Eggelston v. Marshall Durbin Food Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:10-cv-02290-JEO |
| Parties | PHILLIP EGGELSTON, Plaintiff, v. MARSHALL DURBIN FOOD CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Phillip Eggelston ("Eggelston") originally filed this action in August 2010, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") against his former employer, Defendant Marshall Durbin Food Corporation ("Marshall Durbin"). (Doc.1 1). After granting a motion to compel arbitration by Marshall Durbin, the court dismissed the action on June 21, 2012. (Doc. 14). The cause now comes to be heard on Marshall Durbin's "Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award or in the Alternative, Motion to Reinstate [this civil action] and Vacate" (Doc. 21), as wellas cross-motions by Eggelston to confirm the arbitrator's award. (Docs. 26, 31). The parties have previously consented to an exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 18). However, that consent was expressly limited to the disposition of a prior motion by Marshall Durbin that sought to reinstate this action and to confirm an earlier order of the arbitrator to dismiss certain claims. (See Docs. 15, 18). The undersigned therefore concludes that there is no magistrate judge jurisdiction to resolve the parties present motions, so they will be handled via this report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Upon consideration, it will be recommended as follows: (1) the prior dismissal deprives this court of jurisdiction within the confines of this civil action to rule on the parties' respective motions related to the confirmation or vacatur of the arbitration award; (2) Marshall Durbin has not carried its burden to justify the reinstatement of this action, so its alternative motion seeking that relief is due to be denied; and (3) Marshall Durbin's motion to vacate the award is due to be treated as an initial pleading in a separate action and that Eggelston's cross-motions to confirm the award are due to be treated as filings in that same action.
Eggelston filed this action on August 23, 2010, bringing three claimsagainst Marshall Durbin alleging as follows: (1) that it terminated his employment because of race in violation of both Title VII and § 1981 (the "race discrimination claim"); (2) that it failed to pay him overtime compensation required under the FLSA (the "overtime claim"); and (3) that it discharged him in retaliation for complaints about not being paid overtime, also in violation of the FLSA (the "FLSA retaliation claim"). (Doc. 1). On October 6, 2010, Marshall Durbin moved to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4, respectively. (Doc. 7). On October 21, 2010, the undersigned granted that motion. (Doc. 9). Pursuant to the terms of their arbitration agreement (see Doc. 7-1), the parties proceeded to arbitration through the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").
By June 2012, it appeared that all of the claims and issues in this case were going to be heard in the pending arbitration proceeding. (See Docs. 11, 12). That led the undersigned to advise the parties that the court intended to dismiss the action without prejudice to the right of Eggelston to return to this court to seek reinstatement any claims not adjudicated in the arbitration. (Doc. 13). No party objected to that proposition, and, on June 21, 2012, the court, acting through Judge Proctor, entered one-page order of dismissal that stated as follows:
The court having been advised that the above-styled cause willproceed to arbitration (Docs. 12 & 13) it is ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff's right to petition to reinstate the action and pursue any claim embraced herein that is not adjudicated in, or discharged by, the arbitration proceedings. Such reinstatement, if allowed, would cause the filing date of any claim so reinstated to relate back to the original filing date of this action. Each party to bear their own costs.
(Doc. 14) (emphasis original). No appeal followed.
Meanwhile, the parties proceeded in the arbitration before the assigned AAA arbitrator, Allen S. Blair. After Marshall Durbin moved in that proceeding for summary judgment, Arbitrator Blair issued an order, on October 11, 2012, ruling that Marshall Durbin was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on both FLSA claims, i.e., for overtime and for retaliatory discharge, but that a question of fact remained on Eggelston's claim for racially discriminatory discharge. (Doc. 15-1). Therefore, Blair dismissed the overtime and FLSA retaliation claims (id. at 7, 8) and advised that the race discrimination claim alone would proceed to an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 10).
