Ground One: The Ohio state courts entered decisions that were contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, the Supreme Court's clear precedent by failing to conclude on this record that Mr. Eggers entered his guilty plea unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily.
Supporting Facts: Brad Locher fired shots into a home containing men whom had threatened the lives of Mr. Eggers and Locher earlier that night. One shot resulted in the death of Mr. Eggers' former girlfriend. Charged with murder offenses for which he was innocent, Mr. Eggers wished to prepare for trial. His attorney promised to provide discovery, to move suppress both illegally-obtained statements of Mr. Eggers and DNA and GSR-test results. But the attorney challenged only one of the statements and then withdrew that motion. Mr. Eggers asked his attorney to interview witnesses that saw Locher with a gun earlier on the night of the shooting and heard Locher bragging about harming those that were in the home; but the attorney did not do so, and even
refused to read an affidavit presented from one of those potential exculpatory witnesses. The attorney did not prepare for trial and instead pressured Mr. Eggers and Mr. Eggers' close family, stating that Mr. Eggers had to plead guilty. Mr. Eggers appeared for a hearing in court, believing it was a suppression hearing and learned that the attorney had made a plea deal. The attorney reported that Mr. Eggers could not go to trial. Concerned that he would be wrongfully convicted and receive a life sentence because his attorney was not prepared for trial, Mr. Eggers entered a guilty plea, still noting his innocence in that same hearing, stating "You know I did not do this."
Ground Two: The Ohio state courts entered decisions that were contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, clear U.S. Supreme Court precedent by failing to conclude on this record that Mr. Eggers' trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by leading Mr. Eggers to plead guilty in violation of his right to due process.
Supporting Facts: [Identical to Supporting Facts for Ground One.]
In May 2010 four shots were fired into a residence at 926 Southfield Avenue in Springfield, Ohio; one of the shots struck Julie Snyder and killed her instantly. On January 24, 2011, the Clark County grand jury indicted Eggers on six counts: aggravated murder, two counts of felony murder, felonious assault, improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation, andimproper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle. Later, Eggers was separately indicted on one count of having weapons while under disability.
On June 9, 2011, Eggers reached a plea agreement with the State under which he would plead guilty to felony murder as charged in Count Three of the indictment and the State would dismiss all other charges and firearm specifications for an agreed mandatory sentence of fifteen years to life (Plea of Guilty, Doc. No 8-1, PageID 75- 77.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Eggers pled guilty and was sentenced the same day to the agreed sentence.
Eleven days later, on June 20, 2011, Eggers filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds he had been coerced into pleading and had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Doc. No. 8-1, PageID 80-81.) The trial court denied the motion and Eggers appealed. His first appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The Second District Court of Appeals appointed new counsel and ordered briefing on the voluntariness of the plea (Decision and Entry, Doc. No. 8-1, PageID 188). After briefing by new counsel, the Second District affirmed the conviction. State v. Eggers, 2013-Ohio-3174, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3237 (2nd Dist. Jul. 19, 2013)("Eggers DA"). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a subsequent appeal. State v. Eggers, 137 Ohio St. 3d. 1440 (2013).
Eggers also filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21 alleging his plea was involuntary and he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Petition, Doc. No. 8-1, PageID 317 et seq.) The trial court denied relief and the Second District affirmed shortly after it rendered judgment on the direct appeal. State v. Eggers, 2013-Ohio-3174, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456 (2nd Dist. Aug. 2, 2013)("Eggers PC"). The Supreme Court of Ohio also declined to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal of this judgment. State v. Eggers,2013-Ohio-5285, 2013 Ohio LEXIS 2901 (Dec. 4, 2013). Almost a year later Eggers filed the instant Petition.
Ground One: Conviction Based on Unknowing, Unintelligent, or Involuntary Guilty Plea In his First Ground for Relief, Eggers asserts his conviction is based on an unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary guilty plea. He raised this claim as his First Assignment of Error on direct appeal and the Second District Court of Appeals, in rejecting the claim, concluded "that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 by informing Eggers of his rights and determining that Eggers understood that a guilty plea waived those rights." State v. Eggers, 2013-Ohio-3174, ¶ 1 1, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3237 (2nd Dist. July 19, 2013)("Eggers DA"). The court's further explanation of its decision is as follows:
[*P7] At the plea hearing, counsel for the State explained the terms of the plea agreement. Tr. 3. The State then placed the pertinent facts on the record relating to the night that Julie Snyder was killed. Id. at 4-5. Eggers acknowledged that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, and said that he was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication. Eggers informed the trial court that he had signed the plea agreement after reviewing it with his attorney, and that he understood the agreement. Eggers stated that no one had threatened him to convince him to plead, and that he was pleading guilty voluntarily. The court then explained to Eggers the punishment for the offense of Felony Murder, and that Eggers was subject to a mandatory five years of post-release control. Id. at 5-8.
[*P8] The trial court then engaged in the following colloquy with Eggers:
THE COURT: And do you understand that you do have the right to a trial in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: At that trial you would have the right to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense to which you are pleading guilty, and you could only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury. You would have the right to confront witnesses who would testify against you, and your attorney could cross-examine those witnesses. You would have the right to use the Court's subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses on your behalf, and you would also have the right to testify, but you could not be forced to do so. Do you understand all of these rights
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: By pleading guilty you would be giving up or waiving all of these rights that we have gone over. Understanding that at this time how did you wish to plead to the offense of murder in Count Three of the indictment
THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry. Can you say that again
THE COURT: Sure. I just want to make sure that you do understand that upon entering a guilty plea in this case you would be waiving or giving up all of those rights that we have gone over, the trial rights that you would have. The right to a trial, the right to the State proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt, the right whereby you could only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury, the right to confront witnesses who would testify against you, the right to have your attorney cross-examine those witnesses, the right to use the Court's subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses who would testify against you and also the right to testify if you choose to do so but you could not be forced to do so. By pleading guilty you would be giving up or waiving those rights. Understanding that, how did you wish to plead to the offense of felony murder in Count Three of the indictment
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights and entered a plea of guilty to that offense, and based upon that plea I find him guilty of that offense. Id. at 8-10 (Emphasis added.)
[*P9] Eggers contends that the trial court's explanation of his rights, and the fact that by pleading guilty he would waive these rights, was confusing, thereby rendering his guilty plea less than knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. According to Eggers, the trial court erred when it explained all of the rights at once, rather than one at a time, and when it failed to ask Eggers if he understood that a guilty plea would waive his rights. Based on our review of the particular facts of this case, we do not agree.
[*P10] Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) provides that the court may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest:
without first addressing the defendant personally and . . .[i]nforming the defendant and determining
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