EEOC v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. IP 81-408-C.,IP 81-408-C.
• Citation: 641 F. Supp. 115
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

641 F. Supp. 115

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant.

No. IP 81-408-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 28, 1986.

David B. Hunter and Linda R. Zook, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff, E.E.O.C.

Lee B. McTurnan, Michael B. Cracraft, Harry F. Todd, Smith, Morgan & Ryan, A. David Stippler, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant, Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY

NOLAND, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

In this class action suit, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charges that the defendant Indiana Bell's pregnancy and maternity related leave policies and procedures, dating from 1972 to the present ("pregnancy policies"), violate Title VII in that they discriminate against female employees on the basis of their sex. Indiana Bell has filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the EEOC's claim is barred by laches. The motion was fully briefed in October of 1985, and the Court heard oral argument on February 20, 1986. The Court finds that the EEOC inexcusably and unreasonably delayed in filing suit and that said delay has caused Indiana Bell undue prejudice in defending this suit. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be GRANTED.

This suit, in its administrative form, started almost 14 years ago, in April of 1972, when a charge was filed with the EEOC challenging Indiana Bell's pregnancy policies. Similar charges were filed subsequently against Indiana Bell and against Bell companies in other states. Local action on the charges was deferred while the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT & T") and the EEOC tried to resolve them on a national level. The national efforts failed in late 1975, after which the charges were sent back to local EEOC personnel for processing. The local EEOC attempted to investigate the charges, but Indiana Bell refused to cooperate in the investigation and to attempt conciliation. Nevertheless, in 1976 the EEOC sent out letters of determination stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Indiana Bell had discriminated against the charging parties. In 1977, Indiana Bell sent out revised letters of determination to some charging parties, reflecting the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). The EEOC sent Indiana Bell a final offer of conciliation in March of 1980, which Indiana Bell refused. Finally, on April 23, 1981, nine years after the initial charge was filed with the EEOC, the EEOC filed the complaint in this cause on the basis of 53 charges that had been filed from 1972 through 1977, all of which charged Indiana Bell with sex discrimination based on their pregnancy policies.

The charges which form the basis for the complaint in this cause all occurred before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was passed by Congress. This act drastically changed the law regarding pregnancy and the proof of sex discrimination. Before the passage of this act, the Supreme Court stated the law in this area when it held in Gilbert that a disability benefits plan's failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities was not discriminatory because men and women were covered, and not covered, for the same risks. The package was worth no more to men than to women. 429 U.S. at 138, 97 S.Ct. at 409. The Supreme Court pointed out that, although pregnancy is confined to women, it differed from covered diseases and disabilities in significant ways, including that it is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition. 429 U.S. at 136, 97 S.Ct. at 408. Exclusion of pregnancy benefits would be discriminatory only if the plaintiffs proved that the exclusion was a mere "pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other." Id.

The EEOC alleges that Indiana Bell violated Title VII by maintaining two separate and distinct leave policies and procedures — one for pregnancy and maternity related medical conditions and another for non-pregnancy related temporary physical disabilities. According to the EEOC, the policies in effect from 1972 through August 6, 1977 discriminated against women on the basis of sex in the following ways:

1. by not allowing female employees on pregnancy-related leave to accrue seniority past 30 days while allowing employees on sickness disability leave to accrue seniority for the entire period, up to 52 weeks;

2. by not guaranteeing reinstatement to female employees requesting return from pregnancy-related leave while guaranteeing reinstatement upon request to employees returning from sickness disability leave;

3. by requiring pregnant employees to take maternity leave in their sixth month of pregnancy for a mandatory six-month time period regardless of ability to work while requiring employees to go on sickness disability leave only when they are actually disabled and allowing them to return to work when the disability ceases;

4. by terminating all income payments of employees on maternity leave while providing disability income payments to employees on sickness disability leave;

5. by prohibiting pregnant employees from taking earned, paid sick days and vacation days for pregnancy related reasons while no such restrictions were put on employees with other temporary sicknesses or disabilities;

6. by cancelling all company paid health insurance benefits of employees on maternity leave while continuing company paid health insurance benefits for employees on sickness disability leave; and

7. by discontinuing all company paid benefits of female employees on maternity leave while continuing to provide all company paid benefits to employees on sickness disability leave.

EEOC's Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 4-5. Indiana Bell first changed its policies on August 7, 1977, and then again on April 29, 1979 to comply with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The EEOC has alleged that the policies in effect from August 7, 1977 to date discriminate against women,¹ but has not enlightened the Court as to why they are discriminatory.

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES.

Indiana Bell has filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of laches.² To dismiss a case based on laches, a court must find that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing the action and that the delay has caused the defendant undue prejudice. EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir.1980). Both elements are present in this case. The EEOC filed the complaint more than nine years after the first charge was filed with the EEOC and more than three and a half years after the final letters of determination were issued on all but two of the 53 charges which form the basis of this complaint. Although it was reasonable for the EEOC not to file suit during a portion of this time, a substantial amount of the delay was inexcusable. This inexcusable delay has prejudiced Indiana Bell by depriving it of testimony of crucial witnesses who are now unavailable or have substantially faded memories.

The EEOC has argued that inexcusable delay and undue prejudice involve a factual determination, and thus cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment. The EEOC is incorrect, at least partially. Inexcusable delay is a legal question when, as here, the underlying facts have been established. EEOC v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 81 (3rd Cir.1984). In preparing the summary of events and in the discussion that follows, the Court has relied mainly on factual allegations that are not in dispute. In those few instances where the facts are unclear or in dispute, this Court has looked at the situation in the light most favorable to the EEOC, the non-movant.

A. Inexcusable Delay

To grant dismissal of a cause of action for laches, a court must find not merely a delay, but an inexcusable, unreasonable, undue or inordinate delay in asserting a claim. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, 622 F.2d at 275. In analyzing the nine year delay between the filing of the first charge and the filing of the complaint, the Court has excluded three years and eight months as excusable delay because the matter was the subject of national settlement efforts. However, the remaining five year and four month delay is inexcusable. In particular, it was unreasonable for the EEOC to take virtually no action on the case for three and one-half years before filing suit.

Following is a summary of the progress of this case from the filing of the first charge until the filing of the complaint:

                1972
                4/72    First charge of pregnancy related sex discrimination is filed with the EEOC
                        against Indiana Bell
                4/72    EEOC mails notice of charge to Indiana Bell
                5/72    EEOC begins investigation of charge
                1973
                3/73    EEOC and AT&T (including Indiana Bell) agree to national efforts to settle
                        pregnancy related discrimination charges. Pursuant to agreement with
                        Indiana Bell, local EEOC office stops investigation of charges while they
                        are the subject of national negotiations
                1975
                12/75   National efforts fail
                1976
                2/76    Local EEOC renews investigation of pregnancy related sex discrimination
                        charges against Indiana Bell and sends interrogatories to Indiana Bell
                3/76    Indiana Bell refuses to respond to EEOC interrogatories.
                4/76    EEOC informs Indiana Bell that letters of determination will be issued if
                        Indiana Bell does not respond to the 2/76 interrogatories.
                4/76    Indiana Bell refuses to provide requested information.
                6/76    69 identical "cause" letters of determination are issued by EEOC.
                10/76   19 more identical "cause" letters of determination issued by EEOC.
                12/76   Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
                        97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343, holds certain

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