EEOC v. Gallagher
| Decision Date | 15 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-20351,98-20351 |
| Citation | 181 F.3d 645 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 1999) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff - Appellant, MARY BOYLE, Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant, v. R.J. GALLAGHER COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Jodi Beth Danis, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for E.E.O.C..
David Michael Gunn, Russell Stanley Post, Hogan, Dubos & Townsend, Hal Gridley Wolff, Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, Jennifer Bruch Hogan, Holman, Hogan, Dubose & Townsend, Houston, TX, for R.J. Gallagher, Co..
Katherine Louise Butler, Margaret A Harris, Butler & Harris, Houston, TX, for Mary Boyle.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Lynn N Hughes, US District Judge.
Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Mary Boyle, executrix of the Michael Boyle estate, appeal the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on their claims that R.J. Gallagher Company breached an employment contract and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when Michael Boyle was demoted from his position as president and subjected to a fifty-percent reduction in salary. Boyle also alleges that the filing of a lawsuit against him constituted unlawful retaliation under the ADA. We conclude that a material factual dispute precludes a determination on summary judgment that the company did not breach its employment contract with Boyle. We also conclude that there is a material factual dispute concerning whether Boyle had a record of disability or was regarded as having a disability. Finally, we conclude that the filing of a lawsuit does not trigger the ADA's anti-retaliation provisions. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In this appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of the employer, we consider the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the appellants.
Michael Boyle worked for over twenty years for R.J. Gallagher Company (hereinafter, "Gallagher Co."), a distributor of steel pipe, valves, and tube. Over the course of his employment he worked his way up from salesman to president. In February 1990, when Boyle was executive vice president, Boyle and Gallagher Co. entered into an employment agreement under which Boyle would earn an annual salary of $ 205,000. That agreement provided that it would "automatically be renewed for consecutive one-year periods, unless either party gives notice to the other that said party does not intend to renew and extend this agreement." The agreement was modified in February 1991 to extend Boyle's employment term to three years.
In February 1993, Boyle was promoted to president. Over the course of his tenure as an executive of Gallagher Co., Boyle was routinely praised for the excellence of his job performance. Robert Gallagher, Jr. (hereinafter, "Gallagher"), chief executive officer and chairman of the board of Gallagher Co., told Boyle in late 1993 that the company expected and desired that Boyle would stay in office until reaching the retirement age of sixty-five.
At the same time, Boyle began to experience health problems. Testing revealed that he had an elevated white blood cell count. He began to wear glasses with one darkened lens because he suffered from double vision. Coworkers commented upon Boyle's unhealthy appearance.
On December 15, 1993, Boyle was diagnosed with myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), a form of blood cancer. His doctor recommended a month of chemotherapy treatment. The timing was favorable for undergoing this treatment because of slow business during the holiday season. Boyle informed Gallagher Co. of his prognosis and made appropriate work assignments to assure smooth operations during his absence. He was treated over the course of thirty days, during which time he stayed in touch with the office and continued to make executive decisions and work assignments.
Boyle was released from the hospital on January 18, 1994, having lost all the hair on his head, his eyelashes and eyebrows, and twenty-five pounds. He spoke with Gallagher on January 19 and gave an update on his condition. Gallagher asked to speak to or meet with Boyle after a scheduled doctor's appointment on January 21. Boyle's treating physician, Dr. Hagop M Kantarjian, was not available on January 21 and Boyle saw a different doctor. The visit with Dr. Kantarjian was rescheduled for January 25. Boyle spoke to Gallagher after the January 21 visit and informed him that he would return to work on January 26. Gallagher asked Boyle several questions about whether Boyle would be able to work a full day and how many hours he would be able to work.
On January 25, Dr. Kantarjian declared Boyle's cancer to be in "complete remission" and advised that he could return to work without limitation, other than six monthly three-to-five day chemotherapy sessions. Upon his return to work at 9:00 a.m. on January 26, Boyle was immediately and aggressively confronted in his office by Gallagher, who demanded to know whether Boyle would be able to continue as president. Boyle conveyed the information he had received from Dr. Kantarjian, but Gallagher was not satisfied; he wanted Boyle to guarantee that he could continue serving as president of the company. Boyle responded that he and his doctors had reason to be optimistic, but that there was no way to guarantee that the cancer would not return. Gallagher expressed doubt that Boyle could continue to work after being treated for cancer, as well as concerns about the company's profitability under Boyle's leadership. He also demanded a report from Boyle's doctor. Boyle reiterated that he felt that he was able to work, that his doctors knew of no medical impediment to his doing so. He confirmed his intention to continue working until he reached the age of sixty-five. Boyle also stated that he would schedule his chemotherapy on weekends to minimize his time away from the office.
Gallagher suggested that Boyle should retire and alluded to his knowledge that Boyle had completely paid for his home and had over $ 600,000 in his retirement account. After Boyle reiterated his intention to keep working, Gallagher ended the meeting by demoting Boyle to the position of executive vice president and telling Boyle that his compensation would be reduced by half. Boyle expressed dissatisfaction with the reassignment, but said he would think about it. The next day, Gallagher issued a memorandum which stated that Boyle had been demoted to vice president of sales, an even lower position than the executive vice president position offered the previous day, and a lower position in the corporate hierarchy than any Boyle had occupied for the past fifteen years. Boyle was humiliated and demoralized by this demotion.
Boyle entered the hospital again on January 28 for a scheduled chemotherapy treatment. He and Gallagher corresponded about Gallagher's decisions and Boyle's prognosis. On February 8, Boyle wrote to Gallagher and declined to accept the demotion and pay cut. Gallagher responded on February 10, once again accusing Boyle of poor performance and reiterating the importance of the president's position. Gallagher also claimed that he had been left in the dark about the "full ramifications" of Boyle's condition, and he stated his belief that Boyle's employment contract had expired on January 31, and that Boyle had rejected the company's offer of continued employment. Gallagher also noted that Boyle's medical coverage had been paid through the end of the month (February 1994). Boyle replied on February 16, enclosing a copy of Dr. Kantarjian's written statement of Boyle's prognosis. Boyle insisted that he had kept Gallagher Co. fully apprised of his condition, and that the automatic renewal provision in his contract had extended the contract for an additional year. Boyle ended his letter with a note of concern about his medical coverage, pointing out that he understood his employment contract to have pledged medical coverage for life. Gallagher replied on February 17, asserting that the "sparse information" provided by Dr. Kantarjian did not help his understanding of Boyle's condition. He stated, "What your doctor does say is that you can return to work, but I have not seen you here."
Boyle never did return to the office. On April 21, 1994, Boyle filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The EEOC filed this suit, seeking injunctive relief for Boyle, based on its allegations that Gallagher Co. had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by constructively discharging Boyle and otherwise discriminating against him. Boyle intervened and alleged, among other things, that Gallagher Co. had breached his employment contract. The district court initially granted summary judgment in Boyle's favor. Then, in December 1994, Gallagher Co. filed suit against Boyle and others, alleging among other things that Boyle had breached his employment contract and his fiduciary duties by serving on the board of directors of Burch Biscuit Company. That action was removed to federal district court and consolidated with the action already pending there. Boyle added a claim of retaliation under the ADA, based on the lawsuit filed by Gallagher Co.
In April 1997, the district court reversed course and granted motions for summary judgment which had been filed by Gallagher Co. The court decided that its earlier ruling -- that Gallagher Co. had breached its employment contract with Boyle -- had been in error. See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Gallagher Co. on its counterclaims against Boyle, disposing of all remaining issues...
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