Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub

• Decision Date: 24 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 18CA3825,18CA3825
• Citation: 120 N.E.3d 380,2018 Ohio 4060
• Parties: D. Dianna EICHENLAUB, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy R. EICHENLAUB, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

120 N.E.3d 380

2018 Ohio 4060

D. Dianna EICHENLAUB, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Randy R. EICHENLAUB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18CA3825

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Scioto County.

DATE JOURNALIZED: September 24, 2018

Michelle J. Meis, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.¹

Rick L. Faulkner and Kenneth W. Porter, Wheelersburg, Ohio, for Appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

ABELE, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, judgment that granted a divorce to D. Dianna Eichenlaub, plaintiff below and appellee herein, and Randy R. Eichenlaub, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant raises the following assignments of error for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE LOWER COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY FINAL DECREE ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE PARTIES' FIRST MARRIAGE IN ITS ANALYSIS OF R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(e)."

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE LOWER COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY FINAL DECREE ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE SPOUSAL SUPPORT FOR AN INDEFINITE TERM."

{¶ 2} The parties initially married in October 1990, and remained married until November 1998 when they dissolved their marriage. Following the dissolution, appellant and appellee continued to live together, until appellee left the home and stayed with a friend for a short period of time. During this time, appellee became pregnant. Shortly thereafter, appellee and appellant rekindled their relationship and remarried in October 2001.

{¶ 3} During the parties' marriage, appellee gave birth to the child conceived during the parties' period of separation. Also, two other children were born as issue of the marriage.

{¶ 4} In 2015, the parties' relationship deteriorated and they sought a divorce. On September 8, 2017, the trial court held a final divorce hearing. Appellee testified that she and appellant first married in October 1990, and remained married for eight years. Appellee stated that after the parties dissolved their marriage, appellant "lived with [her] continuously." She further explained, however, that at some point, she asked appellant to leave the home. He would not do so, however. Appellee related that she decided to stay with a friend, and that the parties reunited a short time later.²

{¶ 5} Appellee stated that for the past three years, she has worked as a full-time kindergarten aide and earns approximately $21,000 annually. Before that, she had no other meaningful employment.

{¶ 6} Appellant testified that appellee did not work outside the home during the marriage, but instead stayed home to care for the children. Appellant stated that appellee started working within the past few years as a school aide. Appellant claimed that appellee "has the education to do more if she chooses to."

{¶ 7} On December 4, 2017, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, divided the parties' property, and designated appellee the children's residential parent. The court also awarded appellee spousal support in the amount of $800 per month for an indefinite time period. Additionally, the court retained jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order. This appeal followed.

I

{¶ 8} Appellant's two assignments of error challenge the propriety of the trial court's spousal support award. For ease of discussion, we consider them together.

{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by considering the parties' first marriage when determining to award appellee spousal support. Appellant claims that nothing in the spousal support statute allows a trial court to consider a prior marriage, or a period of unmarried cohabitation, when it evaluates the propriety of a spousal support award. Appellant further maintains that once the trial court defined the term of the parties' marriage as October 27, 2001 through September 8, 2017, it could consider only that period of time when awarding spousal support. Appellant additionally asserts that when the parties dissolved their first marriage, the parties agreed to waive spousal support. Appellant thus contends that the trial court could not consider the duration of their first marriage when determining the propriety of a spousal support award following the termination of their second marriage.

{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellee spousal support for an indefinite term.

ASTANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 11} Trial courts generally have broad discretion and "wide latitude" when evaluating the appropriateness, reasonableness, and amount of a spousal support award. E.g. , Kunkle v. Kunkle , 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990) ; Bolinger v. Bolinger , 49 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 551 N.E.2d 157 (1990) ; Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (1981) ; Clifford v. Skaggs , 4th Dist. Gallia No. 17CA6, 2017-Ohio-8597, 2017 WL 5513569, ¶ 9. Consequently, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's spousal support decision absent an abuse of discretion. Clifford at ¶ 9 ; e.g. , Bechtol v. Bechtol , 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990) ; Holcomb v. Holcomb , 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989). " ‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ " State v. Kirkland , 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67, quoting State v. Brady , 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23. "An abuse of discretion includes a situation in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘ "sound reasoning process." ’ " State v. Darmond , 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Morris , 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. , 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). The abuse-of-discretion standard is "highly deferential" and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter , 138 Ohio St.3d 51, 2013-Ohio-5614, 3 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 29 (explaining that reviewing court "will not lightly substitute [its] interpretation for that of the issuing court"). Indeed, "[d]iscretion necessarily connotes a wide latitude of freedom of action on the part of the trial court, and a broad range of more or less tangible or quantifiable factors may enter into the trial court's determination. [Thus], two trial courts could reach opposite results on roughly similar facts and neither be guilty of an abuse of discretion." McGee v. C & S Lounge , 108 Ohio App.3d 656, 661, 671 N.E.2d 589 (10th Dist. 1996). Accordingly, an appellant seeking to show that a trial court abused its discretion ordinarily bears a heavy burden. Griffith v. Purcell , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 97CA2512, 1998 WL 32483 (Jan. 26, 1998), fn.1.

B R.C. 3105.18

{¶ 12} R.C. 3105.18(B) allows trial courts, upon a party's request and after distributing property, to award reasonable spousal support. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) sets forth the factors that a trial court must consider when "determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and [when] determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support":

(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code ;

(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;

(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

(e) The duration of the marriage;

(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;

(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;

(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;

(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;

(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;

(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities;

(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.

{¶ 13} A trial court that is evaluating the propriety of a spousal support award must consider all of the statutory factors and not base its determination upon any one factor taken in isolation. Kaechele v. Kaechele , 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. Additionally, although a trial court possesses broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is reasonable and appropriate, it must consider the statutory factors and must indicate the basis for a spousal support award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award complies with the law. Kaechele at paragraph two of the syllabus. In the absence of a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, Kaechele does not require the trial court to list and comment on each factor. Brown v. Brown , 4th Dist. Pike No. 02AP689, 2003-Ohio-304, 2003 WL 164602, ¶ 10. Rather, Kaechele and R.C. 3105.18(C) only require a trial court to reveal the basis for its award in...