Eingartner v. Ill. Steel Co.

• Citation: 68 N.W. 664,94 Wis. 70
• Parties: EINGARTNER v. ILLINOIS STEEL CO.
• Decision Date: 13 October 1896
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

94 Wis. 70

68 N.W. 664

EINGARTNER

v.ILLINOIS STEEL CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 13, 1896.

Appeal from superior court, Milwaukee county; R. N. Austin, Judge.

Action by Joseph Eingartner against the Illinois Steel Company. Judgment of dismissal, from which plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

This is an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff on the 4th day of September, 1891, in the respondent's rolling mill, in the city of Chicago, Ill.; the plaintiff being at that time and now a citizen of the state of Illinois, and the defendant being an Illinois corporation. The answer set up as a defense the citizenship of the parties in Illinois, and the fact that the accident had occurred in the state of Illinois, and that a law of the state of Illinois limited the time in which actions for personal injuries might be brought to two years after the happening thereof, and, therefore, that this action was barred by said statute. Upon the trial, after the plaintiff's evidence had been introduced, a peremptory nonsuit was granted. It appeared by the evidence that at the time of the accident, and for some time prior thereto, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in its rolling mill, and that his particular business was to oil a machine called the “bloom rolls.” This was a large, heavy machine, standing three feet or more high from the floor, operated by steam power, and having upon one side a series of cogwheels meshed into each other. It appeared by the evidence that at intervals a section of the floor at the side of this machine, close to the series of cogwheels, had to be removed in order to put in new rolls. It further appears that this removal of the floor was done by a separate gang of workmen, called the “sailor gang,” and that, after the replacing of the rolls, the floor was put down again by another gang of workmen, called the “carpenter gang.” Each of these gangs worked under a separate foreman. The evidence tends to show that plaintiff had nothing to do with either the taking up or the putting down of the floor, or with the work of either the sailor gang or the carpenter gang. The plaintiff testifies that at the time of the accident he was about to oil the part of the machinery near the cogwheels; that he stepped upon the end of a loose plank in that part of the floor which had to be removed when the rolls were changed, and the plank tipped up, thus throwing his right hand into the cogs, and severing it. The plaintiff's version of the transaction was to a certain extent corroborated by other employés who testified to seeing the loose board immediately after the accident. It appeared by the evidence that this section of the floor had been taken up, and the rolls changed, and the floor relaid, two or three days before the accident happened; that plaintiff was one of a night crew, working from 6 o'clock in the evening until 7 o'clock in the morning; and that he had to oil the machine every 15 minutes or so, and was obliged to walk over this portion of the floor where the plank was loose every time, but that he had not noticed that the plank was loose. The accident happened just before 7 o'clock in the morning. The plaintiff also offered in evidence the following decisions of the supreme court of the state of Illinois; Railway Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N. E. 905;City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 165, 38 N. E. 892;Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 Ill. 581, 38 N. E. 946;Libby v. Scherman, 146 Ill. 540, 34 N. E. 801;Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 32 N. E. 285. At the close of the evidence, a motion for nonsuit was granted, and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint upon the merits, for the following reasons: “First. Because it appears from the evidence that the occurrence out of which the alleged cause of action arose took place in the state of Illinois, and not in the state of Wisconsin; that both the plaintiff and defendant were at the time of such occurrence, ever since have been, and now are, residents of the state of Illinois, and not of the state of Wisconsin; that the alleged cause of action depends upon peculiar rules laid down by the courts of Illinois, which do not prevail in Wisconsin, and never have done, and which are hostile and obnoxious to the law of the state of Wisconsin, as interpreted by the courts thereof; and that this court, therefore, in this action, is called upon to administer the laws of the state of Illinois, which it has no jurisdiction to do. Second. Because the plaintiff has wholly failed to show by evidence any negligence whatever on the part of the defendant which caused or contributed to the injury which is the basis of the action.” From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

C. H. Van Alstine and J. W. Wegner, for appellant.

Van Dyke, Van Dyke & Carter, for respondent.

WINSLOW, J. (after stating the facts).

Two important questions arise in this case, viz.: (1) Whether the court could, in its discretion, dismiss the case, because the parties were both residents of the state of Illinois, and because the cause of action arose in the state of Illinois, jurisdiction of the person of the defendant having been obtained within this state; (2) if the court could not dismiss the case for this reason, then whether the evidence of the plaintiff was sufficient to entitle him to have the case submitted to the jury upon the merits. These questions will be considered in the order indicated.

This is an action to recover damages for injuries to the person. It is therefore purely a transitory action, and the principle that the courts of this state have jurisdiction to entertain such an action, although the cause arose in Illinois and the parties are residents of Illinois, is unquestioned. Curtis v. Bradford, 33 Wis. 190. A court of this state would even have jurisdiction of a transitory action of this nature where it arose in a foreign country, or on the high seas, and both parties to the action were aliens, provided jurisdiction of the person could be obtained. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134;Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cal. 543; Railway Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 312. But, while it is held that a court has jurisdiction and may administer relief in an action between aliens brought upon a cause of action arising in foreign lands, it is also held that there is a certain discretion which may be used by the court in entertaining such actions, and that the court may dismiss such an action if, for any reason, it seems improper to take jurisdiction. In the present case it is practically claimed by defendant that this rule applies to such an action as the present; in other words, that citizens of another state of this Union are to be treated in the courts of this state precisely as if they were aliens, and that a cause of action arising in another state is to be treated as though it arose in a foreign country; and this really is the first question to be settled.

It is provided by the constitution of the United States (section 2, art. 4) that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” The first attempt at a comprehensive definition of this clause of the federal constitution seems to be made in the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230, where Mr. Justice Washington, referring to this section of the constitution, says: “The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. * * * They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind; and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through or reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxation and impositions than are paid by the citizens of the other state,--may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental.” The subject was again considered in Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, where it is said by Mr. Justice Clifford, who wrote the opinion in that case, referring to the words “privileges and immunities” in this section: “Beyond doubt, these words are words of very comprehensive meaning, but it will be sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business, without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in the courts of the state; and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the state upon its own citizens.” In referring to the same subject in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, Mr. Justice Field, in the opinion of the court, after defining the object of the constitutional provision in question in quite similar terms, very aptly says: “It has been justly said that no provision in the constitution has tended so much to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.” These...