On October 16, 2012, however, Eggelston filed a "Motion for Clarification" in the arbitration proceeding, contending that Blair had overlooked certain evidence in granting summary judgment to Marshall Durbin on the FLSA retaliation claim. A copy of that motion is not in the record, but Marshall Durbin asserts, and Eggelston does not appear to contest, that Eggelston's contention wasto the effect that the arbitrator should reconsider his dismissal of the FLSA retaliation claim based upon allegations in an affidavit by Eggelston that, prior to his discharge, he had engaged in activity protected under the FLSA by complaining to Marshall Durbin about its failure to pay overtime to employees other than himself. (See Doc. 21 at 8-9).
On October 24, 2012, the parties appeared at what was to have been the final arbitration hearing. Arbitrator Blair there heard oral arguments on Eggleston's pending motion for "clarification" of the status of the FLSA retaliatory discharge claim, but Blair again deferred a decision on that and instructed the parties to proceed with their respective presentations on the claim for racially discriminatory discharge. Soon after the hearing began, however, Blair suspended the proceeding on a motion by Marshall Durbin. Then, on November 2, 2012, the parties notified the AAA that they had agreed to mediate the case with Arbitrator Blair acting as mediator.
While that mediation was pending, on November 28, 2012, Marshall Durbin electronically filed, under the civil action number of this case, a "Motion for Reinstatement of Action, Application/Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and to Enter Final Judgment, and Motion to Re-Dismiss the Remainder of the Action Without Prejudice." (Doc. 15). In support, Marshall Durbin contended that onceArbitrator Blair issued his summary judgment order dismissing Eggelston's FLSA claims for overtime and retaliatory discharge, Blair was powerless under AAA rules to reconsider that decision or otherwise reinstate those claims. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6). As such, Marshall Durbin insisted, it was entitled to have this court enter a judgment confirming the arbitrator's dismissal of just those claims. (Id.) With respect to the issue of the court's jurisdiction, Marshall Durbin asserted simply that "Section 9 of the FAA authorizes this Court to issue an order confirming the Award and to enter judgment accordingly." (Id. ¶ 9). Eggelston opposed Marshall Durbin's motion, but neither side disputed that this court possessed jurisdiction to act on the motion. (Docs. 17, 19). As noted above, the parties then consented to an exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction in this action only for purposes of the motion to reinstate and "re-dismiss" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 18).
On February 11, 2013, the court entered an order denying Marshall Durbin's motion, concluding that the uncertainty regarding the status of the FLSA retaliation claim and the arbitrator's authority to revive it under AAA rules, along with the pendency of the race discrimination claim, counseled against confirmation of the arbitration summary judgment order at that time. (Doc. 20). In so doing, however, the court did not address its jurisdiction to hear the motion other than to acknowledge generally that FAA §§ 9-12 provide for judicial reviewto confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award and that a court with the power to say an action pending arbitration has the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award. (Id. at 4). Marshall Durbin did not appeal the denial of its motion.
Subsequently, the parties' mediation with Blair failed. On April 8, 2013, Beverly Baker replaced Blair in his capacity as the AAA arbitrator in the case. On May 1, 2013, Baker entered an order in the arbitration proceeding that reinstated Eggelston's FLSA retaliatory discharge claim, based on Baker's conclusion that she was not bound by Arbitrator Blair's prior summary judgment order dismissing that claim. (Doc. 21-2 at 2-3).
On November 19, 2013, the parties proceeded to an arbitration hearing on both the race discrimination claim and the FLSA retaliatory discharge claim. On April 23, 2014, Baker entered an opinion in which she ruled against Eggelston on his race discrimination claim but in his favor on his claim alleging that Marshall Durbin had violated the FLSA by terminating Eggelston's employment in retaliation for making protected complaints that he was entitled to overtime pay. (Doc. 21-3 at 17-18). On the latter claim, Baker awarded Eggelston damages in the amount of $75,000 "as an appropriate sum to effectuate the purposes of the FLSA retaliation provision." (Id. at 19-20). On August 14, 2014, Baker entered afinal award in which she found that Eggelston was also entitled to $123,685.00 in attorney fees and $4,634.10 in costs, making a total award for Eggelston in the amount of $203,329.10. (Doc. 26-1).
Meanwhile, on July 22, 2014, Marshall Durbin had electronically filed its instant motion, again...
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