Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode

• Decision Date: 15 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 825,825
• Citation: 373 A.2d 1306,36 Md.App. 557
• Parties: Guyneth EIGENBRODE v. Ralph F. EIGENBRODE.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 557

36 Md.App. 557

373 A.2d 1306

Guyneth EIGENBRODE v. Ralph F. EIGENBRODE.

No. 825.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 15, 1977.

Russell Rowell, Rockville, with whom was Arthur M. Wagman, Rockville, on the brief, for appellant.

Steny H. Hoyer, District Heights, with whom were Hoyer & Fannon, District Heights, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, DAVIDSON and MOORE, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Guyneth Eigenbrode appeals from that portion of an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County which denied her motion to cite the appellee, Ralph F. Eigenbrode, for contempt of court for failure to make support payments. The question raised on this appeal is whether the elimination of an alimony provision from the parties' divorce decree by a Nevada Court, which had previously granted the decree, precluded the Maryland trial court from citing the appellee for contempt for default in his support obligation under a separation agreement executed in Maryland, prior to the Nevada decree.

On July 24, 1970, the two parties entered into a voluntary separation agreement whereby the appellee agreed to pay $275 per month as alimony. This agreement was incorporated into a decree of divorce in Nevada on July 30, 1970, It was expressly provided in the agreement that its terms would be embodied in the decree and the agreement would survive any judgment or decree. Both parties personally appeared in the Nevada proceedings. Subsequent to this, the appellee initiated an action in Maryland to have the support payments reduced. In Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, 19 Md.App. 597, 313 A.2d 569 (1974), this Court held that the support provision in the separation agreement did not constitute technical alimony; therefore, the chancellor was not empowered to modify it. ¹ In response to this, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County entered an order that the appellee make support payments pursuant to the agreement. The appellee then petitioned the Second Judicial Court of Nevada for a modification of the divorce decree and that court eliminated its prior alimony award, except as to past installments.

In an attempt to collect alleged arrearages in the support payments, the appellant filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, the contempt motion now under consideration. The court ordered the appellee to pay within thirty days $4,868.65, the amount owed to the appellant pursuant to the divorce decree which had accrued prior to the striking of the alimony award. It stated in its oral opinion that the power to order payment was derived from the divorce decree and not the contract; therefore, any contemptuous conduct ended when the alimony provision of the decree was terminated. The court declined to rule on any contractual obligation.

Md.Code, Art. 16, § 28 provides that an agreement between husband and wife respecting support is valid, binding, and enforceable to every intent and purpose. It is clear that equity courts are empowered to recognize and enforce separation and property settlements. Reichhart v. Brent, 247 Md. 66, 71, 230 A.2d 326 (1967); Jackson v. Jackson, 14 Md.App. 263, 268, 286 A.2d 778 (1972). Support agreements not providing for technical alimony approved by a decree of the court, signed prior to 1950, could be enforced only by recourse to sequestration, execution, and attachment. Md.Rule 685, Reichhart v. Brent, supra. 'By amendment in 1950 of Section 38 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution payments for support provided in an agreement approved by a decree of court are, along with alimony, defined as not constituting a debt within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.' Simpson v. Simpson, 18 Md.App. 626, 629, n. 1a, 308 A.2d 410, 413 (1973). Contempt proceedings, therefore, are now an appropriate means for enforcing the support payments, after the agreement has been approved by a decree. Speckler v. Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 261 A.2d 466 (1970).

It has been established that an equity court can enforce a decree of another State, both as to alimony accrued and to accrue, and may use for its enforcement the same equitable remedies and sanctions it could use to enforce a decree it had duly entered in the first instance. McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 318, 123 A.2d 447 (1956). The incorporation of a separation agreement in a decree of divorce does not invalidate the agreement and does not preclude an action ex contractu on the agreement. Coffman v. Hayes, 259 Md. 708, 270 A.2d 808 (1970). In the case at bar the original divorce decree issued by the Nevada Court both approved and recognized the validity of the support provisions of the separation agreement when it incorporated them. Subsequent to this, the appellant could have sought judicial enforcement in Maryland.

We now look to the effect of the elimination of the alimony by the Nevada Court when it modified its decree. The absence of a support provision in a divorce decree will not necessarily invalidate...