerous work, supervisory harassment and other matters leading to plaintiff's suspension occurred solely because of plaintiff's race and sex. The Complaint went on to allege that events occurring after the filing of the Charge (and plaintiff's transfer back to the Downey facility) involving dangerous, medically unsound, unsuitable job sites and classifications and resultant physical damage to plaintiff's eyes and intestinal system intensified defendant's discriminatory conduct and flowed from the discriminatory acts of defendant.

Based upon these facts, defendant moved this Court, pursuant to Rules 12 (b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.⁷

The Court has examined the entire record which includes, among other things, plaintiff's Complaint, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits thereto and the Affidavits submitted by defendant, the Points and Authorities submitted by plaintiff, and the Brief submitted by the EEOC. The matter has been extensively argued by counsel, in writing and orally. The Court has reviewed all of this material and concludes that defendant is entitled to have its Motion to Dismiss sustained on five grounds and not sustained on one additional ground.

Now having heard the arguments and having examined all the filed documents and records herein, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court renders its Decision.

DECISION

This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Of The Allegations of Paragraphs V and VI of the Complaint Which Were Not Made the Subject of a Charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The Charge was purportedly filed with the EEOC on July 10, 1967. Plaintiff was transferred back to Department 071 at Downey facility on September 17, 1967. All of the allegations contained in Paragraphs V and VI of plaintiff's Complaint here in Court refer to alleged action of the company subsequent to plaintiff's transfer back to the Downey facility with the exception of the phrase "including the period of suspension" which is a repetition of the material appearing in Paragraph IV of the Complaint. The allegations contained in Paragraphs V and VI of the Complaint were not and could not have been included in plaintiff's Charge to the EEOC.

Section 706(a)⁸ and the EEOC's own Rules and Regulations,⁹ require that any charge filed with the EEOC set forth the facts upon which it is based. Any allegations in the Complaint referring to matters occurring after the filing of a charge must necessarily be considered as allegations concerning which no charge has been filed for purposes of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

The primary purpose in setting up the EEOC was to establish a method of eliminating unlawful employment practices, where actually found to exist, through conference, conciliation, and persuasion without the necessity of instituting civil actions. In Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390 U.S. 910, 88 S.Ct. 836, 19 L.Ed.2d 880 (1968), the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on February 15, 1966. The charge was referred to the Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations. This state agency dismissed the charges on May 23, 1966. On July 22, the EEOC was advised of the state agency's action and on August 8 the EEOC requested the plaintiff in a letter to contact them by telephone. Plaintiff failed to contact the EEOC and on July 21, 1967 filed suit in the District Court of Maryland. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's summary judgment, stating:

"Having reviewed the legislative history of the Act, as well as its language, we agree with the District Judge that the plaintiff could not by-pass the federal agency and apply directly to the courts for relief. Congress established comprehensive and detailed procedures to afford the EEOC the opportunity to attempt by administrative action to conciliate and mediate unlawful employment practices with a view to obtaining voluntary compliance. The plaintiff must therefore seek his administrative remedies before instituting court action against the alleged discriminator." 382 F.2d at 268.

To permit the commencement of a civil action based upon allegations other than those contained in the...