Ehrenfeld v. Webber
| Citation | 499 F. Supp. 1283 |
| Decision Date | 04 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 76-122 P. |
| Parties | Robert EHRENFELD and Elizabeth Ehrenfeld, Plaintiffs, v. Nelson WEBBER and Helen Webber, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., Portland, Me. (Charles S. Einsiedler and Donald A. Fowler, Jr., Portland, Me., of counsel), for plaintiffs.
John A. Graustein, Portland, Me. (John A. Anderson, III and Robert E. Hirshon, Portland, Me., of counsel), for defendants.
This case is about the Ehrenfelds and the Webbers. They do not get along and probably never will. At issue is whether these Maine counterparts to the Hatfields and the McCoys belong in the federal court.
The question presented is whether plaintiffs, the Ehrenfelds, have properly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in the instant action against defendants, the Webbers, the action being essentially one to quiet title to two unimproved parcels of land located in Bristol and Bremen, Maine. More specifically, the question is whether, in this diversity action, the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). For the reasons below, the Court holds that it does not. Accordingly, the action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), after a hearing held on July 7, 8, and 9, 1980, without a jury, and after receiving helpful briefs and listening to oral argument by able counsel on both sides.
The action was commenced by the filing of a four count complaint on September 2, 1976.
Count I (the quiet title count) seeks a declaratory judgment to quiet title with respect to the two parcels of land referred to above. For convenience, the Court will refer throughout this opinion, as counsel for both sides did at the hearing, to the two parcels of land as parcel A (consisting of approximately 2 acres) and parcel B (consisting of 15/100ths of an acre).1 No money damage is claimed under Count I.2
Count II (the trespass count) seeks injunctive relief and damages with respect to alleged trespasses on parcel B. Double damages in amount of $4,000 are claimed under Count II.
Count III (the assault count) seeks damages for an alleged assault said to have been committed by defendant Nelson Webber upon plaintiff Robert Ehrenfeld on parcel B on July 15, 1976. Actual and punitive damages in amount of $35,000 are claimed under Count III.
Count IV (the conversion count) seeks recovery of the fair value of certain fence sections and posts claimed to have been removed by defendants from parcel B on July 15, 1976. No specific amount of damage is claimed under Count IV.
Defendants filed an answer, counterclaim and motion to dismiss on October 8, 1976.
The answer denies the material allegations of the complaint.
The original counterclaim seeks a judgment that title to parcels A and B is in defendants, not in plaintiffs. While the original counterclaim alleges that "defendants are entitled to damages for rents and profits of the premises and for destruction of said premises", no specific amount of damage is claimed under the original counterclaim. Defendants filed an amendment to their counterclaim on January 5, 1977 which alleges, inter alia, that plaintiff Robert Ehrenfeld committed an assault on defendant Nelson Webber on parcel B on July 15, 1976, for which $35,000 actual and punitive damages is claimed.
Defendants' motion to dismiss reads as follows:
Five pretrial conferences were held in this action as follows:
Date Before
(1) December 10, 1976 Magistrate Nathanson
(2) July 18, 1978 Magistrate Zarr
(3) May 25, 1979 Magistrate Zarr
(4) April 2, 1980 Judge Gignoux
(5) June 19, 1980 Judge Timbers
After the first pretrial conference, Magistrate Nathanson stated in his report filed December 16, 1976, with respect to the jurisdictional amount issue, as follows:
(emphasis added).
After the second pretrial conference, Magistrate Zarr stated in his report filed July 20, 1978, with respect to the jurisdictional amount issue, as follows:
No further reference was made to the jurisdictional amount issue at the third and fourth pretrial conferences, so far as the reports of those conferences disclose.
At the fifth and final pretrial conference held June 19, 1980 before the undersigned, however, the Court, pursuant to its duty to examine the jurisdictional underpinning of a case at any stage of the proceeding, squarely raised the question whether the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs.3 Counsel for both sides stated their respective positions. The Court was left with the distinct understanding that the action was essentially a quiet title action; that the value of the land involved ranged somewhere between $1,000 and $3,000; that the claims of damage, exclusive of the assault count, could not conceivably exceed $10,000; and that the sole basis for invoking federal jurisdiction in this diversity action was the $35,000 damages claimed under the assault count. The upshot was that the Court ordered, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b), a prior and separate trial of the issue of damages before undertaking a trial on the merits of this quiet title action. The reasons for ordering a prior and separate trial, as the Court informed counsel, were (1) to enable the Court to determine whether the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional amount required for diversity jurisdiction, and (2) to facilitate a settlement, depending on the outcome of the prior and separate trial, before embarking on a long and costly trial of the quiet title action. "As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court." Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939).
The Court then conducted a three day hearing on damages. In order to determine the maximum amount of plaintiffs' claim, it was assumed that all issues on liability had been resolved in plaintiffs' favor. Thus, it was assumed that plaintiffs properly held title to parcels A and B; that defendants had trespassed on parcel B; that defendant Nelson Webber assaulted plaintiff Robert Ehrenfeld on parcel B on July 15, 1976; and that defendants had converted plaintiffs' fence. The evidence adduced at this hearing on damages is summarized in detail in the following section.
In light of the foregoing prior proceedings, the Court turns next to the facts, as adduced at the three day trial on damages, and the relevant law.
Our starting point for determining whether an action satisfies the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement is the familiar "legal certainty" test of Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938):
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