Eidam v. Eidam

• Decision Date: 29 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 1228-A,1228-A
• Citation: Eidam v. Eidam, 279 A.2d 413, 108 R.I. 673 (R.I. 1971)
• Parties: Meredith M. EIDAM v. Luther P. EIDAM et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 413

279 A.2d 413

108 R.I. 673

Meredith M. EIDAM v.Luther P. EIDAM et al.

No. 1228-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1971.

Johnson & Johnson, Martin Johnson, Providence, for plaintiff.

Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Alfred Factor, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION.

PAOLINO, Justice.

The plaintiff brought this complaint for money damages and equitable relief against her former husband, Luther P. Eidam, and Sandra L. Mahoney, his present wife, by a writ of summons and an attachment dated October 30, 1969, attaching real estate at 50Mark Drive, Cranston, Rhode Island.The real estate then stood in the name of Sandra L. Mahoney.

The complaint alleges in substance that plaintiff and defendantLuther P. Eidam were divorced by final decree entered on July 26, 1968; that her former husband has failed to make payments for the support of plaintiff and her three minor children in accordance with the provisions of such final decree and is currently in arrears in the amount of $7,000, which amount constitutes a judgment against him; that in September 1968, he conveyed his real estate at 50Mark Drive to his present wife, Sandra L. Mahoney, for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff.The complaint prays for the following relief: (1) judgment against her former husband for $7,000, plus interest and costs; (2) that the conveyance to Sandra L. Mahoney be declared null and void and the judgment be declared a lien on said real estate; and (3) judgment for costs against defendantSandra L. Mahoney.

The defendants, on November 24, 1969, filed a general denial and a motion to vacate the attachment.In support of this motion to vacatethey filed supporting affidavits.

In his affidavit defendantLuther P. Eidam states that, in August 1968, plaintiff showed him letters from the two banks which had mortgages on the property at 50Mark Drive advising that mortgage foreclosure proceedings be instituted because payments were in default; that his former wife asked him to sign an agreement to hold her harmless from any deficiency balance resulting from any foreclosure proceedings; that in consideration of his promise to hold her harmless, plaintiff executed a quitclaim deed conveying her interest time of the conveyance on September 7, time of the conveyance on September 78 1968, the property was subject to two mortgages totalling $31,500; that plaintiff went to the first mortgagee and requested that they remove her name from the mortgage and note because plaintiff had already conveyed the property to him; that at the time of the conveyance to him he did not owe his former wife any money; that on September 13, 1968, he conveyed whatever interest he had in the property in question to Sandra L. Mahoney for the sum of $1,500; and that at the time of such conveyance he did not owe plaintiff any money and was not in arrears in his support payments under the terms of the final decree of divorce.

The defendantSandra L. Mahoney, in her affidavit, states that on September 13, 1968, she purchased whatever interest Luther P. Eidam had in the real estate in question for the sum of $1,500; that at the time of such conveyance she was aware that the property had a fair market value of approximately $34,000 subject to two mortgages totaling $31,500; that from September 13, 1968, she paid both mortgages; and that she did not owe plaintiff any money then or at the time she filed the instant affidavit.

In reliance on their affidavits, defendants renewed their motion to vacate the attachments, basing the same on their claim that Sandra L. Mahoney was a bona fide purchaser for value of the property in dispute and that defendant, Luther P. Eidam, no longer had legal title thereto.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a counter-affidavit claiming that defendants' motion to vacate the attachment was in effect a motion for summary judgment.The plaintiff further alleges therein that there is a valid equitable claim upon this property as there is a factual dispute on the issue of whether defendantSandra L. Mahoney is in fact a bona fide purchaser for value of such property; that the property was or had been currently advertised for sale in the upper forty thousand dollars; that defendants were married and lived together in said premises within a few weeks after the transfer of the property to Sandra L. Mahoney; that they have continued to reside therein; that defendantLuther P. Eidam had not supported plaintiff or his children for over a year despite the court order contained in the final decree; and that when the property is sold defendants plan to reside in Chicago where her former husband had already moved upon obtaining employment there.

