Edwards v. Thompson

CourtWashington Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWEBSTER, J.
CitationEdwards v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 188, 169 P. 327 (Wash. 1917)
Decision Date13 December 1917
Docket Number14171.
PartiesEDWARDS v. THOMPSON et al.

Appeal from Superior Court, Clallam County; John M. Ralston, Judge.

Action by Betty Edwards against Lydia Thompson and others to annul a mortgage and remove a cloud from title. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Edward Judd, of Seattle, for appellant.

A. W Buddress, of Seattle, for respondents.

WEBSTER J.

The respondents W. C. Geist and Augusta E. Geist, husband and wife, and A. H. Thompson and Lydia Thompson, husband and wife, who are the officers and owners of the capital stock of the Geist-Thompson Company, a corporation, reside at Port Angeles, Wash., and prior to May 4, 1916, held in the name of that corporation the title to lots 10 and 11 in block 38 in original town site of Port Angeles, Clallam county, and lots 1 and 2 in block 8 of tidelands of the first class east of Laurel street in front of the city of Port Angeles, Clallam county, Wash., together with certain personal property in that city. The appellant, Betty Edwards, who was then Betty Garrett, she having married E. O. Edwards on July 18, 1916 was the owner of certain real property located at 512 Pontius avenue, Seattle, Wash.

On April 26, 1916, E. O. Edwarads, as the agent of Betty Garrett, the appellant, made an offer in writing on her behalf to the respondents to exchange for their property in Port Angeles, above described, her Seattle property at 512 Pontius avenue, the appellant to give respondents, in addition to the exchange of the Seattle property, the sum of $1,200 in cash, and her notes aggregating the sum of $4,000 the notes to be secured by a mortgage on the Port Angeles property to be conveyed to the appellant. The offer was subject to acceptance or refusal by the respondents within five days from the date thereof. Within the time limited the offer was accepted in writing by the respondents; whereupon the appellant paid to respondents the sum of $100 to bind the bargain, and abstracts of title to the parcels of land involved in the exchange were prepared and furnished by the respective parties.

On May 4, 1916, the parties met by appointment in the office of Wm B. Ritchie, an attorney of Port Angeles, to complete the transaction in accordance with the terms of the offer and its acceptance. At this time Ritchie prepared, and the respondents executed, deeds and bill of sale for the Port Angeles property to the appellant; also there was prepared by Ritchie, and executed by appellant, a deed for her Seattle property, three promissory notes aggregating the sum of $4,000, and a mortgage to respondents Lydia Thompson and Augusta E. Geist to secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the notes. The instruments affecting the titles to the property were acknowledged before a notary. However, the matter was concluded hastily, the papers not being read aloud, and no delivery was made at that time.

On May 8, 1916, E. O. Edwards, representing the appellant, W. C. Geist, and Wm. B. Ritchie, met at a bank in Seattle, at which time the balance of the $1,200 cash payment was made to Geist by Edwards, and the instruments theretofore executed were delivered to the respective parties, except that the mortgage was given to Ritchie by Edwards, with instructions not to deliver the same to Geist, or any one, until after it was filed for record with the county auditor of Clallam county.

Upon his return to Port Angeles, on May 9, 1916, Ritchie discovered, by a reference to the offer and acceptance, that he had inadvertently omitted lots 10 and 11 in block 38 from the description of the property contained in the mortgage. Before filing the same for record, in good faith and without fraudulent intent, but without the knowledge or consent of any of the parties, he added a description of the omitted lots. This was accomplished without any erasures, and by typewriting the description of the added lots in the blank space remaining in the original instrument; so that the mortgage, when filed and afterward recorded, conformed in all respects to the agreement of the parties relating to the transfers of their property.

This action was instituted by the appellant for the purpose of annulling the mortgage and removing the cloud thereof from the lands of the plaintiff. The respondents answered, denying any knowledge of the alleged alteration, and praying affirmative relief reforming the mortgage to show the intention of the parties. After a trial upon the merits, the court made findings in favor of the respondents, denying the plaintiff the relief sought, and adjudging that the mortgage be reformed to include within the mortgaged property the two lots which had been omitted therefrom and thereafter inserted by Wm. B. Ritchie. From the decree based on the findings the plaintiff appeals. From a careful reading of the entire record, including an examination of the original instrument, it clearly appears that the findings of the trial court are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that its decision was correct.

