Edwards v. Stark

Decision Date17 November 2022
Docket Number21-0589
PartiesCHAD EDWARDS AND MATTHEW MAXWELL, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. RHONDA STARK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E. STARK, Plaintiff Below, Respondent.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Submitted: September 14, 2022.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Harrison County The Honorable James A. Matish Case No. 20-C-267-3.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Frank E. Simmerman, Jr., Esq. Chad L. Taylor, Esq. Frank E Simmerman, III, Esq. SIMMERMAN LAW OFFICE, PLLC Clarksburg West Virginia Petitioners' Counsel.

Douglas R. Miley, Esq. Timothy R. Miley, Esq. THE MILEY LEGAL GROUP, PLLC Clarksburg, West Virginia Respondent's Counsel.

SYLLABUS

1. "'The trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)." Syllabus Point 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W.Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977).

2. "[West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a (1949)] extends the employer's immunity from liability set forth in [West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 (2022)] to the employer's officer, manager, agent, representative or employee when he is acting in furtherance of the employer's business and does not inflict an injury with deliberate intention." Syllabus Point 4, Henderson v. Meredith Lumber Co., 190 W.Va. 292, 438 S.E.2d 324 (1993).

3. "To properly plead a prima facie case under [West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A)], the statute requires an employee set out deliberate intention allegations. Under the statute, deliberate intention allegations may only be satisfied where it is alleged an employer acted with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury." Syllabus Point 9, Tolliver v. Kroger Co., 201 W.Va. 509, 498 S.E.2d 702 (1997).

OPINION

WALKER, Justice:

After Rhonda Stark's husband died in a workplace accident in 2019, she received workers' compensation dependent's benefits based on Mr. Stark's employment with the City of Shinnston. She then sued two of Mr. Stark's supervisors - Petitioners Chad Edwards and Matthew Maxwell - claiming that they are liable for his death based on theories of deliberate intent under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A) (2015) and the tort of intentional and reckless conduct. Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them on the grounds of workers' compensation immunity and immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act,[1] but the lower court found that they could be held personally liable and denied the motion.

On appeal, we find that workers' compensation immunity insulates Petitioners from liability for claims other than for heightened deliberate intent under § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A). But in this case, Mrs. Stark fails to state a heightened deliberate intent claim because under no set of facts consistent with her allegations can she prove the elements of a claim under § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A). So, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand this case with instructions to enter an order granting Petitioners' motion to dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Robert Stark died on June 14, 2019, while digging a trench during his course of business as a City Public Works and Utilities Division employee for the City of Shinnston, West Virginia. Petitioner Matthew Maxwell was Public Works Supervisor for the City and supervised Mr. Stark. Petitioner Chad Edwards was City Manager and supervised Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Stark. Sometime around August 2018, the City had started planning for a storm-drain installation project along Van Rufus Drive.

Mrs. Stark alleges that while the City planned the project, some of its employees told their supervisors that it exceeded their capabilities because unstable soil surrounded the area, the project required a deep trench, the City's equipment was unsuitable, and the City failed to properly train them. The City considered contracting the job to a more capable third-party but refused all quotes. Petitioners chose to execute the project using City equipment and employees, including Mr. Stark. But Mrs. Stark contends that neither the City nor Petitioners ever possessed proper equipment, trained their employees for the project, or ensured compliance with safety standards. On June 14, 2019, Petitioners required Mr. Stark to trench an untested and unmonitored area, and the trench collapsed and killed him.

Based on the workers' compensation benefits provided to City employees, Mrs. Stark received dependent benefits after the death of her husband. She also filed a two-count complaint against Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Edwards in the Circuit Court of Harrison County on November 17, 2020, which she amended a very short time later. Count I of the amended complaint is a heightened deliberate intent claim under § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A), and Count II is a claim described as "intentional and reckless conduct."[2] Respondent alleges that Petitioners caused Mr. Stark's death by failing "to implement safe work practices and procedures for employees under their supervision and control," and it lists numerous safety standards they allegedly breached.

On December 28, 2020, Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion raised three grounds for dismissal: (1) Apogee Coal Co. LLC[3] prohibits heightened deliberate intent claims against non-employers as well as five-factor deliberate intent claims; (2) the workers' compensation system provides the exclusive remedy for the workplace injury; and (3) West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b) (1986), part of the Tort Claims Act, insulates Petitioners from the claims because they serve as political subdivision employees.

By order entered June 30, 2021, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss as to both counts of the amended complaint. First, the circuit court found that Apogee Coal Co. LLC prohibits only five-factor deliberate intent claims brought against non-employers under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)-not heightened deliberate intent claims brought under § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A). So, the circuit court allowed Mrs. Stark's heightened deliberate intent claim to proceed. Second, the circuit court found that workers' compensation benefits did not provide the exclusive remedy for the intentional and reckless conduct claim since Mrs. Stark "assert[ed] this claim . . . in order to establish individual liability on the part of these [Petitioners], not to establish liability on the part of the City." Third, the circuit court acknowledged that the Tort Claims Act does not insulate political subdivision employees from suit when the claims fall within an exception listed in the statute. But it bypassed the question of whether a heightened deliberate intent claim qualifies as one of the exceptions. Instead of analyzing the exceptions, the circuit court found that because Respondent "wishes to hold [Petitioners] personally liable for damages in this matter, damages which a jury might determine are in excess of the recovery she received from the workers compensation benefits[,]" the Tort Claims Act does not immunize Petitioners from liability.

Petitioners appeal the order and raise four assignments of error. Their first two assignments of error mirror each other, so we will address them as one. Petitioners assert that the circuit court erred by allowing (1) the deliberate intent claim to proceed, since the Tort Claims Act omits deliberate intent claims as a listed exception to political subdivision employee immunity, (2) either claim to proceed since West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 (2022) provides workers' compensation immunity to the City and West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a (1949) extends the immunity to Petitioners as City employees, and (3) either claim to proceed because ignoring statutory immunities violates public policy.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a circuit court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, we review the decision de novo on appeal.[4] On the other hand, orders denying motions to dismiss generally constitute non-appealable interlocutory orders; but a defendant may appeal them when the circuit court denies an immunity defense.[5] In that case, we likewise apply a de novo standard of review.[6] When assessing whether a complaint states a valid claim, we take its allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.[7] "The trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."[8]

III. ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by considering the workers' compensation immunity defense of Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Edwards. With that immunity established, a heightened deliberate intent claim represents the only potential claim against them. But because Mrs. Stark fails to allege a valid heightened deliberate intent claim, workers' compensation immunity insulates Petitioners from both Counts I and II of the amended complaint. So, we need not address possible immunity under the Tort Claims Act.

A. Workers' Compensation Immunity

Workers' compensation immunity protects employers from tort liability related to death or injury to covered employees, when the employers maintain workers' compensation insurance:

Any employer subject to this chapter who procures and continuously maintains workers' compensation insurance as required by this
...

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