Edwards v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 05-02-00036-CR.,No. 05-02-00037-CR.,05-02-00036-CR.,05-02-00037-CR.
• Citation: Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App. 2003)
• Parties: Kenneth Dewayne EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

106 S.W.3d 833

Kenneth Dewayne EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-02-00036-CR.

No. 05-02-00037-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

May 19, 2003.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Deborah Farris, Dallas, for Appellant.

William T. (Bill) Hill, Jr., Cheryl D. Holder, Dallas, for State.

Before Justices JAMES, FITZGERALD, and LANG.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice LANG.

Kenneth Dewayne Edwards appeals his conviction by a jury for the capital murder of Hong S. Lee and Me Hyee Lee. He was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment by the court. After his conviction for capital murder, appellant's probated sentence for robbery was revoked, and he was sentented to ten years' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his sentence for capital murder.

Appellant raises the following nine issues to challenge his capital murder conviction: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial after a juror became physically ill; 2) the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that appellant knowingly and intentionally caused the death of Mr. Lee and his mother, Mrs. Lee, by striking them with various objects; 3) the evidence is factually insufficient to prove that appellant knowingly and intentionally caused the death of Mr. Lee and his mother, Mrs. Lee, by striking them with various objects; 4) there is insufficient evidence to establish that appellant was a party to the offense as charged in the indictment; 5) there is insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of accomplice witness Demarcus Joe; 6) there is insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of accomplice witness Jermaine Galloway; 7) a rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty only of manslaughter of Mr. Lee; and 8) a rational trier of fact could not have found appellant guilty of capital murder of Mrs. Lee.

In a single issue as to his ten-year sentence for robbery, appellant asserts it was "illegal" for the trial court to order him to serve this sentence as a consecutive sentence after his life sentence for capital murder has been completed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Factual and Procedural Background

Hong S. Lee and his mother, Me Hyee Lee lived together in DeSoto, and worked in the family-owned cleaning business called GLO Cleaners in Dallas. Mr. Lee and his mother, Mrs. Lee, were brutally murdered. Mr. Lee had dated a woman named Kathy Adams, who lived with him while they were dating. Before dating Lee, Ms. Adams dated appellant. After Mr. Lee and Ms. Adams split up, Ms. Adams's cousin, Demarcus Joe, was released from jail and lived with the victims. Joe was paid to drive Mrs. Lee back and forth to work and to run errands. Also, Joe was given unlimited access to the victims' automobiles and home. At trial, Joe testified he was told by his probation officer that he was required to live within the city limits. Therefore, he had to move out of the Lee home. Joe testified that on the day of the murders, he went to the Lee home to retrieve his possessions. He brought appellant, Jermaine Galloway, and Jacob Jackson with him.

Galloway testified that at around 9 p.m. on February 28, 2001, the night of the murders, Joe arrived at his house with appellant. Joe told Galloway that he and appellant were going to "hit a lick" (i.e. commit a robbery). At about 9:30 p.m. that evening Joe, appellant, Galloway, and Jackson left Galloway's home in the Lees' black Jeep to go to the Lee home. Joe entered the home using the garage door opener and house keys. Joe testified that they all sat down to talk to Mr. Lee. Mrs. Lee was in her bedroom. At this point, the testimony of Joe, Galloway, and appellant diverge, but they agree that the Lees were murdered and several items were stolen from the Lee home, including two TVs, a VCR, and some clothes.

During the murders, Mr. Lee was hit repeatedly with a fire extinguisher, a hammer, and a pole. He was also wrapped in a blanket, tied with an electrical cord, a plastic ball was placed in his mouth, and his mouth was taped shut. Mrs. Lee was hit in the head repeatedly with a hammer, was sexually assaulted with a hammer handle, was stabbed, and was jumped upon.

The pathologist testified that both of the Lees died of homicidal violence. The autopsy report on Mr. Lee mentioned: (a) blunt force head injuries including fractures, hemorrhages, abrasions, and lacerations; (b) incised wounds of the forehead; and (c) blunt force injuries of the trunk and extremities. The autopsy report on Mrs. Lee mentioned: (a) depressed upper left chest; (b) blunt force injuries including fractures, hemorrhages, contusions, lacerations, and abrasions; and (c) three stab wounds.

After the murders, the four men drove away in the Jeep and a Mustang owned by the Lees. They drove to a field where they left the Jeep after transferring most of the stolen goods to the Mustang. The larger TV would not fit in the Mustang and was abandoned in the field. The four men then drove to appellant's home where they left the stolen goods.

On March 2, 2001, the bodies of the Lees were discovered. While executing an arrest and search warrant at appellant's home, the police recovered the smaller stolen TV set and the VCR from the trash outside his house. The black Jeep and larger TV set were discovered in a field.

The police arrested appellant, Joe, Galloway, and Jackson. Galloway, age 15, pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery and testified for the State. Joe testified that he pleaded guilty to two offenses of capital murder and was sentenced to two sentences of life imprisonment, to be served consecutively. He then testified for the State.

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

In his first issue, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for mistrial after one of the jurors prejudiced the jury by becoming physically ill during the trial on the merits.

A. Applicable Law

The decision to deny a motion for mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court. See Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 684 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). A mistrial is an extreme remedy for prejudicial events occurring during the trial process. Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Crim.App.1996). Only when it is apparent that an objectionable event at trial is so emotionally inflammatory that curative instructions are not likely to prevent the jury being unfairly prejudiced against the defendant may a motion for mistrial be granted. Id. The proper method to preserve error is to object, request the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard, and move for a mistrial. See Cureton v. State, 800 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).

B. Application of Law to Facts

At about ten minutes before one o'clock during the testimony of the forensic pathologist and the display of autopsy photographs, one of the jurors stated that he needed a break. The court recessed the trial for lunch, and the juror stated that he needed to lie down. Outside of the presence of the jury, appellant moved for a mistrial based on the juror's illness as a result of seeing the autopsy photographs. The court denied the motion and stated that it was not sure the photographs were the reason the juror had to lie down. Apparently the juror had not eaten since early that morning and was feeling faint. After the lunch recess the court asked the juror how he felt and whether he had eaten anything. The juror responded that he felt fine and he had eaten. The pathologist continued her testimony without incident and with the introduction of approximately forty-five more photographs.

The court observed that it was not clear the juror's illness was in response to the photographs. We agree. Even if the juror was reacting to the photographs, his request for a break and to lie down was not so emotionally inflammatory as to prejudice the jury. See Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 698. The trial court appropriately recessed the trial for lunch and ascertained that the juror had recovered before the trial proceeded. Appellant did move for a mistrial, but he did not request any curative instructions or specify in what manner the juror's illness had prejudiced the rest of the jury. See Cureton, 800 S.W.2d at 261. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.

Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence of Guilt as Principal or Party

In his second and third issues, appellant complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and intentionally caused the death of Mr. Lee and Mrs. Lee by striking them with various objects. In his fourth issue, appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was a party to these offenses.

Appellant does not state specifically whether the claimed error relative to his status as a party is based on a measure of legal or factual sufficiency. However, we will analyze both.

We note that if the evidence of his guilt is sufficient either as a principal or as a party, we must affirm the jury's verdict.

A. Applicable Law

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex.Crim. App.1995). In conducting a factual sufficiency review, this Court neutrally analyzes all of the evidence, both for and against the finding. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). This Court will reverse only if we determine the proof of guilt is so weak or the contrary proof so overwhelming that it renders the guilty verdict clearly...