Egbujo v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 29 September 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-CV-01450 (KAD)
• Parties: Uchechukwu EGBUJO Plaintiff, v. JACKSON LEWIS, P.C. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

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Uchechukwu EGBUJO Plaintiff, v. JACKSON LEWIS, P.C. Defendant.

No. 3:21-CV-01450 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

September 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 23)

KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Uchechukwu Egbujo (“Plaintiff”), commenced this defamation action against Defendant Jackson Lewis, P.C (“Defendant”), in the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut. Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 citing diversity of citizenship. Defendant is a law firm previously hired by Plaintiff's employer, Norwalk Hospital, to investigate allegations that Plaintiff had sexually assaulted or harassed another Norwalk Hospital employee. Plaintiff's defamation claim arises out of the reports Defendant submitted to its client, Norwalk Hospital which included allegedly defamatory statements relayed to Defendant by Norwalk Hospital employees. Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^[1] For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'” setting forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Kolbasyuk v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., LP, 918 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The assessment of whether a complaint's factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal' conduct.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). At this stage “the court's task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the weight of the evidence that might be offered on either side.” Id. Although detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Kinsey v. New York Times Co., 991 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

In general, the Court's review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint ” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007); Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010). However, the Court also “may consider documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into [it] by reference.” Salerno v. City of Niagara Falls, No. 20-3749-CV, 2021 WL 4592138, at *1 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[F]or purposes of a motion to dismiss, we have deemed a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”).

Allegations

The Court accepts as true the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which are as follows. While a medical resident at Norwalk Hospital, another medical resident accused Plaintiff of sexual assault. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. In response, Norwalk Hospital hired Defendant to investigate that accusation. Id. at ¶ 7. Two of Defendant's employees conducted the investigation, interviewing the accuser, the accused and other Norwalk Hospital employees. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9. During its investigation, Defendant heard “several false, defamatory” statements^[2] about Plaintiff, which were republished in a written report produced for the client, Norwalk Hospital. Id at ¶¶ 10, 12. Defendant also submitted a second report to Norwalk Hospital in which it again republished these defamatory statements. Id. at ¶ 14. Defendant also transmitted the second report to Plaintiff's attorney. Id. Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that other persons have seen the second report. Id. at 16. And as a result of Defendant's republication of the defamatory statements, Plaintiff has suffered harm to his career and reputation. Id. at ¶ 18.

Discussion

Plaintiff would have this Court conclude that an attorney hired to investigate employee misconduct may be found liable for defamation to that employee, if, following the conclusion of the investigation, the attorney discloses to the employer the content of witness statements made during the investigation. The law does not support such a conclusion, and indeed precludes any such holding.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not plead a prima facie case of defamation because he did not adequately allege that Defendant published any defamatory statements to a third party. Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff's allegations of publication are sufficient, Defendant's statements to its client are entitled to a qualified privileged. Plaintiff disagrees with both assertions.

Defamation

A defamatory statement is a “communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him...” Bailey v Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., NO. 3:19-cv-00671 (VLB), 2020 WL 1083682, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 6, 2020). “To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.” Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 547-48, 69 A.3d 880 (2013).^[3] The test of a defamation complaint's sufficiency is “whether it is detailed and informative enough to enable [a] defendant to respond.” Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44,46 (2d Cir. 1986). Thus, a plaintiff must plead “what defamatory statements were made.when they were made, and to whom they might have been made.” Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 979 F.Supp. 122, 128 (D. Conn. 1997). And to “constitute a publication it is necessary that the defamatory matter be communicated to someone other than the person defamed.” Restatement, Torts § 577 (1938).

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly allege that any defamatory statements were published to a third person, which Defendant argues is fatal to his claim. See Telkamp v. Vitas Healthcare Corp. Atlantic, No. 3:15-CV-726 (JCH), 2016 WL 777906, at *17 (D. Conn. Feb. 29, 2016) (dismissing a defamation claim where the plaintiff did not plead facts from which the court could conclude that statements were published to a third party); Alvarado v. PBM, LLC, No. 3:21CV01481 (SALM), 2022 WL 3566630, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2022) (dismissing a defamation claim where the plaintiff did not identify any “third party” nor could one be inferred from the allegations of the complaint); Bailey v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00671 (VLB), 2020 WL 1083682, at *6 (finding sufficient publication where a defendant corporation internally distributed statements to management and shared circumstances of plaintiff's termination with his former co-workers orally and in writing).

Plaintiff's primary theory of publication is that Defendant's communication with its own client, Norwalk Hospital, constitutes publication to a third party. He is wrong. Fundamental principles of agency^[4] recognized in the law of Connecticut defeat this theory. The lawyer-client relationship is one of agent-principal. See U.S. v. Int' Broth. Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, 986 F.2d 15, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1993). An attorney is the client's agent. See Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 509-11, 4 A.3d 288 (2010). As such, any knowledge the agent has is imputed to the client. West Haven v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 174 Conn. 392, 395 A.2d 741 (1978) (“[N]otice to, or knowledge of, an agent, while acting within the scope of his authority and in reference to a matter over which his authority extends, is notice to, or knowledge of, the principal.”). It follows that any information gained by Defendant during its investigation was already imputed to Norwalk Hospital.^[5]Defendant's presentation of the report of its investigation to Norwalk Hospital, therefore, cannot constitute publication to a third party for purposes of Plaintiff's defamation claim. In communicating with its principal/client, Defendant was, in essence, communicating with itself. See, Hoch v. Loren, 273 So.3d 56, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (dismissing defamation claim against attorney because the purportedly defamatory communication between the attorney and his client was “tantamount to the principal talking to itself.”).^[6]

Putting aside the unassailable principles of agency, Connecticut law has not recognized a defamation claim based upon communications between an...