EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co.
Decision Date | 25 April 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 9610.,9610. |
Citation | 64 F.2d 224,89 ALR 238 |
Parties | E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. v. CLAIBORNE-RENO CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Willis J. O'Brien and John N. Hughes, both of Des Moines, Iowa (Hughes, O'Brien & Faville and J. M. Parsons, all of Des Moines, Iowa, and C. M. Spargo, of Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for appellant.
John L. Gillespie, of Des Moines, Iowa (Gillespie & Moody, of Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for appellee.
Before KENYON, GARDNER, and SANBORN, Circuit Judges.
The parties will be referred to in this opinion as the Du Pont Company and the Reno Company.
The Du Pont Company brought suit against the Reno Company for $5,989.88, part of which was for goods sold and delivered, and part for a balance due upon a promissory note. The Reno Company admitted this indebtedness, but set up a counterclaim for $350,000 damages for breach of contract. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the Reno Company for $41,588.12. From the judgment entered upon the verdict, the Du Pont Company has appealed.
The Reno Company had been, from the 23d day of October, 1924, until the 1st day of December, 1930, the sole distributor in the state of Iowa of certain products manufactured only by the Du Pont Company, and intended mainly for the finishing, refinishing, and polishing of automobiles. These products were referred to as Duco. The original contract between the parties, which was made in 1924, had been several times renewed, with slight variations, prior to October 1, 1927. On that date a contract substantially similar to those which preceded it was entered into. It was in the form of a letter prepared by the Du Pont Company and accepted by the Reno Company. We set it forth in full:
On October 27, 1930, the Du Pont Company gave notice to the Reno Company of the termination of the contract effective the December 1st following, and it was this termination by the Du Pont Company which the Reno Company asserts constituted a breach of the contract.
The Reno Company's cause of action, briefly stated, is this: That it had since 1924 acted as the sole distributor for Duco in the state of Iowa under the agreement in question and similar agreements; that it had developed the territory and created a demand for the Du Pont Company's products, had abandoned the sale of competitive products, had maintained facilities for instruction and demonstration in the use of and application of Duco, had expended large sums of money in furtherance of the Du Pont Company's interests, and had in all things carried out its obligations under the contract; that, under the terms of the contract, the Du Pont Company could not terminate it so long as the services of the Reno Company were, in the judgment of the Du Pont Company, satisfactory; that the termination of the contract was at a time when, in the judgment of the Du Pont Company, the services of the Reno Company were not unsatisfactory; that the Du Pont Company did not exercise good faith in terminating the agreement; and that the result of the refusal of the Du Pont Company to continue was the destruction of the Reno Company's business.
The question whether the termination of the contract by the Du Pont Company was in good faith, as claimed by it, or in bad faith, as claimed by the Reno Company, was submitted to the jury, and determined adversely to the former. There had been a motion by the Du Pont Company for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, and the failure of the court to direct a verdict in its favor is assigned as error.
The important question in this case is whether the termination of this contract by the Du Pont Company gave to the Reno Company a cause of action for damages. Reduced to its lowest terms, the claim of the Reno Company is that what it bargained for and received from the Du Pont Company was an agreement that it should be the sole distributor of Duco in the state of Iowa so long as the Du Pont Company was satisfied with its services and so long as it (the Reno Company) chose to perform the services; that the consideration for the promise on the part of the Du Pont Company was the promise of the Reno Company to act as sole distributor and to do the things which it was required to do under the agreement, and the performance of that promise. The Du Pont Company, on the other hand, claims that the contract was unenforceable because the Du Pont Company did not promise to continue until dissatisfied, and because of uncertainty of consideration and lack of mutuality of obligation; that it is a bilateral contract, depending for its consideration upon the mutual promises of the parties, and that, being terminable at will by the Reno Company, it was also terminable at will by the Du Pont Company; and that the question whether, in its judgment, the services of the Reno Company were satisfactory, is not a justiciable question.
There is much to be said in favor of requiring men to adhere strictly to their undertakings, whatever they may be, but there are certain established rules with reference to contracts which are not to be disregarded, no matter how great the hardship may be which...
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