Edwards v. . Same, s. 8626-8629.
| Citation | 42 A.2d 442 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 1945 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 8626-8629.,s. 8626-8629. |
| Parties | EDWARDS v. JOHNSON (two cases). SAME v. WALKER (two cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Walter Curry, Judge.
Four actions of the case for negligence by David W. Edwards and Emily C. Edwards, respectively, against Helen C. Johnson, and by the same plaintiffs against Charles R. Walker, for injuries sustained in a collision between automobiles driven by plaintiff Emily C. Edwards and defendant Walker. Defendants' motions for nonsuits were granted, and plaintiffs bring exceptions.
Exceptions overruled and cases remitted for entry of judgments on the nonsuits.
Joseph H. Coen and Carroll & Dwyer, all of Providence, for plaintiffs.
Sherwood & Clifford, Sidney Clifford, and Raymond E. Jordan, all of Providence, for defendants.
These four actions of the case for negligence, arising out of a collision between two automobiles, were tried together before a jury in the superior court and resulted in a nonsuit of the plaintiff in each case. They are here on the plaintiffs' bills of exceptions to such decisions. For convenience we shall discuss only the case of Emily C. Edwards v. Charles R. Walker, since these parties were the operators respectively of the automobiles involved in the collision. These automobiles will be referred to as the plaintiff's car and the defendant's car.
The evidence discloses the following facts. The accident, which gives rise to the controversy, happened July 5, 1940 about 5 o'clock in the afternoon at or near the intersection of Babcock and Cactus streets, two public highways in the city of Providence. Babcock street runs generally from east to west and is about wide enough between curbs to accommodate three automobiles abreast of each other. Cactus street runs generally from north to south and is about three feet wider than Babcock street. For some distance both streets are straight and completely intersect each other. At the southwest corner, within the adjoining property line, a large tree and wild shrubbery were growing; but the latter, being about five feet high, had also grown in and over the sidewalk toward the curb, thus blocking the view at that corner to the south along Cactus street.
It was raining very hard and the plaintiff was driving her car easterly on Babcock street with its left wheels close to the center line thereof, as she approached the intersection at Cactus street. Plaintiff had driven through there frequently and was thoroughly familiar with the location. She knew that the tree and shrubbery at the southwest corner would completely block her view to the south along Cactus street and that it was a dangerous intersection. Therefore, according to her testimony, as she approached the intersection she slowed down from 20 to 12 miles per hour, blew the horn and shifted to a lower speed. When she came to a place where she could see to the south along Cactus street, that is, to her right, the front of her car had reached the corner just at or in the intersection. She then, for the first time, could and did see defendant's car approaching from the south on Cactus street and about two car lengths, 25 or 30 feet, from the intersection. It was coming rapidly, about twice as fast as her car was moving, and was on its own right of the center line of Cactus street, similar to her car's position on Babcock street.
Plaintiff had intended to go straight through the intersection to the east, but when she saw the defendant's car she attempted to get away from it and to avoid the impending collision by applying her brakes and turning to her left or northerly into Cactus street. The brakes, she testified, were in perfect condition. The cars actually came together in Cactus street to the north of the intersection. The plaintiff's car stopped on an angle, heading northeasterly, with its front near the easterly curb of Cactus street and against or close to the left side of the defendant's car. The latter was headed northerly but had mounted the curb and stopped with its front against a tree which was on the sidewalk near the easterly curb of Cactus street and about 15 feet north of the northerly line of the intersection.
A resident of the house at the corner where the cars had stopped heard the crash but did not see the accident. She testified as to the location of the cars immediately thereafter and verified the testimony in that regard of a police officer who arrived at the scene within some seven or eight minutes. Other than plaintiff and defendant, the only witness to the accident who appeared and testified was a passenger in the plaintiff's car, and she substantially corroborated the plaintiff's testimony in connection with the accident, including her knowledge of the existing conditions and the obstructed view at the southwest corner.
The plaintiff contends that the...
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Krall v. M. A. Gammino Const. Co., 10569
...58 R.I. 451, 193 A. 622, was applicable. The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in not doing so and cites Edwards v. Johnson, 71 R.I. 67, 42 A.2d 442, in further support of its contention. Neither that case nor Dembicer is in point. Each involved a collision at the intersection......
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...his right around the obstruction at the southwest corner. Such a view is unreasonable. The defendant strongly relies upon Edwards v. Johnson, 71 R.I. 67, 42 A.2d 442, arguing that the situation which confronted plaintiff in the instant case was 'quite analogous' to the one in that case. The......
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Robbio v. Hart., 8739.
...of this position he strongly relies on Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish Co., Inc., 58 R.I. 451, 193 A. 622, and Edwards v. Walker, R.I., 42 A.2d 442. Our decisions sustaining a direction of verdict on the Dembicer case and a non-suit in the Edwards case are not controlling in......