EEOC v. ROADWAY EXP., S Misc. 83-48.

• Decision Date: 08 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. S Misc. 83-48.,S Misc. 83-48.
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Applicant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

569 F. Supp. 1526

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Applicant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Respondent.

No. S Misc. 83-48.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

September 8, 1983.

David L. Slate, Washington, D.C., Laurie A. Young, Indianapolis, Ind., Emory J. Bailey, Detroit, Mich., Alice M. Craft, Indianapolis, Ind., for applicant.

Michael D. Cullins, Terrence F. Srsen, Akron, Ohio, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHARP, Chief Judge.

I.

This case is before the court on the application of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for an order to show cause why a subpoena issued to respondent, Roadway Express, Inc., (Roadway) should not be enforced. Oral argument was heard before this court on July 15, 1983 in South Bend, Indiana, and both parties have submitted briefs on the issues in dispute.

On July 15, 1981, Darrick Allen, the charging party, applied for a position as a truck driver with Roadway. Roadway declined to hire Allen allegedly because it was determined that he exceeded the company's established height standard for truck drivers. Subsequently, on December 21, 1981, Allen filed a charge with the EEOC's Indianapolis District Office alleging that Roadway, at its Elkhart, Indiana terminal, had committed and continued to commit unlawful employment discrimination against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire him as a truck driver.¹ The charge was numbered XXXXXXXXX.

On March 8, 1982, the EEOC served notice and a copy of the charge on Roadway, thus commencing its investigation. The charge was forwarded to the Commission's Continued Investigation and Conciliation Unit (CIC). On June 22, 1982, the CIC investigator sent a questionnaire to Roadway requesting certain employment data.² Roadway submitted a partial response. Additional questionnaires were submitted to Roadway on September 17, 1982³ and October 29, 1982⁴. Each was returned incomplete in that it did not contain all of the data requested.

After further correspondence, the EEOC issued a subpoena duces tecum, number IN-83-002, to Roadway. The subpoena requested the name, race and height of all persons currently employed at the Elkhart facility and certain information concerning applicants who were rejected for the same reason as the charging party. Roadway submitted all the information requested except for the information regarding the race of its current work force, information which Roadway has refused to submit to this date. Moreover, Roadway has made no attempt administratively to modify or quash the subpoena in accordance with the EEOC's procedural regulations set out in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(b) (1982). On May 12, 1983, the EEOC filed the application for order to show cause why the subpoena should not be enforced that is presently before the court.

Roadway objects to the breadth of the EEOC's subpoena. It maintains that a racial composite of all employees working at the Elkhart, Indiana facility is irrelevant because only one position has been filled at Elkhart during the last five years and seven of the present eleven Elkhart workers transferred in from other locations. Roadway further argues that use of racial statistics concerning people hired up to thirty-five years ago at different facilities by different managers serves no purpose other than to create unfair prejudice or to confuse the issues.

The EEOC counters with the arguments that (1) the subpoena was issued pursuant to a legal investigation and seeks evidence relevant to the investigation of the charge, and (2) irrespective of the merits of any objections Roadway may raise, the court may not entertain any such objections by virtue of Roadway's failure to exhaust administrative review measures.

II.

It has long been established that a party will normally be denied judicial relief for injury until administrative remedies have been exhausted. In one of the leading cases dealing with the exhaustion doctrine, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938), the Supreme Court stated:

The long settled rule of judicial administration is that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.

A prescribed administrative procedure for an appeal within the EEOC exists in this case. The EEOC regulations provide to a party the opportunity to raise objections to a subpoena.⁵ Any subpoena is subject to internal review by means of a petition to revoke or modify the subpoena addressed to the District Director. Any petitioner who wishes to do so may appeal the determination of the Director. Nothing in the record before this court indicates that Roadway ever set forth its objections to the appropriate persons in any manner that can be construed as a petition to revoke or modify the subpoena.

The EEOC argues that Roadway's failure to exhaust administrative remedies precludes it from raising defenses to the judicial enforcement of the subpoena. In support of its argument, EEOC relies on EEOC v. Cuzzens of Georgia, Inc., 608 F.2d 1062, 1064 (5th Cir.1979), a case factually identical with this action. The court, in Cuzzens, analogized the EEOC procedure with that employed by the National Labor Relations Board and concluded that an employer served with an EEOC subpoena and making no effort to exhaust the available administrative remedies may not thereafter challenge the subsequent judicial endorsement of that subpoena for any reason short of objections based on constitutional grounds. Id. at 1064. This court finds great merit in the position adopted by the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit.

There are strong public policy considerations supporting the doctrine requiring exhaustion of federal administrative proceedings as a prerequisite to judicial relief. An instructive commentary on the rationale underlying this doctrine was presented by the Supreme Court in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1979). Specifically, the reasons articulated by the McKart court for applying the doctrine are: (1) to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process; (2) to allow the agency to compile an accurate factual record, exercise its discretion or apply its expertise; (3) to improve the efficiency of the administrative agency; (4) to conserve scarce judicial resources since the complaining party may be successful in vindicating rights in the administrative process and the courts may never have to intervene; (5) to...