The motion to vacate the attachment was heard before a justice of the Superior Court.¹After hearing oral arguments he rendered a brief bench decision.He found in substance that plaintiff gave up her interest in the real estate by deed; that the fact that her former husband decided to give it to some other party presented no problem because it was done immediately after the entry of the final divorce decree; and that there was obviously no time factor sufficient to allow any arrearage to build up.He held that since there was no arrearage due at the time of the conveyance from defendantLuther P. Eidam to defendantSandra L. Mahoney, plaintiff's attachment was not sufficient in law to hold the property.He, therefore, granted defendants' motion to vacate the attachment as of that date and, on December 30, 1969, an order to that effect was entered in the Superior Court.

On January 19, 1970, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 73.²The record indicates that she took no further steps to perfect her appeal until April 1970.It appears from statements in the briefs, which we shall treat as a stipulation of facts, that plaintiff did not pursue her appeal because she was notified by defendants' counsel that the property was being sold at a mortgagee's sale and that there would be no equity remaining because of the large mortgages on the property.Later, however, upon learning that there was in fact a surplus of approximately $1,800 remaining after the sale, plaintiff attempted to obtain an extension of time for filing the transcript in order to perfect her appeal and defendants filed a motion to strike the appeal.The following activity took place.

On April 27, 1970, defendants filed in the Superior Court a motion 'to strike the plaintiff's claim of appeal,' without stating the ground or grounds on which they based their motion.On the same day plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the time for perfecting her appeal be extended.

On the next day defendants filed a 'Motion to Dismiss the Appeal' on the ground that the appeal in question was premature and also on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the 'Rules of Civil Procedure' with respect to said appeal.The defendants also filed an objection to plaintiff's motion to extend the time for perfecting her appeal to this court.

On April 29, 1970, plaintiff filed an objection to defendants' motion 'to strike and/or to dismiss plaintiff's claim of appeal.'

The plaintiff's motion to extend and defendants' motions to strike and/or to dismiss plaintiff's claim of appeal were heard before another justice ³ of the Superior Court on May 7, 1970.After hearing arguments of counselhe rendered a decision from the bench.He held in substance that the order vacating the attachment was an interlocutory order; that an appeal does not lie from interlocutory orders except in certain specified cases; that the dissolution of an attachment was not such a case.Accordingly, he concluded that an appeal did not lie from the order vacating the attachment on the premises in question and granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's claim of appeal.He passed plaintiff's motion for an extension of time on the ground that such motion became moot in view of his decision granting defendants' motion to strikeplaintiff's appeal.An order granting defendants' motion to strikeplaintiff's appeal and dismissing her claim of appeal was entered on May 8, 1970, in the Superior Court.

On May 11, 1970, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the order entered on May 8, 1970, granting defendants' motion to strike and dismissing plaintiff's claim of appeal.

While still other proceedings have transpired between the parties since that time, we shall not discuss them since the only matter before us is plaintiff's appeal from the order entered on May 8, 1970, granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from the December 30, 1969 order vacating the attachment on the property in question.The plaintiff contends that the grounds on which the trial justice based his decision dismissing plaintiff's appeal are not valid grounds for dismissal by the Superior Court.We agree.

The grounds authorizing a dismissal of an appeal by the Superior Court are set forth in the second paragraph of Super.R.Civ.P. 73(a)⁴ which reads as follows:

'A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the Superior Court clerk a notice of appeal.Failure of the appellant to take any one of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground for dismissal thereof by the Superior Court unless circumstances excuse the failure and justice demands that the appeal be heard.If an appeal has not been docketed, the parties, with the approval of the Superior Court, may dismiss the appeal by stipulation filed in that court, or the court may dismiss the appeal upon motion and notice by the appellant.'

Thus it is clear that the trial justice did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for the reasons that he did.The only question properly before him was whether to grant or deny plaintiff's motion for an extension of time for filing the transcript....