Edwards v. Woods, 13681.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 13681.,13681.
• Citation: 168 F.2d 827
• Parties: EDWARDS v. WOODS, Acting Housing Expediter.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

168 F.2d 827 (1948)

EDWARDS v. WOODS, Acting Housing Expediter.

No. 13681.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 11, 1948.

Ninian M. Edwards, of St. Louis, Mo. (Douglas H. Jones and James A. Waechter, both of St. Louis, Mo., on the briefs), for appellant.

Francis X. Riley, Sp. Litigation Atty., Office of Housing Expediter, of Chicago, Ill. (Ed Dupree, Gen. Counsel, Hugo V. Prucha, Asst.Gen. Counsel, and Nathan Siegel, Sp. Litigation Atty., all of Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GARDNER, WOODROUGH, and COLLET, Circuit Judges.

COLLET, Circuit Judge.

On the application of the Federal Housing Expediter the District Court entered a judgment enjoining appellant from charging rents in excess of the maximum rental fixed under the Maximum Rent Regulations and ordering the refund of $30 to the lessee of appellant's premises. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. The case was tried without a jury. The evidence consisted of a stipulation of facts and the testimony of the lessee. The facts are as follows.

On and prior to September 1, 1946, appellant owned a 14 room house at 3825 Delmar Boulevard in the City of St.Louis, a Defense Rental Area in which the rent control provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 901 et seq., applied. On September 1, 1946, the house located at the above address and a vacant 35-foot lot adjoining it on the east were rented to J. A. Dunn. Mr. Dunn was using the house as a rooming house. He paid $35 per month rent for the house. This was the maximum legal rent fixed therefor under the regulations. He also paid $30 per month for the vacant lot. On July 25, 1946, appellant purchased a 55-foot vacant lot adjoining the house on the west. About September 20, 1946, Dorothy Morgan was negotiating with a salesman representing Dunn for the purchase of the rooming house equipment owned by Dunn and located in appellant's house. Before purchasing the equipment she, Dunn and the latter's agent met with appellant for the purpose of determining whether Dorothy Morgan could obtain a lease from appellant if she purchased Dunn's equipment. She was then told by appellant that both vacant lots would have to be rented with the house and that the rent would be $35 per month for the house, $30 per month for the 35-foot vacant lot and $35 per month for the 55-foot vacant lot. She purchased the rooming house equipment from Dunn the next day, took possession of the house, and appealed to appellant for a lease on the house. Appellant prepared the lease on October 14, 1946, which specified that it should extend for one year from October 1, 1946, that the rental on the house was $35.00 per month and the rental on the 35- and 55-foot vacant lots was $30 and $35 per month respectively. She signed the lease and paid $100 at that time for the month of October, 1946. In November she paid $50 rent and was given credit by appellant on the rent for $50 she had expended for repairs. This action was filed December 3, 1946, by General Philip B. Fleming as Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls. Dorothy Morgan paid $100 a month for December, 1946, and January and February, 1947, a total of $450. By agreement no rent was paid after February, 1947, pending the outcome of this action.

The complaint charged that appellant was violating the Rent Control Regulations by compelling Dorothy Morgan to rent the vacant lots and pay the rental fixed thereon as a necessary prerequisite to renting the house and hence was actually charging $100 per month rent for the house.

The answer of appellant denied any compulsion, denied any overcharge, and further alleged that Dorothy Morgan never lived in the house but rented it for the purpose of using it in a profitable business enterprise, to-wit, the operation of a rooming house. Other defenses were interposed which will be noted later. The Trial Court filed a memorandum opinion,¹ findings of fact and conclusions of law. That court found that pursuant to the stipulation of facts² the only question for determination was whether appellant lawfully charged more than the maximum legal rent for the house. The memorandum opinion makes it clear that the foregoing question was determined by the answer to the factual question of whether Dorothy Morgan was compelled to rent the vacant lots in order to get the house. The stipulation eliminated any question of willful violation of the rent regulations. The court found that the vacant lots were of no use to Dorothy Morgan, that she made no use of them, and would not have rented them but for the act of appellant in making their rental a condition for rental of the housing accommodations, all of which appellant knew. The Trial Court further found:

"5. That defendant required Dorothy Morgan to rent the two vacant lots as a condition to renting the housing accommodations."

Following these findings the court found the ultimate facts that:

"7. That defendant tied in the rental of the vacant lots with the housing accommodations, for the purpose of increasing the rent on the housing accommodations above the amount permitted under the regulation, which act by defendant constituted an evasion of the Rent Regulation for Housing.

"8. Defendant has charged and collected as rent for the housing accommodations at 3825 Delmar Boulevard the sum of $450.00 from October 1, 1946 to October 1, 1947.

"9. The maximum legal rent permitted under the Rent Regulation for the said housing over the period from October 1, 1946 to October 1947, is $35.00 per month, or $420.00, and such sum is the maximum defendant could charge Dorothy Morgan for use of the housing accommodations and inclusion of the vacant lots in the lease was a subterfuge which did not alter defendant's rights in this respect."

Appellant assails the judgment upon the grounds that (1) the vacant lots were not appurtenant to the house, were not facilities connected with the rooming house and hence do not fall within the definition of a housing accommodation found in the regulations defining housing accommodations as including "land appurtenant thereto" or "facilities and improvements connected with the use or occupancy of such property"; (2) the rental of the vacant lots with the house did not violate the regulation prohibiting "tying-in" contracts; (3) the purpose for which Dorothy Morgan rented the house was for a commercial business to which the so-called Housing Act and Regulations do not apply; (4) the Housing Act and Regulations promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional and void; and (5) the Housing Expediter should not have been substituted as the party plaintiff for General Fleming, the Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls. Those questions will be considered in the order they are stated above.

The Trial Court did not find that the vacant lots were appurtenances to the house or that they were facilities connected with and incident to the operation of the rooming house. Its judgment was not predicated upon...