Eggermont v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | 46892. |
| Citation | 24 N.W.2d 809,238 Iowa 28 |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | EGGERMONT v. CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION. |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1947.
A. D. Pugh, of Des Moines, for appellant.
C D. Reed, of Des Moines, for appellee.
In Eggermont v. Central Surety and Insurance Corporation, Iowa, 17 N.W.2d 840, 841, we held Mrs. Myrtle Eggermont could maintain an action in this state against the defendant, the insurer of the Dixie Greyhound Lines, based on injuries suffered while a passenger on the insured's motor bus in the State of Missouri; said injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the motor carrier.
Now the trial has been had and the jury has returned a verdict for defendant. Mrs. Eggermont appeals to this court, contending in fifteen separate divisions in her brief, that reversible error occurred in the trial below. The brief contains no assignment of errors as such but some of the various divisions assert error. We will pass upon the asserted errors, with, however some grouping of the duplicate and connected complaints. A statement of the facts is hardly needed for the issue was submitted to the jury and defendant armed with a favorable verdict, does not argue its motion for directed verdict should have been sustained. It will be enough to state that Mrs. Eggermont was a passenger in the Dixie bus which, on the afternoon of June 21, 1943, was traveling in a northerly direction on a two-lane paved highway near Cape Girardeau, Missouri. As the bus went down a grade toward a bridge, a school bus traveling south stopped to let the Dixie bus pass over the bridge. A truck that was following the school bus also stopped, but, in stopping, the truck skidded somewhat to the left and the rear end of the truck struck the front of the Dixie bus. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered an injury to her back when the collision occurred.
I. Plaintiff asserts error in the trial court's striking a portion of her petition wherein she claimed a right of recovery for non-negligent injury. The Missouri statute, section 5729, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939, Mo.R.S.A., is quite plain. It requires the surety to make compensation 'for injuries to persons and loss of or damages to property resulting from the negligent operation of such motor carrier.' See Eggermont v. Central Surety and Insurance Corporation, supra, for statute. The language of the statute calling for a posted liability insurance policy providing for compensation to be paid for injuries to persons or property resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle covered, ends the argument. The trial court was right in his ruling. See also Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N.W. 320.
II. The plaintiff pointed to a printed paragraph in the policy providing for Coverage C--Medical Payments $_____ each person. She claimed a right to recover the medical expense established by the evidence, or $233.92 as a contractual liability under the above clause. The policy shows that it was merely a blank clause in the policy that was not used. The policy stated that: 'If no premium charge is indicated in the premium space under Coverage A. B, or C opposite any automobile described herein it shall mean no insurance is afforded for such coverage as respects such automobile.' A premium charge is indicated under Coverage A (Bodily Injury) and under Coverage B (Property Damage). None is indicated under Coverage C, and since such coverage is not required by statute, no insurance was afforded for such coverage.
III. The plaintiff claims error with respect to an X-ray Technician's testimony concerning X-ray picture exhibits, which pictures she had taken. No specific error is pointed out. We have examined the record of her testimony and can find no error of admission of testimony and no error in rejection of any of her testimony.
In the same division the plaintiff complains that her attorney was excluded by the doctor from the X-ray room when the pictures were taken. This, she asserts, was violative of Rule 132, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, providing: 'The party examined may have any representative present throughout any such examination.' It does not appear that the physical examination was under any order of court or made under any rule. Moreover, it could hardly be contended the above rule would compel the doctor to disrobe a female patient in her lawyer's presence.
IV. The complaint that...
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