Edwards v. Roper

• Decision Date: 19 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1092.,11–1092.
• Citation: 688 F.3d 449
• Parties: Kimber EDWARDS, Petitioner–Appellant v. Donald ROPER, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

688 F.3d 449

Kimber EDWARDS, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Donald ROPER, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 11–1092.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 10, 2012.

Filed: Aug. 20, 2012.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 19, 2012.^*

Kent E. Gipson, argued, Jeremy Sean Weis, on the brief, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Andrew W. Hassel, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, BYE, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Kimber Edwards was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in a Missouri trial court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Edwards (Edwards I), 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo.2003), and later affirmed the denial of Edwards's motion for postconviction relief. Edwards v. State (Edwards II), 200 S.W.3d 500 (Mo.2006). Edwards filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising thirteen grounds for relief. The district court ¹ denied the petition, but granted a certificate of appealability on two of Edwards's claims. Edwards appeals the denial of habeas relief on these two grounds, as well as the district court's denial of his motion for funds to conduct a mental examination. We affirm.

I.

Edwards was prosecuted for first-degree murder in the murder-for-hire killing of his ex-wife, Kimberly Cantrell. Edwards and Cantrell divorced in 1990. Between March 1999 and March 2000, Edwards failed to pay child support for the couple's daughter, and he was indicted for felony nonsupport. Days before a court appearance in the nonsupport case, family members found Cantrell's dead body. She had been shot twice in the head.

Cantrell's neighbor, Christopher Harrington, told police that he saw a man with a black backpack knocking on Cantrell's door on the day before her body was discovered. Harrington later identified the man as Orthel Wilson, a tenant in one of Edwards's rental properties. In Wilson's apartment, officers found a backpack matching the one described by Harrington. Wilson was charged with first-degree murder, and he implicated Edwards in the crime. Wilson took police to a vacant building where he had hidden the murder weapon, and officers found a gun and ammunition.

Police interviewed Edwards, who confessed that he had agreed to pay an individualnamed “Michael” $1,600 to kill Cantrell. Edwards denied that “Michael” was actually Wilson, but stated that “Michael” may have involved Wilson in the crime. The State charged Edwards with first-degree murder.

During jury selection at Edwards's trial, the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against the three remaining black members of the venire: Ector Robinson, Laverne Evans, and Ronald Burton. Edwards, who is black, objected to the strikes based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor responded by offering race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The trial court overruled Edwards's objections.

In the guilt phase of his trial, Edwards testified that he had no involvement in Cantrell's death and that his confessions to the contrary were false. The jury found Edwards guilty of first-degree murder.

Edwards chose not to testify again in the penalty phase of his trial, and he requested that the trial court give the jury a “no-adverse-inference” instruction. The court denied the request. In the penalty phase, the prosecution offered the testimony of Cantrell's sister and brother regarding the impact of Cantrell's death on her family. Edwards offered testimony from nine family members, friends, and coworkers, who testified regarding Edwards's character and childhood and asked for mercy.

The jury found one statutory aggravating circumstance—that Edwards had hired Wilson and/or “Michael” to murder Cantrell—and recommended a sentence of death. The court sentenced Edwards to death.

On direct appeal, Edwards argued that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenges with respect to prospective jurors Evans and Burton. He also argued that the court erred in denying his request for a no-adverse-inference instruction and that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify in the penalty phase. The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected Edwards's claims and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Edwards I, 116 S.W.3d at 550.

In 2007, Edwards filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Edwards alleged that the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against Evans and Burton based on their race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged that the trial court's failure to give a no-adverse-inference instruction and the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. The district court denied relief, but granted Edwards a certificate of appealability on these claims.

II.

We review petitions for writ of habeas corpus under the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Because Edwards's claims were “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” he is entitled to relief only if he shows that the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2).

III.

“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712.Batson established a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.

Miller–El v. Cockrell (Miller–El I), 537 U.S. 322, 328–29, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citations omitted).

A claim that the state courts misapplied the Batson framework is a legal question subject to the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(1). Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir.2011). A contention that the state courts unreasonably determined that the prosecutor's strikes were not motivated by race is a factual determination subject to the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2). Id. “AEDPA further mandates that a state court's factual determinations ‘shall be presumed to be correct,’ and that the petitioner has ‘the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

A.

We first consider Edwards's claims regarding the peremptory strike of Evans. Edwards contends that the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri rejecting a challenge to the strike of Evans was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and that it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Batson and related decisions of the Supreme Court.

In response to Edwards's Batson objection, the prosecutor explained that he struck Evans because she believed that her niece was a “victim of the system” and had been treated unfairly by the police. Based on Evans's responses during voir dire, the prosecutor stated his belief that Evans had “some distrust of courts and prosecutors.” Defense counsel responded by noting the prosecution's failure to strike a white juror, Kristin Tincu, who stated during voir dire that her nephew was in prison for burglary. The prosecutor countered by arguing that Tincu did not believe her nephew had been persecuted by the police, but rather thought “the system was too lenient” on the defendant in a manslaughter case in which Tincu was a witness. The trial court agreed and overruled Edwards's Batson objection. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting the Batson challenge. Edwards I, 116 S.W.3d at 525.

Edwards contends that the state court's decision is contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of Batson, because it rests on an “implicit finding” that a Batson objection fails unless an allegedly similarly situated white juror is “exactly identical” to the stricken juror. He also argues that the state supreme court's determination that Evans and Tincu were not similarly situated was an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Striking a black panelist for reasons that apply “just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve” is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. Miller–El v. Dretke (Miller–El II), 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). The state supreme court recognized that a “key factor to be considered in determining pretext is the existence of similarly situated white jurors who were not struck.” Edwards I, 116 S.W.3d at 525 (internal quotation and alterations omitted). Edwards argues, however, that the state court's standard for similarity was too rigorous. He relies on the Supreme Court's statement in Miller–El II that a “ per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.” 545 U.S. at 247 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Because Miller–El II had not been decided at the time of Edwards's trial and appeal, his contention that the Supreme Court of Missouri unreasonably applied federal law “as determined by the Supreme Court of the...