Eghnayem v. Bos. Scientific Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-07965 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | AMAL EGHNAYEM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant. |
(Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Punitive Damages Claims and Ms. Eghnayem's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint)
Pending before the court are Boston Scientific Corporation's ("BSC") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Punitive Damages Claims [Docket 106] ("Def.'s Mot.")1 and plaintiff Amal Eghnayem's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [Docket 126] ("Eghnayem's Mot. to Amend"). For the reasons below, I FIND that Florida substantive law, not Massachusetts law, applies to the plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. I also conclude that BSC has failed to carry its initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to punitive damages. Accordingly, I DENY BSC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Punitive Damages Claims. Because I conclude Florida punitive damages law applies here and Ms. Eghnayem concedes her motion is moot if this is so, I DENY plaintiff Amal Eghnayem's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.
Plaintiffs' cases are four of more than 60,000 assigned to me by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in seven different MDLs against various manufacturers.2 Of the more than 60,000 cases, over 13,000 reside in the Boston Scientific MDL. These cases involve the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence. In this particular case, plaintiffs, including Ms. Eghnayem, were implanted with a product manufactured by defendant Boston Scientific Corporation: the Pinnacle Pelvic Floor Repair Kit ("Pinnacle"). The plaintiffs allege that as a result of implantation with this product they experienced several complications. The plaintiffs currently advance the following claims: negligence, strict liability (defective design, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn), breach of express and implied warranties, fraudulent concealment, and punitive damages. (See, e.g., Eghnayem Short Form Compl. ¶ 13).
On July 18, 2014, BSC moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' punitive damages claims and filed a memorandum in support. (See generally Def.'s Mot.; Def.'s Mem.). On July 23, 2014, Ms. Eghnayem moved the court for leave to amend her complaint so she could add a claim for damages (including punitive) under Massachusetts law. (See generally Eghnayem's Mot. to Amend). On August 22, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition to BSC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Punitive Damages Claims [Docket 176] ( ). BSC filed its Reply in Support of Its Motion [Docket 181] ("Def.'s Reply") on August 27, 2014.
In September 2014 the court requested supplemental briefing on choice-of-law issues pertaining to both motions. The plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiffs'Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Docket 198] ( ) on September 22, 2014 and BSC filed its Reply [Docket 208] ( ) on September 26, 2014. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties, I address the defendant's motion first.
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 587-88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987); Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Here, the plaintiffs are Florida residents who were implanted with the Pinnacle in Florida but filed their complaints directly into the MDL. "For cases that originate elsewhere and are directly filed into the MDL, I will follow the better-reasoned authority that applies the choice-of-law rules of the originating jurisdiction, which in our case is the state in which the plaintiff was implanted with the product." Sanchez v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2:12-CV-05762, 2014 WL 202787, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 17, 2014). Florida is the originating jurisdiction and neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant disputes that the court must consult Florida's choice-of-law principles to determine the substantive law applicable to the plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. . The defendant contends that Florida's choice-of-law principles dictate application of Massachusetts law. (See Def.'s Mem. at 8-10). By contrast, the plaintiffs maintain that Florida law controls this issue.3 .4 For the reasons below, I FIND that Florida substantive law applies to the plaintiffs' punitive damages claims.
In Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., the Florida Supreme Court announced a new approach for choice-of-law questions concerning tort:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
389 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145-146 (1971)). The Bishop court noted additionally that:
Id. at 1001 n.1 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(1971)); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fla. 1981) (). Florida courts have continued to adhere to thesignificant-relationship test set forth in Bishop5 E.g., Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Trust, 1 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Connell v. Riggins, 944 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
In adopting this test, the Bishop court reiterated the language set forth in § 146 of the Restatement, noting that "[t]he state where the injury occurred would, under most circumstances, be the decisive consideration in determining the applicable choice of law." 389 So. 2d at 1001. Here, I am bound to apply Florida law to the issue of punitive damages "'unless, with respect to [that] particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship.'" Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971)). Because the facts also implicate the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, I must determine whether Massachusetts has a more significant relationship to the issue of punitive damages than Florida in this case.
Below I have applied the...
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