EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-72347.
• Citation: 595 F. Supp. 344
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

595 F. Supp. 344

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 81-72347.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

January 24, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dorothy M. Smith, Jan C. Leventer, Emory J. Bailey, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Thomas G. Kienbaum, Joseph C. Marshall, III, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP PRATT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought this action against defendant Chrysler Corporation ("Chrysler"), alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. This matter is now before the Court on Chrysler's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The parties have extensively briefed the issues and presented oral argument to the Court. For the following reasons, Chrysler's motion is hereby denied.

Chrysler's motion is based on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), in which the Court held that a legislative device known as the legislative veto is unconstitutional. Plaintiff Chadha was an East Indian who was in the United States on a student visa. An immigration judge held that he was deportable for having remained in the United States beyond the expiration of his visa, but permitted him to apply to the Attorney General for a suspension of his deportation. The Attorney General was authorized to grant such a suspension under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), and did grant a suspension to Chadha.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1), the Attorney General was required to report to Congress each time he exercised his power to suspend a deportation. Under § 1254(c)(2), either House of Congress was authorized to pass a resolution stating that it did not concur with the Attorney General's decision; upon passage of such a resolution, the Attorney General was required to deport the alien.

The House of Representatives did pass a resolution disapproving the Attorney General's decision not to deport Chadha, and the I.N.S. instituted deportation proceedings. Chadha appealed his deportation order to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the legislative veto by the House was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the action of the House was unconstitutional, and ordered the Attorney General to cease and desist in the deportation proceedings. Chadha v. I.N.S., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).

On review, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the House's action constituted legislative action, and could be effected only by passage of legislation by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the President. The Court found it "crystal clear" that under the Constitution, any legislative action was invalid unless this procedure was followed. 103 S.Ct. at 2788.¹ Defining legislative action as "action which had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch", the Court found that the one-House veto was legislative in character. Id. at 2784. The Court noted that in the absence of the legislative veto provision, neither House would have been able to order the deportation of an alien without passage by the other House and presentment to the President. The Court held not only that the House's exercise of the legislative veto was unconstitutional, but also that the mere enactment of a statute which conferred a legislative veto power was unconstitutional as well:

We hold that the Congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional.

Id. at 2788 (emphasis added).

The statutory scheme which is at issue on this motion is nearly identical to that involved in Chadha. When originally enacted, the ADEA was to be enforced by the Department of Labor, not the EEOC. Pub.L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1967). The Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., conferred upon the President the authority to formulate plans for reorganizing the structure and functions of federal agencies. The Act required the President to submit every reorganization plan to Congress. Upon submission of a plan, a resolution disapproving the plan was to be introduced automatically in both the House and Senate. 5 U.S.C. §§ 909, 910. A designated committee in each House was required to make recommendations on the resolution within 45 days. Id. If a committee failed to make a recommendation within this period, the resolution of disapproval was to be placed automatically on the calendar of the respective House; thereafter, any member of that House could move to consider the resolution. If neither House passed the resolution of disapproval within 60 days after submission of the proposal, the proposal became law. 5 U.S.C. § 906. Conversely, either House could veto the President's plan by passing the resolution. Id.

In President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, enforcement of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, was transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC. The purpose of this reorganization was to place the enforcement power for all antidiscrimination statutes in the same agency. Pursuant to the statute, resolutions of disapproval were introduced in the House and the Senate. The House voted on the resolution, but it was overwhelmingly defeated. The Senate never voted on the resolution. Accordingly, the President's plan was implemented, and the EEOC ultimately brought this action seeking to enforce the ADEA.

Chrysler now argues that it is unconstitutional for the EEOC to enforce the Act and bring this action. It argues that under Chadha, it was an unconstitutional act for Congress to reserve a legislative veto power in § 906 of the Reorganization Act. It further argues that because of the legislative history of the Reorganization Act, § 906 cannot be severed from the remainder of the Act. Therefore, defendant argues, the entire Reorganization Act is unconstitutional, there was no constitutional basis for the President's plan transferring enforcement of the ADEA to the EEOC, and the EEOC has no power to prosecute this lawsuit.

After Chadha, it is indeed "crystal clear" that the legislative veto provision in the Reorganization Act is unconstitutional; the EEOC does not even argue to the contrary. The EEOC makes four arguments, however, in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss this action. The EEOC asserts that:

A. The legislative veto provision is severable from the remainder of the Reorganization Act;

B. Defendant has no standing to challenge the EEOC's power to prosecute this action;

C. Even if the President's transfer of enforcement power to the EEOC was unconstitutional, Congress has cured this defect by ratifying the transfer through subsequent legislation which was passed by both Houses and presented to the President; and

D. Chadha should not be applied retroactively to invalidate legislative actions which occurred before that decision.

Any one of these arguments, if sustained, would require that defendant's motion be denied.²

A. SEVERABILITY

If § 906 is severable from the remainder of the Reorganization Act, then the transfer of enforcement power pursuant to § 903 is arguably not tainted by its unconstitutionality. If, on the other hand, § 906 is inseverable, then the entire Reorganization Act is unconstitutional. There is a presumption that an unconstitutional portion of a statute should be severed from the rest of the statute. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The fundamental consideration in determining whether § 906 is severable, however, is congressional intent. The Court must determine whether "the Legislature would ... have enacted those provisions that are within its power, independently of that which is not." Id. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 677.

The EEOC argues that Congress would have enacted the Reorganization Act even if no legislative veto provision had been present in the Act. It argues that Congress clearly recognized the need for executive reorganization, and that it enacted this Act despite its apprehension that the legislative veto provision might well be unconstitutional. It notes that Congress had earlier (in 1933) enacted a similar Reorganization Act without reserving any legislative veto power. It further notes that the Reorganization Act of 1977 also included other provisions which placed limits on the power conferred on the President. 5 U.S.C. § 905. The EEOC concludes that Congress did not intend that all reorganizations which occurred under the President's plans should later be undone by the courts if the legislative veto provision was found to be unconstitutional.

This conclusion does not fairly state the issue to be resolved, however. The issue is whether Congress would have enacted this statute without including § 906. Chrysler has presented persuasive evidence that it would not have, and the Court finds that § 906 is not severable from the remainder of the Act.

The Reorganization Act which was finally enacted was a compromise between a bill sponsored by the Administration and a bill which was initially introduced in the House. The Administration bill provided for a legislative veto by either House of Congress of any plan proposed by the President. The original House bill, on the other hand, provided that no reorganization plan would be given effect unless both Houses approved it and it was presented to the President for signature. The House bill, patterned after "traditional" Article I mandates, was designed to alleviate fears that a legislative veto was unconstitutional. The compromise bill included the legislative veto proposed by the Administration, but gave Congress greater control over the President's proposals. Unlike the...