Edwards v. Oliver

• Decision Date: 19 April 2022
• Docket Number: 21-10366
• Citation: 31 F.4th 925
• Parties: Odell EDWARDS, individually and as the representative of The Estate of Jordan Edwards, deceased, Vidal Allen, and Kevon Edwards, Plaintiff—Appellee, Shaunkeyia Keyon Stephens; Rhonda Washington; Maxwell Everette; Maximus Everette, Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. Roy OLIVER, Defendant/Intervenor Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

31 F.4th 925

Odell EDWARDS, individually and as the representative of The Estate of Jordan Edwards, deceased, Vidal Allen, and Kevon Edwards, Plaintiff—Appellee,

Shaunkeyia Keyon Stephens; Rhonda Washington; Maxwell Everette; Maximus Everette, Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees,

v.Roy OLIVER, Defendant/Intervenor Defendant—Appellant.

No. 21-10366

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED April 19, 2022

Timberly Jamal Davis, Timberly J. Davis Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, Reginald Edmund McKamie, Sr., Law Offices of Reginald E. McKamie, Sr., Houston, TX, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee Shaunkeyia Keyon Stephens.

Luke F. Bickham, Luke Bickham, P.C., Dallas, TX, Michael Anthony Smith, Dallas, TX, for Intervenors Plaintiffs-Appellees Rhonda Washington, Maxwell Everette, and Maximus Everette.

Thad D. Spalding, Esq., Durham, Pittard & Spalding, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Daryl Kevin Washington, Esq., Attorney, Law Offices of Daryl K. Washington, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William Wayne Krueger, III, Esq., James Christopher Bearden, Law Office Of William W. Krueger, III, P.C., Richardson, TX, for Defendant/Intervenor Defendant-Appellant.

Before King, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

King, Circuit Judge:

Jordan Edwards, a fifteen-year-old boy, was shot and killed while leaving a house party by then-Officer Roy Oliver, who had responded to a 911 call about possible underage drinking. Edwards's family and friends sued Oliver and the City of Balch Springs alleging excessive force, and later Oliver was separately convicted of murder. Oliver's summary judgment motion asserted his entitlement to qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion. We DISMISS Oliver's interlocutory appeal of the order denying qualified immunity for lack of jurisdiction and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 29, 2017, fifteen-year-old Jordan Edwards attended a party at a house in Balch Springs, Texas (east of Dallas) with his two brothers and two friends. The house is situated on the south side of Baron Drive, a residential road that runs east-west and originates on the east end in a "T" intersection with Shepherd Lane.

At around 11 p.m., Balch Springs Police Department officers Roy Oliver and Tyler Gross arrived at the house in response to a 911 call about possible underage drinking. The partygoers dispersed, and the boys returned to their car parked on Baron Drive near the "T" intersection with Shepherd Lane. Jordan Edwards's brother, Vidal Allen, got in the driver's seat, and Jordan got in the front passenger seat, with the three other boys in the back seat.

While the officers were in the house talking with the party host, gunfire erupted from a parking lot on the east side of Shepherd Lane. Officer Gross exited the house and immediately walked east. Officer Oliver also exited the house but walked to his squad car to retrieve his semi-automatic rifle before beginning to walk east.

While Vidal drove his car slowly, in reverse, on Baron Drive toward Shepherd Lane, Officer Gross, approaching on foot, yelled at the car to stop. Officer Oliver continued to walk east along Baron Drive from his squad car, and eventually started jogging toward the intersection where Officer Gross was.

Once Vidal got into the intersection, he put the car in drive and proceeded southbound on Shepherd Lane. It is at this critical point—when Vidal started driving forward on Shepherd Lane rather than in reverse—where the parties dispute what happened.¹ Officer Oliver argues that Vidal accelerated toward Officer Gross, whereas the plaintiffs-appellees claim that the vehicle was not close to Officer Gross when it proceeded forward and that Officer Gross was never in the path of the vehicle.

When Officer Oliver arrived at the intersection, the car was accelerating past Officer Gross,² and Oliver fired five shots at the car's passenger side as it headed southbound on Shepherd Lane, away from the officers in the "T" intersection.

