EEOC v. Puerto Rico Job Corps

• Citation: 729 F. Supp. 208
• Decision Date: 02 January 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 89-0076 (JP).
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO JOB CORPS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

729 F. Supp. 208

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO JOB CORPS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 89-0076 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 2, 1990.

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Lizandra Betancourt, E.E.O.C., New York City, for plaintiff.

José R. Garcia Pérez and Maricarmen Almodóvar Diaz, Federal Litigation Div., Dept. of Justice, San Juan, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has filed this complaint on behalf of Luz Rivera pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title 29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq. (ADEA) and Section 3 of the Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-283, 102 Stat. 78 (ADCAA). The complaint alleges that Ms. Rivera's contract with the Department of Education, which expired on November 30, 1985, was not renewed because of her age. The plaintiff seeks backpay, liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and costs.

Luz Rivera was an employee of the Puerto Rico Department of Education (Department of Education) from 1979 to 1985. She was assigned to work with the Puerto Rico Job Corps (Job Corps), which was then administered by the Department of Education. The last position she held was Supervisor of the Residential Area for the Job Corps Center in Barranquitas. On November 27, 1985, the Department of Education sent Ms. Rivera a letter informing her that her contract, due to expire on November 30, would not be renewed.

As of December 1, 1985, a majority of Job Corps personnel had been transferred to the Corps of Volunteers in the Service of Puerto Rico (Corps of Volunteers) upon recommendation by the Department of Education. The Department did not recommend the transfer of Ms. Rivera. The Corps of Volunteers replaced the Department of Education as the new agency contractor responsible for the administration of Job Corps funds through a contract with the United States Department of Labor.

On May 9, 1986, Ms. Rivera filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, naming Puerto Rico Job Corps as respondent. The EEOC filed the instant action against defendant Puerto Rico Job Corps on January 23, 1989, and amended the complaint on May 2, 1989, to include defendants Puerto Rico Department of Education, Corps of Volunteers to the Service of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Commonwealth).

The Court has before it defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Co-defendants Corps of Volunteers and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico first seek summary judgment on the issue of whether they are proper parties to this action. All defendants claim that the action is time barred. Job Corps, the Corps of Volunteers, and the Commonwealth further assert that they are not Luz Rivera's employers for the purpose of imposing liability under ADEA. All defendants aver that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, defendants claim that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of willful age discrimination.

Plaintiff counters that the following genuine issues of material fact exist:

* Whether Luz Rivera's age was the basis for nonrenewal of her contract of employment.

* Whether Luz Rivera was subjected to age-based insults and slurs by defendants' officials.

* Whether Carlos Vázquez, one of Luz Rivera's supervisors, made statements announcing a policy of favoring the employment of younger persons on the staff of the Puerto Rico Job Corps.

* Whether the discriminatory acts were committed willfully.

Plaintiff claims that the EEOC does not lack jurisdiction over the Corps of Volunteers or the Commonwealth because plaintiff was permitted to amend the civil complaint to name the additional defendants. Also, the statute of limitations has not run due to the applicability of the Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988, which extends the ADEA statute of limitations in certain circumstances. Defendants Department of Education and Job Corps are agencies or instrumentalities of the Commonwealth, which was Rivera's employer at the time of discharge, and therefore fall within the ADEA definition of "employer." Finally, plaintiff argues that it has sufficiently stated a claim and has established a prima facie case of willful discrimination under ADEA.

For the reasons stated below, we grant summary judgment in favor of Job Corps and deny summary judgment as to the remaining defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c). The court views all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and indulges in all inferences favorable to that party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Ismert and Associates v. New England Mut. Life Ins., 801 F.2d 536, 537 (1st Cir. 1986). The non-moving party can defeat a motion for summary judgment by showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact pertaining to those issues upon which it would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1171 (1st Cir.1988).

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY CONDITION PRECEDENT

Under the ADEA, no civil action may be commenced until sixty days after a charge or "notice of intent" has been filed with the EEOC. The EEOC, upon receipt of such charge, must promptly notify all persons named in the charge as prospective defendants and must also attempt to eliminate any allegedly discriminatory practice through informal conciliation methods. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (1985). The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide the Secretary of Labor the opportunity to conciliate the dispute between the parties. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318 (D.Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). Courts have consistently dismissed parties in an ADEA action when these statutory procedures have not been followed. See, e.g., Michelson v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir.1987) (failure to file writing sufficient to constitute charge resulted in summary judgment in favor of defendant); Jay v. International Salt Co., 694 F.Supp. 207, 208 (W.D.La.1988), aff'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1989) (failure to file any charge pursuant to § 626(d) requirements entitled defendants to summary judgment). However, these statutory conditions precedent do not constitute jurisdictional prerequisites and are therefore subject to equitable modification. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (Title VII condition precedent is not jurisdictional; failure to comply with precondition does not deprive federal court of subject matter jurisdiction); Calderón v. Banco Santander-Puerto Rico, 671 F.Supp. 898 (D.P.R. 1987) (180 day period ADEA provides for filing EEOC charge is not jurisdictional requirement).

For example, a civil ADEA action may be brought against a party not named in the notice of intent if: 1) there exists a "substantial identity" between the named party and the unnamed party, and 2) the unnamed defendant had notice of the administrative proceeding. Gunning v. San Antonio Teachers Credit Union, 652 F.Supp. 697, 698 (W.D.Tex.1987). See also Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241, 245-46 (6th Cir.1987) (discussing and applying Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit tests for determining "identity of interest" sufficient to excuse plaintiff's failure to name defendant in the EEOC charge in Title VII action); Lettich v. Kenway, 590 F.Supp. 1225, 1227 (D.Mass.1984) (district courts in several circuits, "including this Circuit, have recently held that an age discrimination suit can be brought against a defendant not named in the notice of intent...."). The rationale underlying this exception to the statutory requirement is as follows: an unnamed party who is aware of the administrative proceedings and has interests substantially similar to the party named in the EEOC charge is likely to have had an opportunity to contribute to the amicable resolution of the dispute prior to litigation. Romain, 836 F.2d at 246; Schaffrath v. Akron/Summit/Medina Private Industrial Council, 674 F.Supp. 1308, 1310 (N.D.Ohio 1987); Gunning, 652 F.Supp. at 698. In these cases, the courts reasoned that compelling technical compliance with the notice requirement of section 626(d) would not further the policies underlying that requirement. Gunning, 652 F.Supp. at 698.

Defendants argue that claimant Luz Rivera failed to name the Corps of Volunteers and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in her grievance filed with the EEOC and that the EEOC failed to notify the Corps of Volunteers and Commonwealth of the filed charge. They further claim that no substantial identity exists between the Department of Education and the Corps of Volunteers and the Commonwealth so that the EEOC cannot properly proceed against them in a civil action.

Plaintiff EEOC contends that all defendants were on notice of Ms. Rivera's charge filed with the EEOC because they were corresponding with the Equal Opportunity Specialist who was investigating the charge. See Plaintiff's July 19, 1989 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 and Exhibit A, Affidavit of José A. Rojas. See also Defendant's June 20, 1989, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit E, Affidavit of Salvador Padilla, Corps of Volunteers Executive Director ("In 1986 I received letters and some telephone communications from EEOC inquiring about why Ms. Luz Rivera's contract was not renewed...."). Indulging in all inferences favorable to the plaintiff and viewing all facts in...