If it be assumed that Richie, by virtue of the delivery of the mortgage by him by Edwards, thereby became the agent of the appellant, and was clothed with authority to make the alteration by inserting the description of the omitted lots, the subsequent delivery of the altered instrument to the respondents would unquestionably foreclose appellant against claiming that the mortgage was void. Under such circumstances the act of Ritchie was the act of appellant, and upon elementary principles of agency would be binding on her.

If, on the other hand, it be assumed that the delivery of the mortgage to Ritchie, with instructions to lodge it for record before delivery to the respondents, created merely a special agency for that purpose, and did not impliedly authorize him to make the alteration, which we consider to be the law, then the insertion of the omitted description by Ritchie, which was clearly without the authorization, knowledge, or consent of the respondents, was merely the act of a stranger to the transaction which did not affect the validity of the instrument, nor destroy the right of the respondents to have the mortgage reformed so as to express the true agreement of the parties.

The ancient rule that any material alteration of a written instrument, even though made by a stranger thereto, avoids such instrument, has long since been abandoned; the overwhelming weight of modern authority being to the effect that a change, though material, when made by a stranger, does not avoid the instrument or affect the rights of the parties. Indeed, such change is not regarded as an alteration. In legal contemplation, an alteration of a written instrument consists in the erasure, interlineation, addition, or substitution of material matter affecting the identity of such instrument or the rights or obligations of the parties arising therefrom, made by a party thereto, or one entitled thereunder, or one in privity with such person, without the consent of the other party, and after the instrument has been fully executed. Any change made by a stranger to the instrument, without the connivance or consent of the parties is, strictly speaking, a spoliation. 2 Corpus Juris, pp. 1172- 1231; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 184; 1 Greenleaf, Ev. § 565, 566; Bigelow v. Stilphen, 35 Vt. 521; United States v. Spalding, 2 Mason, 482, F. Cas. No. 16,365; Ames v. Brown, 22 Minn. 257; Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45 Wis. 373; Boyd v. McConnell, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 68; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192; Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 242; Lee v. Alexander, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25, 48 Am. Dec. 412; Bridges v. Winters, 42 Miss. 135, 97 Am. Dec. 443, 2 Am. Rep. 598; Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459; Rees v. Overbaugh, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 746; Chessman v. Whittemore, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 231; Jackson v. Malin, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 293; Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 529; Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. Law, 227, 10 Am. Rep. 232; Forbes v. Taylor, 139 Ala. 286, 35 So. 855; Andrews v. Calloway, 50 Ark. 358, 7 So. 449; Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115, 39 L. R. A. 697; Orlando v. Gooding, 34 Fla....

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5 cases
  • Akers v. Sinclair
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 28, 1950
    ...that the degree of proof required in actions to reform for mutual mistake is a mere preponderance of the evidence. Edwards v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 188, 169 P. 327; Vanasse v. Cavey, 167 Wash. 238, 9 P.2d 60; v. Noel, supra, are cited in support of this proposition. In the Edwards case we said......
  • Teratron General v. Institutional Investors Trust
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 1977
    ...632, 638, 209 P. 1095 (1922); Lynn Tucker Sales, Inc. v. Le Blanc, 323 Mass. 721, 84 N.E.2d 127, 128 (1949). See Edwards v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 188, 194, 169 P. 327 (1917). Similarly, an alteration made with consent does not prevent the holder from enforcing the altered instrument against th......
  • Orr v. Murray
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • October 2, 1923
    ... ... the instrument's validity." ...          To the ... same effect are Edwards v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 188, ... 169 P. 327; White Sewing Machine Co. v. Dakin, 86 ... Mich. 581, 49 N.W. 583, 13 L. R. A. 313; Miller v ... Stark, ... ...
  • Thompson v. Stack
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1944
    ...Peterson, 6 Wash. 418, 33 P. 969; Edwards v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 188, 169 P. 327; 2 Am.Jur. (Alteration of Instruments), p. 604, § 11. In the Edwards case, we said, page 191 of 99 Wash., page 328 of P.: 'The ancient rule that any material alteration of a written instrument, even though made ......
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