Egnatic v. Wollard
| Decision Date | 08 May 1943 |
| Docket Number | 35868. |
| Citation | 156 Kan. 843,137 P.2d 188 |
| Parties | EGNATIC v. WOLLARD, Public Administrator. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus bye the Court.
A judgment correctly sustaining demurrer to petition must stand on appeal, though reason given by trial court for such ruling was erroneous.
A person may file a monetary claim against decedent's estate for special services rendered to decedent by claimant under agreement not fulfilled by decedent at date of his death, for payment therefor in land or other compensation.
In action against administrator to establish demand against decedent's estate on decedent's oral contract to arrange by will or otherwise for compensation of plaintiff for services rendered to decedent, petition held sufficient as against demurrer for failure to state cause of action.
Where defendant withdrew motion to make petition more definite and certain and substituted demurrer to petition, averments of petition must be liberally construed in petitioner's favor. Gen.St.1935, 60-736.
Where petition, filed in district court, to hear and determine claim against decedent's estate, shows on its face that probate court may be applied to for such purpose or is already exercising jurisdiction over issue involved, it is not error to sustain demurrer to petition. Gen.St.Supp. 1941 59-301, 59-2237; Const. art. 3, § 8.
A petition, filed in district court, to establish demand against decedent's estate on decedent's oral contract to arrange by will or otherwise for compensation of plaintiff for services rendered to decedent, held demurrable as showing on its face that probate court might be applied to for such purpose. Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-301, 59-2237; Const. art. 3, § 8.
A party having adequate remedy for equitable relief in probate court which is exercising its jurisdiction in matter, may not invoke district court's jurisdiction.
The provisions of probate code that probate courts shall have such original jurisdiction as may be given them by statutes pertaining to particular subjects and exercise such equitable powers as may be necessary and proper fully to hear and determine any matter properly before such courts, confers exclusive jurisdiction on them as to exercise of powers given them in other portions of code. Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-301 (11 12).
The legislature, in enacting probate code, had power to confer jurisdiction on, as well as to take it away from, both district and probate court. Const. art. 3, §§ 6, 8.
It is fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that legislature's purpose or intent governs, when ascertainable from statute though words, phrases or clauses must be omitted from, or inserted at, some place in statute.
When interpretation of statute according to exact and literal import of its words would thwart or contravene legislature's manifest purpose in enacting it, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding strict letter of law so far as necessary.
A statute susceptible of more than one construction must be given construction which expresses its intent and purpose when considered in its entirety, though such construction is not within strict literal interpretation of statute.
The power granted probate court by statute to grant and revoke letters testamentary and of administration carries with it right to direct and control executor or administrator in all matters pertaining to administration of decedent's estate, including his activities in matter of exhibiting and establishing demands against estate. Gen. St.Supp.1941 59-301(2).
The power granted probate court by statute to direct and control executors and administrators' official acts, settle their accounts, and order distribution of estates, includes right to require notice to all persons interested in hearing on application for allowance of claim against estate and weigh claimants' evidence in support of its allowance, right to determine what claims should be included in such accounts, and power to determine what assets should be included in and what liabilities should be excluded from amount of money to be distributed. Gen.St. Supp.1941, 59-301(3).
Under statutes respecting probate court's original jurisdiction and allowance of secured claims against decedents' estates, a claimant may surrender security, file claim in probate court and have it allowed for full amount, or he may exhaust security by action filed in district court to foreclose lien, and if property sold in such proceeding is insufficient to pay full amount of claim, district court may render deficiency judgment for remaining amount, which must be considered a demand legally exhibited against executor or administrator from time of original service of summons on him. Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-301(11, 12) 59-1303.
The statute, providing that action against executor or administrator shall be considered a demand legally exhibited against decedent's estate from time of serving original process on such representative and that judgment creditor shall file certified copy of judgment in proper probate court within 30 days after it becomes final, does not give district court jurisdiction to allow general unsecured demands against estate after service on administrator or executor, nor render its judgment "final". Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-301(3), 59-2208, 59-2237, 59-2238, 59-2401, 59-2402, 59-2408.
The statute, providing that action against executor or administrator shall be considered a demand legally exhibited against decedent's estate from time of serving original process on such representative and that judgment creditor shall file certified copy of judgment in proper probate court within 30 days after it becomes final, applies only where code makes no express or adequate provision for establishment of demand in probate court. Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-2238.
The probate code, giving probate courts original jurisdiction to probate wills, appoint executors and administrators of decedents' estates, requiring inventories and appraisements of estate assets, hear petitions of parties claiming all or any part of such estates after due notice to all parties interested, settle such representative's accounts, and disburse estates, is not unconstitutional nor in conflict with jurisdiction given by Constitution and statutes to district courts. Gen.St.1935, 20-301; Gen.St. Supp.1941, 59-301, 59-2208, 59-2237, 59-2401, 59-2402, 59-2408; Const. art. 3, §§ 6, 8.
The probate code grants probate courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters incident and ancillary to control, management, administration, settlement and distribution of decedents' estates, including exhibition and establishment of claims, whether equitable or legal, against such estates. Gen.St.Supp.1941, 59-301, 59-2237.
Where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, court first acquiring jurisdiction retains it to exclusion of other court.
1. A proceeding to recover monetary compensation from the estate of a deceased person may be maintained in a proper tribunal when a person has performed special services for an aged person under an oral agreement such services were to be paid for in land or other compensation and the agreement has not been fulfilled by the promisor at the date of his death.
2. Except for matters involving the adjudication of secured demands and a few others where adequate and proper relief is not expressly provided for the Kansas Probate Code, effective July 1, 1939, grants exclusive original jurisdiction to the probate court over all matters incident and ancillary to the control, management, administration, settlement and distribution of decedent estates, including the exhibition and establishment of claims and irrespective of whether those claims be denominated equitable or legal.
3. The probate court of the county where a decedent's estate is being administered is the proper tribunal in which to exhibit and establish a claim of the character herein described and the district court of such county has no jurisdiction to entertain an action wherein a party seeks to accomplish that purpose.
Appealed from District Court, Wyandotte County, Division No. 3; Harvey J. Emerson, Judge.
Action by Edward Egnatic, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Sophia Egnatic, against N. J. Wollard, Public Administrator of Wyandotte County, as administrator of the estate of Charles Yoda, also known as Karl Yoda, deceased, and deceased's unknown heirs, if any, to establish a demand against the estate for a money judgment on an oral contract of deceased with plaintiff's parents to make arrangements by will or otherwise to give a share of the estate to plaintiff and to educate him. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition and dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.
J. H. Brady and Wm. H. McCamish, both of Kansas City, for appellant.
Elmer E. Martin, of Kansas City, for appellee.
This was an action commenced in the district court against the administrator of an intestate deceased person to exhibit and establish a demand against the estate of decedent, Charles Yoda, arising out of an oral contract alleged to have been made by such decedent with the plaintiff. The defendant's demurrer to the petition was sustained and the action dismissed by the trial court from which judgment the plaintiff appeals.
Pertinent facts material to a proper determination of this appeal appearing from the pleadings and the record and admitted by all parties can be thus stated: Charles Yoda, a bachelor died intestate on April 14, 1941, a resident of Wyandotte county, Kansas; N. J. Wollard the then public administrator of Wyandotte county was appointed as administrator of the decedent's estate by the Probate Judge of such...
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