Edwards v. Trahan

• Decision Date: 27 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. 1284,1284
• Citation: 168 So.2d 365
• Parties: Nolan J. EDWARDS et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lezime J. TRAHAN et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 365

168 So.2d 365

Nolan J. EDWARDS et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lezime J. TRAHAN et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 1284.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Oct. 27, 1964.

Rehearings Denied Nov. 18, 1964.

Mouton, Champagne & Colomb, by George J. Champagne, Jr., Lafayette, Frank L. Maraist, Abbeville, for defendants-appellants.

Edwards & Edwards, by Nolan J. Edwards, Crowley, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before TATE, FRUGE , and CULPEPPER, JJ.

TATE, Judge.

This is a tort suit arising from a rear-end collision wherein after dark an automobile driven by the plaintiff Nolan Edwards crashed into the unlighted rear of a tractor-haywagon combination driven by the defendant Lezime Trahan. The plaintiff and his wife sue for their personal injuries resulting from the accident. They sue Trahan and his insurer ('Central Mutual') under a comprehensive personal liability coverage.

The defendants appeal from judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in this and in the companion suits by other passengers in the Edwards vehicle, Edwards v. Trahan, 168 So.2d 369 and Edwards et ux. v. Trahan, 168 So.2d 370.

The trial court held that the sole proximate cause of the present accident was the defendant Trahan's failure, while travelling after dark, to have the rear of the hay-loaded wagon he was hauling equipped with a lighted rear red signal light, as required by the statutory provision now incorporated as LSA-R.S. 32:304.

In urging error in such ruling, the defendants contend Trahan's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The co-defendant insurer ('Central Mutual') further contends that its policy did not cover Trahan's liability at the time of the accident because of a clause excluding coverage for business activities.

1. Negligence Causing the Accident.

The accident occurred after dark. The defendant Trahan had no lights, reflectors, or signals on the rear of the wagon hauled by his tractor. A huge stack of hay was loaded on the wagon, which obliterated from view the front and rear tractor lights.

The defendants contend that Trahan's negligence in not having taillights at night was a remote rather than a proximate cause of the accident. They argue that the evidence support a factual interpretation that the accident was instead caused by Edward's highly excessive speed and by his imprudent attempt to pass the haywagon until oncoming traffic forced his return to his own lane too late to avoid crashing into such wagon. It is contended that Edward's negligence in these respects was the sole proximate cause of the accident (or at least a concurrent proximate cause), and that Edwards had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

Despite counsel's skillful arguments, we find that the great preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's factual findings to the following effect: The slowly (8--10 mph) moving unlighted haywagon constituted, under the circumstances, an obscured unexpected and unusual obstruction in the highway which the plaintiffs' driver Nolan Edwards could not reasonably have anticipated or observed sooner than he did. Edwards was approaching at a lawful and reasonable speed of under 60 mph at the time. His vision and his ability to observe the unlighted obstruction in his path were also somewhat hampered by the lights of three vehicles in oncoming southbound traffic, which prevented him from passing the trailer in the other lane after he had observed same as soon as reasonably possible but at a time when he could not reasonably have avoided striking it by swerving, slowing, or stopping.

The trial court correctly held that a proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Trahan in proceeding on the highway without rear reflectors or lights so as to warn oncoming traffic, as required by statute. D & D Planting Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., 240 La. 684, 124 So.2d 908; Brown v. S. A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So.2d 891. Likewise, under the circumstances, the plaintiff Edwards, as the driver of the vehicle approaching from the rear, was free of contributory negligence in colliding with this obscure unexpected and unlighted obstruction in the highway, which he could not reasonably have anticipated or perceived sooner. Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Co., 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909; Graham v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 159 So.2d 333; Mose v. Insurance Co. of Pa., La.App. 3 Cir., 134 So.2d 312; Fontenot v. Lafleur, La.App. 3 Cir., 124 So.2d 607. We affirm the trial court's holding in these regards.

2. Coverage Afforded Trahan by the Central Mutual Policy.

The co-defendant insurer, Central Mutual, had issued to the defendant Trahan a 'Homeowners Policy'. Included in it as 'Coverage E--Comprehensive Personal Liability' was an agreement to pay all sums which the insured became legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage. This coverage included insurance upon the operation of farm tractors and trailers.

However, the defendant insurer alleges that coverage was excluded for the present accident under a 'Special Exclusions' provision of the policy which provided: 'Section II (which included Coverages E, F, and G) of this Policy Does Not Apply: (a)(1) to any business pursuits of an Insured, other than under Coverages E and F, activities therein which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits, * * *'.

The insurer-appellant contends that the liability under Coverage E is excluded for business pursuits of the insured by this provision; and that Trahan, the insured, was engaged in transporting hay for business purposes at the time of the accident. On the other hand, the plaintiffs-appellees and the defendant Trahan all urge that the intention of the clause was to exclude business pursuits Except for Coverages E and F, which meaning they contend is supported by a construction of policy provisions as a whole; alternatively, these parties further contend that, even if business pursuits were excluded, Trahan nevertheless was covered at the time of the accident because he...