EEOC v. Cent. Kansas Medical Center, 82-1988.
Decision Date | 20 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-1988.,82-1988. |
Citation | 705 F.2d 1270 |
Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CENTRAL KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Robert D. Overman, Wichita, Kan. (Marvin J. Martin, Wichita, Kan., with him on brief) of Martin, Churchill & Overman, Wichita, Kan., for defendant-appellant.
Karen MacRae Smith, Atty., Washington, D.C. (David L. Slate, Gen. Counsel; Philip B. Sklover, Associate Gen. Counsel; and Vella M. Fink, Asst. Gen. Counsel; E.E. O.C., Washington, D.C., with her on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McWILLIAMS, DOYLE and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
This action was brought against Central Kansas Medical Center (Hospital) under the Equal Pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1), 215(a)(2), 255(a) (1976).1 After a trial to the bench, the district court found that: (1) the Hospital had violated the Act by paying its male janitors more than its female housekeepers for substantially equal work; (2) the discrepancy in pay was not due to a factor other than sex; and (3) the violations were willful. The Hospital contends on appeal that these findings are clearly erroneous and contrary to applicable law. We affirm.
The Equal Pay Act provides:
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (quoting S.Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1963)). "The Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve." Id. at 208, 94 S.Ct. at 2234.
Under the Act, the EEOC must prove that the employer pays unequal wages for work that is substantially equal in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility, and that is performed under similar working conditions. Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, 538 F.2d 859, 861 (10th Cir.1976). If this burden is met, the employer must then prove that the pay differential is justified by one of the four exceptions in the Act. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196, 94 S.Ct. at 2228; Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 271 (D.C.Cir.1982). The employer's burden is a heavy one. Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1981); Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital, 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973, 96 S.Ct. 2170, 48 L.Ed.2d 796 (1976).
EEOC v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 653 F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir.1981).
Jobs may be equal even though one sex is given extra duties if the other sex also performs extra duties of equal skill, effort and responsibility, or if the extra tasks take little time and are of only peripheral importance. South Davis Community Hospital, 538 F.2d at 862. "Differences in the kind of effort expended but not significant in amount or degree will not support a wage differential." Id.; accord Usery v. Columbia University, 568 F.2d 953, 959 (2d Cir.1977); Prince William Hospital Corp., 503 F.2d at 285-86. "Jobs can be substantially equal even though performed with different equipment or machines." Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d at 273.
Job descriptions or titles do not determine whether the jobs are substantially equal. "Actual job requirements and performance are controlling." Prince William Hospital Corp., 503 F.2d at 288; accord Orahood v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas, 645 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir.1981). Moreover, a plaintiff need only show that the lower paying jobs are substantially equal to some jobs in the more highly paid category. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d at 275. An employer may not avoid violating the Act by classifying some men's jobs that are substantially equal to the women's jobs with other men's jobs that are not. Id. An employer cannot cure its violation of the Act by opening the higher paying jobs to women; "`the lower wage rate must be increased to the level of the higher.'" Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 206-07, 94 S.Ct. at 2233 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963)).
The district court here correctly stated the above legal principles in resolving the factual issues presented below. In its detailed opinion, the court found that the employees of the Hospital's housekeeping staff, Housekeepers I, Housekeepers II and Janitors, all performed substantially equal work.2 The court further found that the pay differential between the housekeepers and the janitors was not justified by a factor other than sex.
The court observed:
Rec., vol. I, at 111. The judge determined that all the employees performed general cleaning duties under similar working conditions and that any extra effort exerted by the janitors was too insubstantial to be significant or was equalized by additional responsibilities regularly performed by the housekeepers.
The court found that the higher janitorial wage was not based on a legitimate night differential because before May 1974 women working at night were paid the lower housekeeper rate. The court also rejected the Hospital's additional contention that its job descriptions and corresponding pay plan justified the pay differential, because the court found that the job descriptions did not reflect actual job requirements and performance.
We may overturn these fact findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d at 274. After a careful review of the entire record in this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See Taylor v. Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1382, 1383 (10th Cir.1974).
The evidence below was conflicting and required credibility determinations.
Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir.1977) (citations omitted). "Where the evidence supports a conclusion either way the choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not `clearly erroneous' as the term is used in Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P." United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 547 F.2d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir.1977).
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