Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin

• Decision Date: 31 October 1858
• Citation: 27 Mo. 495
• Parties: EGYPTIAN LEVEE Co., Respondent, v. HARDIN, Appellant. EGYPTIAN LEVEE Co., Respondent, v. CUMMINS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

27 Mo. 495

EGYPTIAN LEVEE Co., Respondent,

v.HARDIN, Appellant.

EGYPTIAN LEVEE Co., Respondent,

v.CUMMINS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1858.

1. That provision of the constitution of the State of Missouri, which requires all property subject to taxation to be taxed in proportion to its value, is applicable only to taxation in its usual, ordinary and received sense, to taxation for general state, county, city and town purposes, not to local assessments, where the money raised is expended on the property taxed.

2. The act of February 27, 1855 (Sess. Acts, 1855, p. 73; also Adj. Sess. 1855, p. 28), authorizing the Egyptian Levee Company, thereby incorporated, for the purposes of reclaiming a certain district from inundation by leveeing, ditching and embanking, to levy a tax per acre (not exceeding fifty cents) upon the land owners within said district, is constitutional; it is not in conflict with that provision of the constitution requiring that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.

Appeals from Clark Circuit Court.

Bush, for appellants.

I. The charter, so far as it authorized a tax per acre, is unconstitutional. (Constitution of Missouri, art. 13, §19.) This provision applies to counties and all corporations created by the act of the legislature, as much as it does to the state in raising revenue for state purposes. The state not possessing the power to levy an “acre tax,” it could not delegate this power. If it can delegate the power to a special corporation, it can authorize a County Court to raise a revenue for county purposes by a tax per acre.

Cowgill & Givens, for respondent.

NAPTON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases involve the same question. For the purpose of reclaiming from liability to inundation a district of country between the Des Moines, Fox and Mississippi rivers, in Clark county, a company was chartered by the legislature in 1855 (Sess. Acts, 1855, p. 74), authorized to construct levees and dig canals, and raise the fund necessary for such construction by a tax, not to exceed fifty cents per acre, upon the land holders in the district embraced within the charter. Each land owner was allowed a vote in the control of this work, for every forty acres of land he owned in the limits. The towns of Alexandria and Churchville, with their additions, were excepted from the operation of the charter, although within the district of country embraced by it. At a subsequent session of the legislature, the charter was altered so as to authorize the tax to be as high as one dollar per acre. These suits were brought to recover some of these assessments, and the defense was, that the act of the legislature was unconstitutional, because the land was taxed by the acre, and not in proportion to its value.

That provision of our state constitution, which requires taxation to be proportioned to the value of the property on which it is laid, is only applicable to taxation in its usual, ordinary and received sense, and is, therefore, limited to taxation for general purposes alone, where the money raised by the tax goes into the state treasury, or the county treasury, or the general fund of some city or town, and is applicable to any person to which the legislative body of such state, county or town may choose to apply it; and is not intended to apply to local assessments, where the money raised is to be expended on the property taxed. These local assessments are not necessarily, under our constitution, apportioned by reference to the value of the property assessed, but may be regulated by the value of the benefit which the improvement, to which the money is devoted, is expected to confer on the proprietor. Legislative sanction of such assessments is usually brought about by the action of the parties interested, and it is for the legislature to determine in what ratio the burden shall be distributed. It ought to be according to the value of the benefit to be derived; but, if the plan adopted should not, in the opinion of the judiciary, attain the object, it is still not their province to interfere.

This restriction in our constitution is not without precedent; and the construction here given to it is sanctioned by authority. Judge Martin says, in the case of The State v. New Orleans Nav. Co., 11 Mart. 309: “These words [impost, tax or duty] must be confined to the idea which they commonly and ordinarily present to the mind, exactions to fill the public coffers, for the payment of the debt, and the promotion of the general welfare of the country, not to a contribution provided to defray the expenses of building bridges, erecting causeways, or removing obstructions in a watercourse, to be paid by such individuals only who enjoy the advantages resulting from such labor and expense.” The ordinance of 1787 declared that “all the navigable waters leading into the St. Lawrence and Mississippi, and the...