Edwards v. Ollison
| Decision Date | 08 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 06-5084-SJO (PLA).,CV 06-5084-SJO (PLA). |
| Citation | 621 F.Supp.2d 863 |
| Parties | Richard Leigh EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. Derrick L. OLLISON, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Richard Leigh Edwards, Blythe, CA, pro se.
Alene M. Games, CAAG-Office of Attorney General of California, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the entire file de novo, including the magistrate judge's final report and recommendation filed herein and petitioner's objections and supplemental objections. The Court agrees with the recommendations of the magistrate judge.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:
1. The final report and recommendation is adopted.
2. Judgment shall be entered consistent with this order.
3. The clerk shall serve this order and the judgment on all counsel or parties of record.
The Court submits this Final Report and Recommendation to the Honorable S. James Otero, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636 and General Order 194 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed with prejudice.
Following a bench trial in the Santa Barbara County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of possession of methamphetamine (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)). The trial court also found that petitioner suffered four prior "strike" convictions for robbery, and that he had served five prior prison terms.2 (Lodgment No. 3 at 1, 3). Petitioner received a sentence of thirty years to life in state prison. (Lodgment No. 1; Lodgment No. 3 at 1).
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. (See Lodgment No. 3). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review, which the California Supreme Court denied on May 12, 2004, 2004 WL 396887. (See Lodgment Nos. 4, 5).
Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Santa Barbara County Superior Court, which was rejected on February 17, 2005. (See Lodgment Nos. 6, 7). Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on June 1, 2005. (Lodgment Nos. 8, 9). Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on June 28, 2006. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 11).
On August 14, 2006, petitioner filed the instant Petition. Respondent filed an Answer and Return on January 30, 2007. Petitioner filed a Traverse on April 3, 2007.
This matter has been taken under submission, and is now ready for decision.
As petitioner is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the Court adopts the statement of facts contained in the California Court of Appeal's opinion affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction.
At trial, Santa Barbara Police Department Officer Matthew Barrall testified that on December 22, 2001, he was dispatched to a check cashing business on State Street in Santa Barbara. He met Sergeant Fryslie outside the location and they both went inside and contacted [petitioner]. Officer Barrall informed [petitioner] they were there "concerning the check that he was attempting to cash."
After asking [petitioner] for identification, Officer Barrall obtained [petitioner's] driver's license, ran it through dispatch, and learned that [petitioner] was on parole and had a no-bail parole warrant. Officer Barrall asked [petitioner] if he had any weapons on him and [petitioner] replied that he had a large folding knife. The officer retrieved the knife and asked [petitioner] if he had any other weapons on his person. [Petitioner] said he did not and he gave the officer permission to pat him down for weapons and to look inside his pockets. Officer Barrall retrieved a wallet from [petitioner's] pocket and, in his right front coin pocket, found a small vial that appeared to contain crystal methamphetamine. The officer asked [petitioner] what it was. [Petitioner] said it was "cut" and claimed it was "a legal energy booster that he bought from a head shop in Ventura." Officer Barrall arrested [petitioner]. Later, at the station, [petitioner] admitted he had used drugs. Susan Silvia, a criminalist employed by the California Department of Justice, examined the contents of the vial and determined it contained 0.88 grams of methamphetamine.
1. Petitioner's sentence of thirty years to life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Petition at 1-21).
2. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to argue that California's Three Strikes law denied petitioner equal protection. (Petition at 23-38).
3. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to argue that the use of petitioner's prior convictions to increase his sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Petition at 39-47).
4. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to argue that the use of petitioner's prior convictions to increase his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Petition at 48-56).
5. The cumulative errors of appellate counsel violated petitioner's constitutional rights. (Petition at 57-59).
6. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to file a Motion for Deferred Entry of Judgment under California Penal Code § 1000(a). (Petition at 60-75).
7. California Penal Code § 1000(a) violates the Equal Protection Clause. (Petition at 76-84).
8. The sentencing court abused its discretion in failing to strike the prior convictions. (Petition at 85-95).
The Petition was filed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("the AEDPA"). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Therefore, the Court applies the AEDPA in its review of this action. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As explained by the Supreme Court, section 2254(d)(1) "places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In Williams, the Court held that:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing Williams). A federal court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry asks "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Weighall, 215 F.3d at 1062. The Court explained that Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; accord: Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Section 2254(d)(1) imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, and "demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam). A federal court may not "substitut[e] its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Id.; Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 366, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam) ().
The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under the AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law (Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999)), only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968, 124...
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...this Court is not permitted to review the state court's refusal to exercise its discretion under state law. See Edwards v. Ollison, 621 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("[P]etitioner's claim that the trial court improperly denied his request to strike the prior convictions is not subj......