Edwards v. Willey

• Decision Date: 17 June 1914
• Citation: 218 Mass. 363,105 N.E. 986
• Parties: EDWARDS v. WILLEY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

218 Mass. 363

105 N.E. 986

EDWARDS v. WILLEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 17, 1914

COUNSEL

Frank H. Stewart and W. H. Rand, Jr., both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Samuel J. Elder, Arthur H. Russell, and Edward M. Moore, all of Boston, for defendants.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This case comes before us on a report by a judge of the superior court of questions of law raised upon a motion for setting aside the verdict.Hetherington Sons Co. v. Firth Co.,212 Mass. 257, 98 N.E. 797;Weil v. Boston Elevated Ry. (Suffolk; June, 1914)105 N.E. 983.The case was sent to an auditor, whose report was for the plaintiff in a large sum.It then was tried before a jury, which also found for the plaintiff in about the same amount.Thereupon the defendants made a motion for a new trial on four different grounds, one being excessive damages.Upon this motion the order was made:

'The court adjudges the verdict to be excessive by the sum of $83,296.78, and the court orders that unless the plaintiff within ten days after the entry of this order shall in writing remit that sum from the verdict then the verdict shall be set aside and a new trial ordered upon the question of damages alone.The special finding of the jury as to the Barre Wool Combing Company business shall stand and no new trial be had upon that issue.'

This question was, 'What amount, if any, for commissions on profits of the Barre Wool Combing Company is included in the verdict?' to which the answer was, 'None.'This was equivalent to a finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages for profits arising from that source or to a finding for the defendants on that issue.

At common law the power of the judge presiding over a jury trial to set aside the verdict upon any ground recognized by the law was limited only by sound judicial discretion.Ellis v. Ginsburg,163 Mass. 413, 39 N.E. 800.It was only in an extraordinary case revealing an abuse of judicial discretion, Simmons v. Fish,210 Mass. 563, 572, 97 N.E. 102, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 588, or an excess of jurisdiction, Shanahan v. Boston & Northern Street Railway,193 Mass. 412, 79 N.E. 751, or similar error, that an appellate court could review the action of the trial judge in setting aside a verdict.The exercise of such discretion in an ordinary case was not subject to revision.Parker v. Griffith,172 Mass. 87, 51 N.E. 462, Lopes v. Connolly,210 Mass. 487-496, 97 N.E. 80, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 986.

The exercise of this power has been regulated by the Legislature to the extent that a verdict can be set aside only upon written motion filed by one of the parties stating the reasons relied on.R. L. c. 173, § 112;Peirson v. Boston Elevated Railway,191 Mass. 223, 229, 77 N.E. 769.Failure to observe reasonable regulations of this sort apparent upon the record is cause for nullifying the action of the trial court.James v. Boston Elevated Railway,213 Mass. 424, 100 N.E. 545.By St. 1911, c. 501, it has been provided further that in setting aside a verdict the judge 'granting the motion for a new trial shall file a statement setting forth fully the grounds upon which the motion is granted, which statement shall be a part of the record.'Before this statute was enacted the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court advised the Senate that it would be constitutional.In the course of that opinion, it was said:

'We deem it the established law of this commonwealth that the right of each party to have the assistance and protection of the presiding judge, including the power on the part of the judge to set aside the verdict for good cause, is a part of his right to a trial by jury, secured to him by the Constitution of the commonwealth.* * * The requirement that a judge shall file a statement setting forth the grounds upon which the motion is granted is a reasonable regulation that does not injuriously affect the rights of either party.'Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 606, 609-610, 94 N.E. 846, 848.

The language of the statute is to be interpreted in the light of this statement of the undoubted law.The power of the judge presiding over the jury trial to set aside the verdict for any reason recognized by law, which is a part of the constitutional right of trial by jury, may be put forth only in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, and not for any arbitrary or whimsical reason.Powers v. Bergman,210 Mass. 346, 96 N.E. 674;Welsh v. Milton Water Co.,200 Mass. 409, 86 N.E. 779.There is nothing in this statute which indicates a purpose to take away this discretionary power or to narrow it in any way.The aim of the statute simply is to require that the judge put in writing a statement of the ground or grounds upon which he bases his action in setting aside the verdict, and to make that a part of the record.It...