Edwards v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 17 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. CV-20-492,CV-20-492
• Citation: 625 S.W.3d 226,2021 Ark. 140
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Parties: Samantha EDWARDS, Individually and as a Special Administratrix of the Estate of William Bobby Wray Edwards, Deceased, and Arleigh Grayce Edwards, Deceased; and as Parent and Next Friend for Peyton Hale, a Minor, Petitioner/Plaintiff v. Eric James Cornell THOMAS and McElroy Truck Lines, Inc., Respondents/Defendants

2021 Ark. 140

625 S.W.3d 226

Samantha EDWARDS, Individually and as a Special Administratrix of the Estate of William Bobby Wray Edwards, Deceased, and Arleigh Grayce Edwards, Deceased; and as Parent and Next Friend for Peyton Hale, a Minor, Petitioner/Plaintiff

v.Eric James Cornell THOMAS and McElroy Truck Lines, Inc., Respondents/Defendants

No. CV-20-492

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: June 17, 2021

Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks ; and Rainwater, Holt & Sexton, P.A., by: Denise Reid Hoggard and Jeremy McNabb, Little Rock, for appellant.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, Little Rock, by: Gregory T. Jones and Kristen S. Moyers ; and Dover Dixon Horne PLLC, by: Todd Wooten, for appellees.

ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice

This case presents a question of law concerning the failure to comply with the Child Passenger Protection Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 27-34-101 et seq. (Repl. 2014), which was certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8. The certified question is as follows:

Under the facts of this case, whether Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-34-106(a) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine under article 4, section 2, and Amendment 80, section 3, of the Arkansas Constitution.

As explained below, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-34-106(a) does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.

As set out in the certifying court's order, the facts relevant to the certified question are as follows:

This wrongful death and survival action arose out of an August 2, 2018, two-vehicle accident that took place in Howard County, Arkansas. Defendant Eric James Cornell Thomas failed to obey a stop sign while driving a tractor trailer in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. The tractor Mr. Thomas was operating struck a pickup truck driven by William Bobby Wray Edwards, in which Mr. Edwards’ daughter, Arleigh, and stepson, Peyton, were riding. Following the initial impact, the pick-up struck a tree. Arleigh was then ejected from the cab of the pick-up. Mr. Edwards and Arleigh were killed as a result of the accident.

At the time of the collision, Arleigh was two years old. Plaintiff will offer proof at trial that at the time of the collision, Arleigh weighed less than sixty pounds. Arleigh was not restrained in a child passenger safety seat or any other passenger restraint system at the time of the collision. A "Cosco Scenera Next" brand child safety seat was in the back seat of the pick-up at the time of the collision.

For purposes of this civil action, Defendant Thomas admits he was negligent and his negligence was the cause of the collision between the tractor and the pick-up. Defendant McElroy admits the same and admits it is vicariously liable for any injuries proximately caused by Mr. Thomas's negligence. However, both defendants allege (as a defense) fault on the part of Mr. Edwards for failing to put or maintain Arleigh in a child passenger safety seat. Defendants will offer expert biomechanical proof at trial that, had Arleigh been properly restrained, then she would not have been ejected and would have survived the accident.

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-111, Defendants have given notice to the Arkansas Attorney General of their challenge to the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-34-106(a) insofar as it would bar or limit admission of evidence at trial of the failure to use a child passenger safety seat.

Mr. Edwards's wife, Samantha Edwards (plaintiff), filed suit in February 2019, individually and as special administratrix of the estate of William Bobby Wray Edwards, deceased, and Arleigh Grayce Edwards, deceased, and as parent and next friend for Peyton Hale, a minor. Defendants’ answer asserted fault on the part of Edwards for failing to put Arleigh in a child-safety seat, and plaintiff then filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to comparative fault and nonparty fault related to child-safety restraint nonuse. She argued that the defense was precluded as a matter of law by Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-34-106(a) and Potts v. Benjamin , 882 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1989). In response, defendants argued that the statute is an unconstitutional encroachment on the judiciary's exclusive power to make rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.

We begin our analysis with an overview of the Child Passenger Protection Act (CPPA). In passing the CPPA, the General Assembly recognized "the problems, including death and serious injury, associated with unrestrained children in motor vehicles" and sought to "encourage and promote the use of child passenger safety seats." Ark. Code Ann. § 27-34-102. With certain exceptions not applicable here, see Ark. Code Ann. § 27-34-105, the CPPA imposes the following requirements on drivers of motor vehicles with regard to child passengers:

(a) While operating a motor vehicle on a public road, street, or highway of this state, a driver who transports a child under fifteen (15) years of age in a passenger automobile, van, or pickup truck, other than one operated for hire, shall provide for the protection of the child by properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle and meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on January 1, 1995.

(b) A child who is less than six (6) years of age and who weighs less than sixty pounds (60 lbs.) shall be restrained in a child passenger safety seat properly secured to the vehicle.

(c) If a child is at least six (6) years of age or at least sixty pounds (60 lbs.) in weight, a safety belt properly secured to the vehicle shall be sufficient to meet the requirements of this section.

Ark. Code Ann. § 27-34-104. Any person who violates the CPPA is subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars. Ark. Code Ann. § 27-34-103. The provision at issue here, section 27-34-106, provides:

(a) The failure to provide or use a child passenger safety seat shall not be considered , under any circumstances, as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence , nor shall failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence.

(b) Neither shall the failure to provide or use a child passenger safety seat be considered, under any circumstances, as evidence in any prosecution for negligent homicide.

(Emphasis added.)

This court recognizes the existence of a strong presumption that every statute is constitutional. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Cole , 2011 Ark. 145, at 8, 380 S.W.3d 429, 434. The burden, therefore, of rebutting a statute's constitutionality is on the party challenging the legislation. Id. An act should be struck down only when there is a clear incompatibility between the act and the constitution. Id.

Regarding separation of powers, our state constitution provides that "[n]o person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." Ark. Const. art. 4, § 2. Furthermore, amendment 80, section 3 to the Arkansas Constitution instructs that the Arkansas Supreme Court "shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all courts." Accordingly, rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure are the responsibility of this court. See Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. , 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d 135, 141. The legislative branch of the state government has the power and responsibility to proclaim the law through statutory enactments. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Howard , 367 Ark. 55, 66, 238 S.W.3d 1, 8 (2006). This court has stated that substantive law is "[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties," while procedural law is defined as "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Summerville v. Thrower , 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (2007) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1443, 1221 (7th ed. 1999)). Here, plaintiff argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-34-106(a) is a substantive rule of law, while defendants contend that it is procedural and therefore unconstitutional in that it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.

In Mendoza v. WIS International, Inc. , 2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298, this court distinguished section 27-34-106(a) from the seat-belt statute at issue in that case, which was held to violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. This court wrote: "The seat-belt statute states that evidence of nonuse may not be admitted, whereas section 27-34-106 provides that the failure to place children in child-restraint seats may not be admitted as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence." Mendoza , 2016 Ark. 157, at 7, 490 S.W.3d at 302. This court further noted that the language of the statutes had been nearly identical, but in 1995 the legislature removed from the seat-belt statute the language "shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence" and "with regard to negligence." Accordingly, Mendoza supports a conclusion that section 27-34-106(a) is a rule of substantive law.

In the present case, defendants argue that section 27-34-106(a) is a legislative attempt to deprive trial courts of their authority to control the admission of evidence. Defendants point to the plain language of the statute, which indeed speaks partly in terms of the admission of evidence. Plaintiff points out that the substantive law always has at least some effect on what evidence is admissible because the substantive law determines what facts...