Edwards v. State

• Decision Date: 07 May 1925
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 523
• Citation: 104 So. 255,213 Ala. 122
• Parties: EDWARDS et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

104 So. 255

213 Ala. 122

EDWARDS et al. v. STATE.

7 Div. 523

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 7, 1925

Anderson C.J., and Thomas and Bouldin, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; S.W. Tate, Judge.

Proceeding by the State to condemn the automobile of Bill McWhorter used in the unlawful transportation of prohibited liquors, in which A.S. Edwards interposed his claim. From a decree of condemnation, claimant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Knox Acker, Sterne & Liles, of Anniston, for appellant.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GARDNER J.

This appeal is from a decree of condemnation of a Ford touring car under the provisions of the prohibition law. The car was sold by A.S. Edwards (claimant in the court below and appellant here) to one Bill McWhorter under a conditional sale contract, on which was due at the time of the seizure $280. That the car was subject to condemnation, so far as the interest therein of Bill McWhorter is concerned, is clearly established and not controverted on this appeal.

A prima facie case for condemnation was therefore established, and the burden of proof then shifted to claimant Edwards, the vendor under the conditional sale contract, to show that at the time of said sale he had no knowledge or notice of any design on the part of the vendee to use the car for any unlawful purpose, or knowledge or notice of any fact calculated to excite suspicion and put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to such intended use of the car. One Packard Automobile v. State, 204 Ala. 435, 86 So. 21; Cherry-Ellington Auto Co. v. State, 210 Ala. 469, 98 So. 389; State v. Hughes, 203 Ala. 90, 82 So. 104; Maples v. State, 203 Ala. 153, 82 So. 183; Glover v. State, 205 Ala. 446, 88 So. 437; Byles v. State, 205 Ala. 286, 87 So. 856; Bowling v. State, 204 Ala. 405, 85 So. 435; Echl v. State. 205 Ala. 466, 88 So. 567; Fearn v. State, 205 Ala. 478, 88 So. 591; Briscoe v. State, 204 Ala. 231, 85 So. 475.

The foregoing rule is recognized and given application in the above-cited cases. Under this rule if the vendor or mortgagee has no notice or knowledge that the vehicle is to be used for any unlawful purpose, or no notice or knowledge of any fact calculated to excite suspicion so as to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to such intended use, then inquiry on his part is not demanded. This rule was adopted as reasonable and just and as expressive of the legislative intent that innocent parties free from fault should not suffer loss through the wrong of another, as was said in Briscoe v. State, supra:

"The act does not contemplate the condemnation of property of those who do not aid or assist in the unlawful transporting of liquors, or who are not chargeable with notice or knowledge that their property is to be used for such unlawful purpose."

In Bowling v. State, 204 Ala. 405, 85 So. 500,a bona fide, innocent, mortgagee was protected, though there was no evidence that any inquiry was made--the court, speaking through Chief Justice Anderson, saying:

"The petitioner not only proved the existence of a valid subsisting mortgage, but met the statutory requirement of negativing notice or knowledge on his part of the unlawful use of the automobile."

This decision was immediately thereafter construed by this court as declaring the rule herein stated, as appears from the following quotation from the case of One Packard Automobile v. state, 204 Ala. 435, 86 So. 21, wherein the court said:

"On this evidence, if believed, on the principle stated in Bowling v. State, present term, 85 So. 500, in the absence of countervailing evidence showing notice or knowledge on the part of some agent of the claimant, or facts calculated to excite suspicion and put a reasonable person on inquiry, the claimant's right to the car was not subject to condemnation."

And in Glover v. State, 205 Ala. 446, 88 So. 437, supra, after referred to the subsequent qualification of the earlier cases, the court again recognized the rule as herein announced, in the following language:

"If it were shown that claimant was entirely innocent of the use of his car by Short, having no knowledge or notice thereof, or notice of any facts to put him on inquiry, then no action on his part would be required."

In one of the earlier cases (State v. Hughes, 203 Ala. 90, 82 So. 104, the court used the following language here directly applicable:

"It seems to us too clear for argument that the Legislature did not intend that the property of a person wholly innocent of any intent to violate the law, or to aid or assist another in violating, and without knowledge or notice of facts to put him on notice that his property was to be used in violation of the statute, should be confiscated."

This authority was followed in Maples v. State, supra. A reading of these authorities will demonstrate that any different rule subsequently stated was a distinct departure from the earlier cases, and that in the instant case the court is but recognizing and enforcing the rule first adopted. Quotations from other cases could be given to like effect, but the foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the court has not heretofore proceeded in cases of this character upon such construction of the case of Flint Motor Car Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 437, 85 So. 741, as placed thereon in McCormack v. State (Ala.Sup.) 102 So. 894, and in the dissenting view in the instant case.

The rule announced in the McCormack Case is, in our opinion, impractical of operation, and would seriously impair the business world engaged in the sale of means of transportation, including not only automobiles, but buggies, wagons, and the like.

The notice necessary to excite suspicion and stimulate inquiry may be slight, but, in any event, will necessarily be left to the determination of the facts in each particular case. It may be a notice imputed by law, such as general character of the purchaser as a violator of the prohibition law, as illustrated in the cases hereinafter cited. The rule herein applied but recognizes the general rule of presumption of good character until the contrary is made to appear. 22 Corpus Juris 144. That stated and enforced in the McMormack Case is to the contrary, and at variance with the earlier cases and others hereinabove cited. The McCormack Case will therefore be overruled.

We have now but to apply the rule herein recognized to the instant case. Edwards was engaged in the automobile business at Piedmont in Calhoun county, and that he sold this car to Bill McWhorter in the usual course of business and in perfect good faith is not questioned. In the transaction an old car was traded in, and deferred payments provided by the written contract for the balance due. The principal portion of the negotiations was through one Gunter, who was in Edwards' employ. Neither Edwards nor his employé Gunter had any information derogatory of the purchaser's character, or any notice, knowledge, or information that would in the least excite suspicion that the car would be used for any unlawful purpose. Bill McWhorter, it appears, had previously purchased gasoline and accessories at this place, and had been known by employé Gunter for a period of about four months. The car being purchased on time, Gunter made inquiry of Barlow, a competitor, who stated he considered him (McWhorter) "all right," and that "he would take...