EEOC v. DEL. DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES
| Decision Date | 03 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-412-JRR. |
| Citation | 667 F. Supp. 1057 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES; John A. Dillman, III, Director of State Personnel; Dwayne Olsen, Controller General; and Steven Golding, Budget Director, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
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Edmond Falgowski, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., Spencer L. Lewis, Jr., Issie L. Jenkins, Yolonda R. Hughes, Christopher L. Morkides, and Wanda E. Flowers, of the E.E.O.C., Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel for plaintiff.
Susan H. Kirk-Ryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for State of Del., Dept. of Health and Social Services.
Regina M. Mullen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants Dillman, Olsen and Golding.
This action was brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of 18 Public Health Nurses (PHNs) employed by the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) at the Kent County Health Clinic and its associated satellite clinics. In addition to the DHSS, other defendants named were John A. Dillman, III, Director of State Personnel, Dwayne Olsen, Controller General, and Steven Golding, Budget Director (hereinafter collectively referred to as the DHSS). The suit was brought under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), which prohibits payment of lower wages to employees of one sex than are paid to employees of the other sex for performing equal work.
Initially the case involved over 100 PHNs throughout the state. In an earlier opinion ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, however, the scope of the case was reduced to just the Kent County Health Clinic. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delaware Department of Health and Social Services, C.A. 83-412 (D.Del. Nov. 7, 1986). Trial was held in December, 1986, resulting in judgment for plaintiff. Presently, before the Court are defendant DHSS's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively for a new trial, and plaintiff EEOC's motions for liquidated damages and prejudgment interest.
The EEOC's complaint alleges that for the relevant time period, July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1982, the DHSS paid a male Physician's Assistant (PA), Donald Bloom, a higher salary than it paid to the female PHNs, who were performing equal work. Bloom was reclassified in April, 1980, from PA II to PA III, and thereafter he earned more than any of the PHNs at the Kent County Health Clinic. The PHNs soon brought the pay differential to the attention of the relevant state officials and were reclassified as a group effective July 1, 1982.
The EPA defines "equal work" as work that requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and is performed under similar working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Under the EPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the duties of the PHNs and Bloom were equal. Once this prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove one of the four specific types of affirmative defenses that the statute lists as valid reasons for unequal pay. The four defenses are that there was a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or that the wage differential was based on a factor other than sex. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228-29, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974).
In addition to the alleged EPA violation, the complaint further charges that the EPA violation was willful, an allegation which, if proven, would extend the time period for bringing suit. Under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), an action for damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (which includes the EPA) must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action, unless the violation was willful, in which case the time is extended to three years. Since this action was filed on June 28, 1983, a finding of willfulness would extend the recoverable period back an additional year from June 29, 1981, to June 29, 1980. The wage disparity alleged was eliminated in July, 1982, so that a finding of willfulness in this case would effectively double the period of time for which recovery could be made.
The case proceeded to trial on December 1, 1986, on these two issues — whether the DHSS had violated the EPA, and, if so, whether the violation was willful. The evidence was presented to a jury of six and two alternates. During the course of the trial the number of complaining PHNs was reduced from 18 to 13. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict for two of the individual defendants, Steven Golding, the Budget Director for Delaware, and Dwayne Olsen, the State Controller General. The motion was not opposed by the EEOC and was granted D.I. 188G, p. 35.1
At the conclusion of the defendants' case, both parties made motions for directed verdicts. The defendants' motion was limited to its affirmative defense that Bloom's wage increase of April, 1980 was due to a factor other than sex, namely, a valid classification system. D.I. 188G, p. 55. After hearing argument on the motions, the Court reserved decision on them, and the case was submitted to the jury on the merits.
Because one juror had already been dismissed and two others were not feeling well, the Court asked counsel for both sides if they had any objection to permitting the remaining alternate to stay with the jury for the deliberation process. Neither side expressed any objection, and, thus, a jury of seven retired to decide the case.
During their deliberations, the jury sent a note to the Court asking whether it was necessary that the sex of the employees be "used as a basis for determining the different wages" in order to find a violation of the EPA. D.I. 188H, p. 74 (emphasis in original). After consulting with counsel for both sides, the Court responded to the jury:
D.I. 188H, p. 79. No further note was received by the Court, and shortly thereafter the jury returned with a verdict.
The jury found in favor of each of the 13 PHNs and also found that the EPA violation had been willful. The defendants requested that the jury be polled, however, and when the seventh juror was polled, the following exchange occurred:
D.I. 188H, p. 82. Once the Court explained to Juror No. 7 that she was expected to vote, she indicated she did not agree with the verdict. The Court then asked her how her verdict differed.
D.I. 188H, p. 83. After clarifying the seventh juror's position, the Court dismissed the jury. Both parties have filed post-trial motions challenging part or all of the verdict. The EEOC takes the position that the seventh juror was not a voting member of the jury, and that there was a unanimous 6-0 verdict for both the EPA violation and the issue of willfulness. The EEOC has also moved for prejudgment interest and liquidated damages, based on its position regarding the verdict.
The DHSS has moved for summary judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), and alternatively, for a new trial. It takes the position that the seventh juror was a full voting member of the jury, and that if a j.n.o.v. is not granted, a new trial is required because of the jurors' confusion and the failure to reach a unanimous verdict on willfulness. We will consider the motion for j.n.o.v. first.
In support of its motion for j.n.o.v., the DHSS argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the EEOC's prima facie case on the issue of whether the working conditions for Bloom and the PHNs were similar. It also asserts that there was no evidence to support the finding of willfulness. The EEOC objects that the DHSS may not raise the similar working conditions or willfulness grounds on a motion for j.n.o.v. because they were not raised in the DHSS's directed verdict motion. It also argues that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the DHSS had not proved its affirmative defense, so that a j.n.o.v. is not appropriate.
A motion for a j.n.o.v. under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) may only be considered by the trial court if the moving party has previously made a motion for a directed verdict, and that motion has been denied, or at least not granted. In such a case, "the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). The "later determination" is made upon a motion j.n.o.v.
Furthermore, the j.n.o.v. motion is limited in scope to those issues raised in the directed verdict motion. See ...
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E.E.O.C. v. State of Del. Dept. of Health and Social Services
...of all thirteen of the PHNs, the interests of justice require that the new trial include all thirteen PHNs." Delaware Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 667 F.Supp. at 1068. On the issue of willfulness, the court determined that a new trial was warranted for two additional reasons. First, i......