Edwards v. State
| Decision Date | 14 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 109467,ED 109467 |
| Parties | Thomas A. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
For Appellant: Stephanie A. Hoeplinger, 1010 Market St., Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101.
For Respondent: Gregory L. Barnes, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
Thomas A. Edwards ("Movant") appeals from the motion court's judgment denying his Rule 29.151 amended motion for post-conviction relief. According to Movant, the motion court clearly erred because his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue on appeal that Movant's right to a speedy trial had been violated. The judgment is affirmed.
A jury found Movant guilty of second-degree murder and armed criminal action, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. This Court affirmed Movant's convictions and sentences in State v. Edwards , 530 S.W.3d 593 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
Movant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15, and the motion court appointed counsel to represent him. Movant timely filed an amended motion alleging his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Henry Williams as a witness. The motion court granted Movant an evidentiary hearing as to that claim, but ultimately denied relief, and Movant does not challenge the motion court's denial of that claim. Movant's amended motion also alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges because his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion court denied that claim without an evidentiary hearing, concluding there was not a "reasonable likelihood the Court of Appeals would have reversed Movant's convictions had [the] claim been raised." This appeal follows.
Appellate review of a motion court's denial of post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of "whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Forrest v. State , 290 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Mo. banc 2009) ; Rule 29.15(k). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, "there is a ‘definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.’ " Forrest , 290 S.W.3d at 708 (quoting Goodwin v. State , 191 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. banc 2006) ). The movant bears the burden of proving all allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Meiners v. State , 540 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Mo. banc 2018).
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a movant must: "(1) allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) raise factual matters that are not refuted by the file and record; and (3) raise allegations that resulted in prejudice." Johnson v. State , 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013). Under Rule 29.15, an evidentiary hearing "shall not be held" in circumstances where "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief." Rule 29.15(h).
In his sole point on appeal, Movant contends the motion court clearly erred in denying his amended motion because his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue on appeal that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. We disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that: (1) counsel did not demonstrate the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would have exercised in a similar situation; and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Prejudice exists when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If a movant fails to satisfy either the performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, his or her claim fails, and it is not necessary for a reviewing court to address the other prong. Bradley v. State , 292 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
"The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is essentially the same as that employed with trial counsel." Hosier v. State , 593 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Storey v. State , 175 S.W.3d 116, 148 (Mo. banc 2005) ). "The error overlooked on appeal must have been ‘so obvious that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it.’ " Meiners , 540 S.W.3d at 836 (quoting Williams v. State , 168 S.W.3d 433, 444 (Mo. banc 2005) ). To establish prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different had the issue been raised. See Hosier , 593 S.W.3d at 87.
"The right to a speedy trial guarantees to a criminal defendant that the State will move fast enough to assure the defendant of the early and proper disposition of the charges against him." Giammanco v. State , 416 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (quoting State v. Bell , 66 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) ). "Deprivation of the right to a speedy trial is not considered per se prejudicial to a defendant." Id. When considering whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to speedy trial, we consider four factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) : "(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Giammanco , 416 S.W.3d at 839. Courts use these factors to "engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process," and a finding of any one of the four factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to find a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Barker , 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.
The first factor to be considered, the length of the delay, "is a triggering mechanism" that serves as a prerequisite before any inquiry into the remaining factors. State v. Sisco , 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc 2015). Missouri courts hold a delay greater than eight months is "presumptively prejudicial." Id. (). "The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints are imposed by an arrest." Id. Thus, "[t]he delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of arrest, not from the time that the right is first asserted." State v. McKay , 411 S.W.3d 295, 303 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
Here, Movant was arrested on May 8, 2013, and his trial did not begin until September 14, 2015. Both parties agree the delay is presumptively prejudicial because it exceeded eight months. Accordingly, we proceed to analyze the three remaining factors.
The second factor we consider is the reason for the delay. Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313. The Barker Court's analysis of this factor provides guidance:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstance must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313-14. While "delays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against the defendant," delays that are jointly requested by the parties are neutral factors in the analysis. Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting State v. Greenlee , 327 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) ); State v. Vickers , 560 S.W.3d 3, 16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).
Here, the total delay between Movant's arrest and the commencement of his trial was 859 days. Among these delays, a continuance of 49 days granted at the request of the State was justified due to the unavailability of a witness. See Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313-14. The delays caused by two additional continuances totaling 140 days were neutral because the continuances were jointly requested by the State and Movant. See Vickers , 560 S.W.3d at 16. Therefore, these three continuances, which resulted in 189 days of the delay, were caused by either justified or neutral reasons, and do not weigh in favor of or against either party. See id. ; Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 314.
After Movant's arrest, he was indicted and the case was transferred to another division of the court. On August 28, 2013, the newly assigned judge continued the case and set the initial trial date of October 28, 2013. Although the State is ultimately responsible for these initial procedural delays of 173 days, they were for "more neutral" reasons and are "weighted less heavily" against the State. See Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313-14.
The State was later granted a 42-day continuance of the trial date from February 10, 2014 to March 24, 2014 due to a scheduling conflict with the prosecutor. Then, the trial court granted the State a 64-day continuance from November 17, 2014 to January 20, 2015 because the prosecutor had laryngitis
. Because these delays were not deliberate attempts by the State to hamper the defense, the reasons for the delays were "more neutral" and, although they weigh against the State, they do not do so heavily. See id.
In January 2015, the trial court granted the State another continuance and rescheduled the trial for March 2, 2015, which caused a delay of 41 days. The trial court's order did not indicate the reason for the continuance and simply noted that the State requested it over Movant's objection. It is Movant's burden to prove the motion court clearly erred. Meiners , 540 S.W.3d at 836. Mov...
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