EF v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch.
| Decision Date | 10 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-15507 |
| Parties | EF, a minor, by her next friends, STACY FRY and BRENT FRY, Plaintiffs, v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, JACKSON COUNTY INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, and PAMELA BARNES, in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [dkt 17]. The parties have fully briefed the Motion. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties' papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion be resolved on the briefs submitted, without oral argument. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
EF, an eight-year-old girl, was born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, the most severe form of that disorder. Spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy affects EF's legs, arms, and body, and significantly limits her motor skills and mobility. She is not cognitive impaired, however, but requires physical assistance in her daily activities.
On or about May 2008, EF's pediatrician wrote a prescription for a service dog to assist her in everyday activities. Before EF enrolled in Ezra Eby Elementary School's kindergarten program for the 2009-10 school year, Plaintiffs (EF's parents) informed Defendants1 Napoleon Community Schools and Jackson County Intermediate School District ("Defendants") that they intended to obtain a service dog for EF. Defendants allegedly "led [Plaintiffs] to believe that the service dog could attend school with [EF]." With the success of a local community fundraiser, EF and Plaintiffs were able to pay for the training of a service dog named "Wonder."2 In the fall of 2009, EF and her family trained with Wonder at service animal training facility in Ohio.
According to Plaintiffs, Wonder "is a specially trained and certified service dog and assists [EF] in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, retrieving dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat, helping her transfer to and from the toilet." Dkt. # 1, ¶ 27. Wonder also "enables [EF] to develop independence and confidence and helps her bridge social barriers." Id at ¶ 28.
In October 2009, Defendants informed Plaintiffs that Wonder could not accompany EF to school. On January 7, 2010, Defendants convened a meeting wherein the Individual Educational Program("IEP") team considered whether Wonder was necessary to provide EF with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE").3 The IEP team concluded that EF was successful in the school environment without Wonder, and that all of her "physical and academic" needs were being met by the IEP program and services in place. Id at ¶¶ 32-33. Subsequent to that decision, Plaintiffs and Defendants negotiated an agreement whereby EF was allowed to bring Wonder to school for a 30-day trial period that commenced on April 12, 2010, and was ultimately extended through the end of the school year. Although Wonder was permitted in school, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants required Wonder "to remain in the back of the room during classes," "forbade [him] from assisting [EF] with many tasks he had been specifically trained to do," "refused to allow [him] to accompany and assist [EF] during recess, lunch, computer lab and library," and "prohibited [EF] from participating in other activities with Wonder such as walking the track during 'Relay for Life,' a school play and 'field day.'" Id at ¶¶ 35-37. Following the trial period, Defendants not only refused to modify the school's policies, but also refused to recognize Wonder as a service dog.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") on July 30, 2010. On May 3, 2012, the OCR issued a disposition letter finding that EF's school district and intermediate school district (i.e., Defendants) violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the federal regulations implementing those laws. Attempting to find an amicable resolution to the OCR complaint, Defendants entered into a resolution agreement wherein EF could return to the elementary school with Wonder and could utilize the dog to assist her throughout the school.
Plaintiff Brent Fry conversed with Defendant Pamela Barnes during the summer of 2012 to discuss EF's return with Wonder. According to Plaintiffs, that conversation evoked "serious concernsthat the administration would resent" EF. Plaintiffs located a different public school in Washtenaw County for EF to attend with Wonder.4
Plaintiffs filed their three-count complaint on December 17, 2012, alleging the following causes of action: violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Defendants Napoleon Community Schools and Jackson County Intermediate School District (Count I); violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act against Defendants Napoleon Community Schools and Jackson County Intermediate School District (Count II); and violation of the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act against all Defendants (Count III). On January 18, 2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' state-law claim (Count III).
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' remaining federal claims.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." The Court's review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is the same as the review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Jelovsek v. Bredesen, 545 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in that plaintiff's favor. See Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1992). While this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, the plaintiff must make "a showing, rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief" and "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level" so that the claim is "plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). See also Ashcrof v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The crux of the parties' dispute is narrow and relatively straightforward. Defendants argue Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with the Michigan Department of Education before filing this federal suit and, as a result, their federal claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, dispute that they were required to adhere to the exhaustion requirement. The Court finds Defendants' position meritorious as further explained below.
A. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA") conditions a state's receipt of federal funding upon the state's development and implementation of policies and procedures ensuring that "[a] free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The central means by which a state provides this education is through the development of an IEP that is tailored to the unique needs of a particular child. Id. at § 1412(a)(4); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982).
The IDEA requires a parent, dissatisfied with an education decision regarding her child, to exhaust state administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. Id. at § 1415(l);5 Crocker v.Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989) (). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant. See, e.g., B.H. v. Portage Pub. Sch. Bd of Educ., No. 08-293, 2009 WL 277051, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2009).
The IDEA's exhaustion requirement is not limited to claims brought under the IDEA. Section 1415(l) of the IDEA states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (emphasis added). "[T]he IDEA exhaustion requirement applies to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act or other federal statutes to the extent those claims seek relief that is also available under the IDEA." M.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2008). As summarized by one court, exhaustion is required in three IDEA-related contexts:
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