Egan v. Palos Community Hosp., 94 C 7617.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94 C 7617.,94 C 7617.
• Citation: 889 F. Supp. 331
• Parties: Mary A. EGAN, Plaintiff, v. PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

889 F. Supp. 331

Mary A. EGAN, Plaintiff, v. PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 94 C 7617.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

June 21, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donald J. Parker, Law Office of Donald J. Parker, Ltd., Downers Grove, IL, for plaintiff.

Joan E. Gale, Frederick T. Smith, Seyfarth, Shaw Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CASTILLO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Mary A. Egan ("Egan") sues defendant Palos Community Hospital ("PCH") for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. Egan alleges that her age was a motivating factor in several adverse employment actions taken by PCH toward her. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), PCH moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Egan was employed as a Registered Dietitian with PCH since March of 1965. For over twenty years Egan performed her job in a competent manner and satisfied PCH's performance standards. Am.Compl. ¶ 13. In April of 1985, one year after receiving an excellent job evaluation, Egan's superiors told her that "only young people could make changes and that a lot of changes had to be made." Am.Compl. ¶ 14. In February of 1986, she was directed to resign as Director of Nutrition and Food Service and accept a position as a Staff Dietitian at a reduced hourly rate. Am.Compl. ¶ 16. Jamie Shepherd, a women in her twenties, replaced her. Am.Compl. ¶ 17. In September of 1987, Egan's position was changed again to that of Operation Analyst. Am.Compl. ¶ 19. Three years later, on approximately October 18, 1990, "plaintiff's pay grade was lowered from grade 11 to grade 4, the effect of which eliminated any chance of a pay increase for approximately seven years." Am.Compl. ¶ 20. During the period since her forced resignation as Director of Nutrition, PCH continuously subjected Egan to demotions, reductions in pay, and exclusion from employment duties appropriate to her professional experience.

In early June of 1992, Egan was "informed by her supervisor that her current job may be downgraded once again." Am.Compl. ¶ 21. At the time Egan was informed that her job was to be downgraded, there were other positions available in her field for which she was qualified, but because of her age, those positions were assigned to others who were not in the protected age category. Id. On November 2, 1992, Egan filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that PCH discriminated against her on the basis of her age.

PCH challenges Egan's complaint on several interrelated grounds. In the first place, PCH contends that all of Egan's allegations pertaining to events predating her notification in June of 1992 that her job may be downgraded are time barred. Second, PCH contends that Egan's timely allegation that in June of 1992 she was informed that her job may be downgraded does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, in response to Egan's efforts to invoke the "continuing violation" doctrine, PCH argues that the doctrine is inapplicable to the facts as alleged by Egan and that there is no timely alleged violation that can serve as the anchor claim for Egan's otherwise time barred allegations. In this latter regard, PCH contends that Egan's "failure to promote" claim, which is articulated in her response to PCH's motion to dismiss, falls outside the scope of the charge of discrimination Egan filed with the EEOC. For the reasons that follow, we agree that Egan's complaint must be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(6) Standards

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit. Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 129, 112 L.Ed.2d 97 (1990). The only question is whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir.1991) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In considering this question, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, all inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id.

Timeliness, Continuing Violation & the Scope of the EEOC Charge

Under § 626(d)(1) of the ADEA, a party must file a charge of discrimination "within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). In a "deferral state" such as Illinois, the time for filing a charge is extended to 300 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2); see Stark v. Dynascan Corp., 902 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir.1990). Egan did not file a charge until November 2, 1992. Therefore, as PCH argues, Egan's claims based on events that occurred prior to approximately May of 1992 are time barred unless saved by a tolling doctrine.¹

In order to circumvent the untimeliness defense raised by PCH with respect to the events predating May of 1992, Egan attempts to invoke the so-called continuing violation doctrine.² Egan's "argument" is conclusory and unsupported by any specific facts. The pertinent passages of Egan's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss are as follows:

The events described in Plaintiff's complaint are intended to allege a continuing pattern of discrimination on account of Plaintiff's age from her forced resignation as director in 1985 until she filed her charge with the EEOC in November of 1992.

Although limitations periods are ordinarily triggered at the time a discriminatory act occurs, the limitations period will be tolled during continuing violations. Thus, where an employer continues discriminatory activities during the limitations period and engages in a series of discriminatory acts at least one of which occurs within the limitations period, the limitations period is tolled as to the earlier discriminatory acts. citations omitted

. . . . .

It is the gist of Plaintiff's complaint that she was summarily demoted and forced to resign her position as Director of Food Services in April of 1985 by a supervisor who stated at the time that her age was a factor, perhaps the only factor, in his decision. She was reduced in responsibilities and salary, at first with promises of future reinstatement. Eventually, however, she was subjected to threats of future demotions and denied any opportunity to work at the level and for a salary for which she was qualified.... The treatment ... is continuing discrimination on account of her age which demonstrates a pattern or series of similar discrete violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Pl.'s Mem.Opp.Mot.Dis. at 4. As we shall explain, Egan's complaint, even as buttressed by her memorandum, cannot support her invocation of the continuing violation doctrine.

Under the continuing violation doctrine, acts of discrimination that are otherwise time-barred may be actionable under certain limited circumstances. Drawing on its earlier opinion in Stewart v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 117 (7th Cir.1982), in Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.1992), the Seventh Circuit outlined three viable theories under which a plaintiff may successfully appeal to the continuing violation doctrine:

The first theory stems from cases usually involving hiring or promotion practices, where the employer's decision-making process takes place over a period of time, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact day the violation occurred. Courts have tolled the statute in such cases for equitable reasons similar to those underlying the federal equitable tolling doctrine.... The second theory stems from cases in which the employer has an express, openly espoused policy that is alleged to be discriminatory. ... The third continuing violation theory stems from cases in which the plaintiff charges that the employer has, for a period of time, followed a practice of discrimination, but has done so covertly, rather than by way of an open notorious policy.... In such cases the challenged practice is evidenced only by a series of discrete, allegedly discriminatory, acts. This brand of continuing violation has also been referred to as a "serial violation," Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179 at 183 (1st Cir.1989), and as a "pattern of ongoing discrimination." Santos v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 641 F.Supp. 353, 357 (N.D.Ill.1986).

Selan, 969 F.2d at 565.

As is plain from the above-quoted passages from Egan's responsive memorandum, she makes no effort to identify which continuing violation theory she believes controls her suit. However, her statement that "the treatment to which she was subjected ... is continuing discrimination ... which demonstrates a pattern or series of similar discrete violations...." leads this Court to believe that she means to invoke the third theory outlined in Selan. In its reply memorandum, PCH guessed that Egan was seeking to invoke the first continuing violation theory. However, we find nothing either in the complaint or in Egan's response memorandum to indicate that the essence of her position is that PCH's decision-making process made it difficult to pinpoint when the particular violations occurred. Nor do we find any basis — either in the complaint or in Egan's memorandum — to conclude that she is contending that PCH maintained an express, openly espoused policy that is alleged to be discriminatory. Thus, we conclude that the only potentially relevant continuing violation theory in this case is the third.

In Selan, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's suggestion as to the pertinent factors to consider in determining whether the defendant's acts were "`related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation' or were `merely discrete, isolated, and completed...