EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
Decision Date | 23 September 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-826-Civ-J-12.,86-826-Civ-J-12. |
Citation | 696 F. Supp. 1438 |
Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. JACKSONVILLE SHIPYARDS, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Louis Foster-Steers, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.
William H. Andrews and Robert G. Riegel, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, ETC.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), filed herein on March 14, 1988. Defendant Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ("JSI") responded with a memorandum in opposition to the motion, filed herein on March 28, 1988. Plaintiff additionally filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on July 12, 1988. EEOC's motion addresses five issues raised by JSI as affirmative defenses. The Court will address each issue in turn.
JSI's Affirmative Defense "F" alleges that this action cannot proceed because EEOC did not properly defer to the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission ("JEOC"), an authorized "deferral" agency within the framework established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). EEOC relies upon a worksharing agreement executed between it and JEOC and JEOC's waiver of initial processing of the charges, pursuant thereto. JSI claims that EEOC cannot rely upon the worksharing agreement to establish that JEOC relinquished jurisdiction over the underlying charges in this action. JSI's view has been rejected, and EEOC's view adopted, by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1671, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). The Court therefore will grant summary judgment in favor of EEOC on JSI's Affirmative Defense "F".
JSI's Affirmative Defense "G" alleges that EEOC is estopped from pursuing this action on behalf of some of the parties. This alleged estoppel relies upon two earlier proceedings, EEOC's own reasonable cause determinations on some charges and a private lawsuit which alleged a pattern and practice of discrimination in promotions by JSI. The second proceeding will be addressed in the next section of this order; the estoppel effect of prior EEOC determinations is the present issue.
The application of estoppel against EEOC involves an examination of the agency's role in vindicating charges of discrimination in the private sector. "When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination." General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (footnote omitted). EEOC fills two roles, one as representative of the charging parties and another as guardian of the public interest. Cf. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 477 (5th Cir.1980)1 (en banc) (, )aff'd, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). Because of its representative role, the defense of laches is sometimes available against EEOC2 although laches is not available against the United States when it is acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce a public right or protect the public interest. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987). EEOC's public interest role encompasses inter alia administrative processing of charges of discrimination. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 53 L.Ed. 2d 402 (1977). It was in the public interest role that EEOC made the determination of "no reasonable cause."3 It would defy the logic of the statutory scheme (as well as common sense) to bar EEOC in its representational role on the basis of its actions in its public interest role.
The plainest proof of this proposition is produced by peering at private suits proceeding after EEOC's no reasonable cause determinations. The absence of a finding of reasonable cause does not bar a suit in federal court, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822-23, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), although this fact may be admissible as evidence of lack of discrimination, Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n. 39, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 1961 n. 39, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976). Moreover, EEOC's reasonable cause determination is not an adjudication of rights and liabilities; indeed, it is a nonadversary proceeding designed to notify an employer of EEOC's findings which is not reviewable in court and not binding on the employer. See, e.g., EEOC v. KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (6th Cir. 1984). Subsequent trial of a charge pursued by EEOC is always de novo.4 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 799, 93 S.Ct. at 1822. In the light of this treatment accorded EEOC's reasonable cause determinations in both private and EEOC suits, the Court concludes that a finding of no reasonable cause does not estop EEOC from subsequently including a charge within a larger pattern and practice class action suit.5
The Court will enter summary judgment in favor of EEOC on JSI's Affirmative Defense "G" as to estoppel resulting from prior EEOC reasonable cause determinations. This ruling expresses no opinion on the admissibility of those determinations as evidence of lack of discrimination.
JSI's Affirmative Defense "G" also apparently embraces a claim of collateral estoppel arising from a private lawsuit brought by at least two class claimants in this suit, Porter v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., Case No. 78-117-Civ-J-JHM, dismissed with prejudice by joint stip. (M.D.Fla., Apr. 2, 1982). EEOC frames the issue as one of res judicata; JSI eschews that doctrine in favor of a collateral estoppel effect of those facts necessarily decided in the earlier litigation. Because EEOC seeks summary judgment on the defense JSI plans to assert, the Court addresses only the collateral estoppel argument. JSI's representation regarding res judicata expressly waives that doctrine as an element of JSI's Affirmative Defense "G".
To apply collateral estoppel doctrine in this case, the Court must resolve two issues: (1) Is EEOC bound to any extent by any determinations made in a prior private suit under Title VII?; (2) if so, did the voluntary dismissal with prejudice in Porter necessarily determine any issues present in this suit?
In answer to the first question, JSI offers no argument. The Court finds no reason or basis in law to extend an issue preclusion effect against EEOC for any matters determined in a prior private lawsuit. EEOC was not a party to the earlier suit. Its interests were not represented by the parties therein. Collateral estoppel doctrine cannot apply under those circumstances. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 7, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (due process offended); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498-99 (11th Cir.1987) (, )cert. granted sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2843, 101 L.Ed.2d 881 (1988); compare Barber v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 778 F.2d 750 (11th Cir.1985) ( ). Although EEOC provides "virtual representation" of private individuals, this level of representation is insufficient to bar private actions subsequent to an EEOC action. E.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) ( ); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 65-66 (5th Cir.1974) (, )vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977). The Court finds no reason to apply collateral estoppel against EEOC when the timing of suits is reversed. Indeed, to do so would inhibit EEOC's operations in its public interest role.6Cf. EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1010 (6th Cir.1975) ( ); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.) (, )cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994, 96 S.Ct. 420, 46 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1975); EEOC v. Hutting Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1975) ( ).
Arguably, the individual plaintiffs in Porter might be limited in their remedy due to the disposition of that suit. See Hutting Sash, 511 F.2d at 456. The Court does not find this argument to be persuasive. If the issue were framed as res judicata, the Court would be forced to address whether those individuals could be barred from recovery. See id. ( ); Astron Indus. Assocs., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.1968) ( ); Barrantes Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 667 F.Supp. 833, 838 (S.D.Fla. 1987) ( ). JSI, however, disavows any reliance on the doctrine of res judicata.
Although the Court concludes that collateral estoppel does not apply against EEOC, the Court holds alternatively that were collateral estoppel to apply, the stipulated dismissal in Porter did not necessarily determine any issues in this suit. While "the stipulation of dismissal with prejudice...
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