Edwards v. Sotomayor

• Decision Date: 27 January 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 79-1191CC.
• Citation: 557 F. Supp. 209
• Parties: Harry Garcia EDWARDS and his wife Mireya Garcia Edwards, Joseph J. Corcoran and his wife Turkan Corcoran and United States Security Services Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. Gene Robles SOTOMAYOR, Ramon Orisini Zayas, Jose Maldonado Trinidad and Reinaldo Vazquez Ortega, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

557 F. Supp. 209

Harry Garcia EDWARDS and his wife Mireya Garcia Edwards, Joseph J. Corcoran and his wife Turkan Corcoran and United States Security Services Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. Gene Robles SOTOMAYOR, Ramon Orisini Zayas, Jose Maldonado Trinidad and Reinaldo Vazquez Ortega, Defendants.

Civ. No. 79-1191CC.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 27, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Patrick Cavanaugh, and Gustavo Vázquez-Mares, Hato Rey, P.R., for plaintiffs.

Esteban J. Núñez-Hoyo, Federal Litigation Div., Dept. of Justice, Com. of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CEREZO, District Judge.

This is an action for declaratory and monetary relief based on an arrest, search, seizure, and subsequent criminal prosecution which plaintiffs claim violated their constitutional rights. Jurisdiction is premised on determination of the federal constitutional rights underlying the claim, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, as enforced by the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Dismissal has been requested by defendants¹ on the ground that the action is time barred. The motions for and in opposition to dismissal, the accompanying memoranda and exhibits, the oral argument offered and the documentary evidence on record reveal the following:

On June 2, 1975 defendants Gene Robles Sotomayor (Robles), Ramón Orisini Zayas, José Maldonado Trinidad and Reinaldo Vázquez Ortega, without order or warrant, entered and searched the premises of plaintiff United States Security Services Corporation (Security) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The last three defendants mentioned were at that time law enforcement agents of the Special Investigations Division, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, while Robles was a former employee of Security. The warrantless search resulted in the seizure of fourteen .38 caliber handguns which were contained in a closed box inside a closet in one of the rooms. Orders of arrest were issued against plaintiffs Harry García Edwards (García) and Joseph Corcoran (Corcoran), president and vice-president of Security. Criminal charges contained in fourteen counts were filed against them on June 26, 1975 in the courts of Puerto Rico for violation of Article 7 of the Weapons Law, P.R. Laws Ann., Tit. 25 Sec. 417 and on June 11, 1975 in this Court for violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(e). The federal charges against García were eventually dismissed,² but the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, found both García and Corcoran guilty. They were sentenced on June 17, 1976 to a concurrent six month suspended sentence on each count and later filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico which hinged on their previously rejected suppression argument. This argument was based on their version of the facts which are summarized as follows:³

Security was a corporation duly authorized by the Puerto Rico Police Department to provide private security services which sometimes required the use of armed guards. It had been hired by a government agency to provide fourteen armed guards. To this end, García and Corcoran placed an order for fourteen handguns with a company in the United States that usually supplied firearms to their parent corporation in Baltimore. Unfamiliar with the legal procedures involved to obtain authorization of entry of the guns, they visited Police Headquarters together with defendant Robles who at that time was an employee of Security and who would help translating since García and Corcoran spoke no Spanish. They met with Lieutenant Estéfano Vázquez who informed that they had to formally notify the Police Department in writing of the shipment. Following these instructions, they sent a letter to the technical division of the Hato Rey Police Headquarters indicating the serial numbers of the guns that were to be shipped to Puerto Rico and requesting guidance as to how to register them once the shipment arrived. Since the letter was never answered, they assumed all was in order and proceeded with the shipment. The guns were packed in a box labelled "auto parts" as was customarily done with firearm shipments in order to curtail the curiosity of potential gun thieves. When the shipment was being retrieved, they told the officers from the Puerto Rico Treasury Department that the box contained auto parts. The box was then taken to the premises of Security and placed in a closet where it remained until found by the police during the search. The police arrived at Security's offices based on a sworn statement made by Robles indicating that there were unregistered firearms on the premises. Robles who had previously resigned from Security due to differences with García and Corcoran decided to initiate criminal proceedings against them. The agents, allegedly acting in concert with Robles, arrived at Security and met with William A. Alcover, Personnel Director of the company. They told him that they had received confidential information as to illegal guns in Security's premises and asked permission to search the offices. Mr. Alcover consented to the search stating that as far as he knew there were no illegal weapons in the place. When the police agents found the box and requested permission to open it, Alcover again consented. The guns were seized and criminal charges leading to plaintiffs' conviction were filed.

On September 19, 1977 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed the conviction and acquitted García and Corcoran holding that the Superior Court should have granted the motion to suppress since the search was conducted in violation of the Constitution of Puerto Rico.⁴ This complaint followed almost a year later — September 13, 1978. An identical complaint filed simultaneously in the federal court for the District of Maryland was later transferred to this District for lack of venue and consolidated with this action. The pleadings essentially state the same factual setting supporting the argument for suppression raised in the state criminal proceedings which has been outlined. Plaintiffs have added a conspiracy claim between Robles and the law enforcement agents based on their agreement to conduct the search, seize the weapons and to institute criminal proceedings against them⁵ as well as a damage claim. The complaint is framed as a civil rights action seeking redress under 42 U.S.C., Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. The constitutional rights allegedly violated stem from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Defendants urge that the civil rights claim is based on the illegal search and seizure and that, since federal law determines when an action based on a federal right accrues, this action accrued when the search and subsequent seizure took place for since then plaintiffs could note and charge the violation of their federal rights. Since the most analogous state statute of limitations is one year, they argue that the constitutional claim should have been brought on or before June 1976. Plaintiffs characterize their civil rights action as one analogous to a local tort action for illegal entry and search. Under this theory and according to local law,⁶ this type of action does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have concluded and the search has been determined to be illegal. Since the criminal proceedings in this case ended with the Supreme Court's reversal on September 19, 1978, they contend that they had one year after this decision to file their action.

The parties puzzling limitation of the claim as one for illegal arrest and search requires that we examine the allegations to define the elements of the constitutional claims in issue. This complaint is essentially a claim of redress of damages caused by an allegedly wrongful use of the state's prosecutorial machinery by state officials and by a private party to deprive plaintiffs of their federal constitutional rights. Scrutinizing the complaint in search of local actions analogous to the constitutional claim reveals that the pleadings encompass not only the local torts of illegal search and arrest but also an action akin to that of malicious prosecution. Although the Commonwealth defendants deny the presence of a malicious prosecution claim, they have failed to substantiate this bare denial in a way which would justify disregarding the veracity of plaintiffs' pleadings at this stage of the proceedings. See: Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Regardless of which analogous local tort may be used to baptize plaintiffs' constitutional claims, federal law requires that we carve its epitaph under the statute of limitations.

The time period during which a civil rights action must be brought is determined by the forum's state statute of limitations for the most analogous type of action. Board of Regents, etc., v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). In Puerto Rico, this court and our circuit have held that the applicable statute of limitations for these types of actions is the one year period provided by P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 31 Sec. 5298(2) for bringing ex delicto actions under P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 31 Sec. 5141. Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir.1982); Ramírez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.1978); Graffals González v. García Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir.1977). See also: Olmo v. Young and Rubican of Puerto Rico, Inc., ___ PRR ___, decided on March 10, 1981, 81 JTS 22. In Board of Regents, etc., v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980) the Supreme Court indicated that in civil rights cases federal courts must also look to the laws of the state where they are sitting to determine the applicable tolling provisions and apply them, if not inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration. In the present case, none of the parties dispute these...