One bullet struck Jordan in the head, killing him. Three days after the incident, on May 2, 2017, the Balch Springs Police Department terminated Oliver's employment. Then, on May 5, 2017, Jordan's father, Odell Edwards, and his two (now adult) brothers, Vidal Allen and Kevon Edwards, filed complaints against the City of Balch Springs and Oliver, alleging, among other things, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the use of excessive force contrary to the Fourth Amendment.³

While the civil suit was pending, on August 28, 2018, a jury found Oliver guilty of murder. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed Oliver's conviction. Oliver v. State , No. 05-18-01057-CR, 2020 WL 4581644, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2020, pet. granted).⁴ Oliver was sentenced to fifteen-years imprisonment.

Then, in September 2020, Oliver moved for summary judgment in the civil suit on the basis of qualified immunity. The magistrate judge denied the summary judgment motion, concluding that "a reasonable jury could conclude the car full of teenagers presented no immediate threat to the officers' safety, making Oliver's use of deadly force unreasonable." The district court issued an order accepting the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation and denying Oliver's motion for summary judgment. Oliver appeals this decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"District court orders denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are ... reviewed de novo. " Kokesh v. Curlee , 14 F.4th 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2021). Cases like this one "involve[ ] multiple legal standards, corresponding to qualified immunity, summary judgment, ... and the Fourth Amendment." Joseph v. Bartlett , 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020). And the "intersection of these standards gets tricky," especially how "[q]ualified immunity changes the nature of the summary-judgment burden, how and when the burden shifts, and what it takes to satisfy the burden." Id. at 328–29.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In other words, summary judgment is appropriate when "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In qualified immunity cases, "[t]he plaintiff must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury could return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief." Joseph , 981 F.3d at 330. "But, to overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff's version of those disputed facts must also constitute a violation of clearly established law." Id.

Complicating our task further, "[w]hen a defendant invokes qualified immunity," and the district court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment, "it affects our jurisdiction in two ways—‘we review earlier than we otherwise would, and we review less than we otherwise would.’ " Kokesh , 14 F.4th at 391 (quoting Joseph , 981 F.3d at 330 ). First, we allow an interlocutory appeal "even though denials of summary judgment are not generally final, appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Id. (citations omitted); see Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty. , 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the collateral order doctrine). Second, "the district court's finding that a genuine factual dispute exists is a factual determination that this court is prohibited from reviewing in this interlocutory appeal." Kokesh , 14 F.4th at 390 (quoting Good v. Curtis , 601 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2010) ). Thus, "in reviewing the denial of qualified immunity, we accept the district court's determination that there are genuine fact disputes." Id. at 391 (citation omitted); see Melton v. Phillips , 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) ("[W]e lack jurisdiction to review the genuineness of a fact issue but have jurisdiction insofar as the interlocutory appeal challenges the materiality of [the] factual issues." (quoting Allen v. Cisneros , 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) )). Instead we ask only "whether the factual disputes that the district court identified are material to the application of qualified immunity." Samples v. Vadzemnieks , 900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018).

Accordingly, to avoid an improper review of the genuineness of this case's facts, we consider only whether the district court correctly assessed the legal significance—that is, the materiality—of the disputed facts in plaintiffs-appellees' Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

III. MATERIAL FACT DISPUTE

"To determine whether a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable, this Court looks at the legal argument advanced." Reyes v. City of Richmond , 287 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2002). "An officer challenges materiality when he contends that ‘taking all the plaintiff's factual allegations as true no violation of a clearly established right was shown.’ " Id. at 351 (quoting Cantu v. Rocha , 77 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1996) ).

On appeal Oliver argues that the facts at the moment of the threat are undisputed and urges this court to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the issue of materiality. "[D]espite giving lip service to the correct legal standard, [Oliver's] argument does not take the facts in a light most favorable to the [p]laintiffs. In fact, significant portions of his argument assume facts different from those assumed by the [m]agistrate [judge]." Id.

For example, Oliver invites us to consider the fact that Oliver "heard the window shatter right next to Gross," which may have "sounded like a gunshot," making it "reasonable to think it was a gunshot." Although the magistrate judge acknowledges the fact that the officers heard gunfire while they were in the house, nowhere in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation does the magistrate judge credit Oliver's factual...