Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer
| Decision Date | 22 August 1967 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 67--31 |
| Citation | 229 N.E.2d 144,86 Ill.App.2d 224 |
| Parties | Jean EGGEMEYER, Appellee, v. Donald EGGEMEYER, Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Palmer, Nielsen & Sumberg, Rockford, for appellant.
Russell J. Goldman, Roald A. Jacobsen, Rockford, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order entered January 12, 1967, on plaintiff's petition for the modification of a decree for divorce entered on December 11, 1964, which decree granted the custody of Tammy Renee Eggemeyer to plaintiff and that of Donna Jean and Joni Lynn Eggemeyer to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in plaintiff and defendant. As of the date of the decree, Donna Jean was 11 years of age; Joni Lynn, 8; and Tammy Renee, 4.
In August of 1966, the plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree wherein she sought the care, custody and control of Donna Jean and Joni Lynn, and child support for all of said minor children. The defendant filed an answer to this petition which asserted that he had remarried and that he and his present wife were better able to furnish a suitable home for said minor children than was the plaintiff.
By order entered on said petition on September 30, 1966, the court found the defendant in arrears in payment of child support for Tammy in the sum of $665 and directed him to pay the sum of $20 per week for Tammy's support--as provided in the divorce decree--and to pay an additional sum of $10 per week on the delinquent child support. However, the court, after hearing the evidence, found no change in circumstances since the entry of the decree upon which to predicate a change in the custody of the children awarded to the defendant by the decree; and denied plaintiff's petition for the modification thereof.
On December 30, 1966, the plaintiff filed a further petition seeking the custody of Donna Jean and Joni Lynn wherein she alleged the defaults of the defendant in paying child support as ordered in the divorce decree; his refusal to comply with the decree visitation provisions; and her fitness as a custodial parent. She further alleged that the defendant was not capable of managing, supervising and caring for said children and that it was for their best interest that plaintiff be awarded their custody. The defendant filed an answer denying the allegations of the petition; asserting further that no change of conditions had been alleged to justify the modification of the decree for divorce; and stating that he had remarried and that he and his present wife were better able to furnish a suitable home for said children than was the plaintiff.
In the interim, between the date of the divorce decree and the filing of the petition on December 30, various petitions had been filed and heard for rule to show cause on the defendant with reference to his failure to pay child support for Tammy and to honor plaintiff's visitation rights as provided for the divorce decree. It was under this background that the December 30 petition came on for hearing. The complaint for divorce, the first petition for change of custody and the December 30 petition, were heard by different trial judges. No appeal was taken from the decree for divorce or from the order of September 30 which denied plaintiff's petition for change of custody.
The hearing on the December 30 petition was complete and covered the factual circumstances which had occurred from the entry of the decree for divorce to the date of the hearing. The evidence fairly indicated that neither of the parties had made a serious effort to comply with the spirit and letter of the decree relative to the divided custody of the children. The bitterness and conduct of the parties undoubtedly caused the children to experience a maximum of friction and anxiety and a minimum of serenity and freedom from family strife and discord.
The plaintiff lived in an apartment with her mother and Tammy, worked, and hoped to get a better paying job and a three bedroom apartment in a Government Housing Project in event she was given the custody of Donna Jean and Joni Lynn. The record indicated that she was a proper person to have the custody of the children; that she properly cared for Tammy and loved all of the children; and that she sent them to Church.
The reasons underlying the provisions of the divorce decree which awarded the custody of two of the children to the defendant and one to the plaintiff, were not before this Court. It was undisputed that the defendant was delinquent in his child support payments for Tammy in the sum of $535 at the time of the last hearing. The defendant and his present wife testified that they desired to keep the custody of Donna Jean and Joni Lynn; that the two children were in good health, doing reasonably well in school, and had no disciplinary problems; and that the children got along well with their step-mother, who was then pregnant. The record also indicated that the defendant loved the children; that he and his present wife and the two children lived in a two bedroom frame house; and that the children attended Church. The record likewise indicated that the defendant was a proper person to have the custody of the children.
On January 12, 1967, the court entered an order awarding the care, custody, control and education of all three of the children to the plaintiff, subject to Donna Jean and Joni Lynn staying with the defendant until the conclusion of the semester of school then in session. The order gave the defendant reasonable visitation rights--not here in dispute--and directed him to pay to the plaintiff, as child support, the sum of $15 per week for Donna Jean; $10 per week for Joni Lynn and $10 per week for Tammy, commencing as of the date of the order. On appeal, the defendant prays that this order may be reversed, and the plaintiff's petition for child custody, denied.
Upon the record before us, we must assume that both the plaintiff and the defendant were fit and competent persons to have the custody of the children. The issues before us are: whether there were changes in the conditions and circumstances of the parties which justified the modification of the decree; and whether the trial court abused its discretion in taking Donna Jean and Joni Lynn from the defendant and in awarding their custody to the plaintiff.
After the divorce decree in the case at bar, the question of the custody of the children remained subject to the order of the court and could be reviewed and modified from time to time as the unfolding circumstances and the best interest of the children may require. Jenkins v....
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