Einhorn v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 17 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 50A03–1303–CT–93.,50A03–1303–CT–93. |
| Citation | 996 N.E.2d 823 |
| Parties | John EINHORN and Roxanne Einhorn, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. Scott JOHNSON, Gretchen Johnson, Purdue University Board of Trustees d/b/a Purdue University Cooperative Extension Service, and Marshall County 4–H Fair Association, Inc., Appellees–Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
996 N.E.2d 823
John EINHORN and Roxanne Einhorn, Appellants–Plaintiffs,
v.
Scott JOHNSON, Gretchen Johnson, Purdue University Board of Trustees d/b/a Purdue University Cooperative Extension Service, and Marshall County 4–H Fair Association, Inc., Appellees–Defendants.
No. 50A03–1303–CT–93.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Oct. 10, 2013.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 2013.
[996 N.E.2d 825]
Daniel H. Pfeifer, Jerome W. McKeever, Pfeifer, Morgan & Stesiak, South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Andrew B. Miller, Shannon G. Starr, Starr Austen & Miller, LLP, Logansport, IN, Barry L. Loftus, Jordan J. Szymialis, Stuart & Branigin LLP, Lafayette, IN, Michael H. Michmerhuizen, Charles C. Dubes, Barrett & McNagny LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
NAJAM, Judge.
John and Roxanne Einhorn appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Purdue University Board of Trustees d/b/a Purdue University Cooperative Extension Service (“Purdue”), Marshall County 4–H Fair Association, Inc. (“4–H Fair Association”), and Scott and Gretchen Johnson on the Einhorns' complaint for damages alleging negligence. The Einhorns also appeal the trial court's order dismissing their complaint against Purdue for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Einhorns present the following dispositive issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their claims against Purdue.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Purdue and 4–H Fair Association are immune from liability under the Equine Activity Statute as a matter of law.
3. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the Johnsons were not negligent as a matter of law.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On July 12, 2009, eleven-year-old Renae Johnson was riding her horse, Clu, in the practice arena at the Marshall County 4–H Fairgrounds (“the Fair”) when a nearby truck backed up, sounding a back-up alarm, and “spooked” Clu. Johnsons' App. at 83. Clu bucked Renae off of him three times in the course of an hour after being spooked, and each time she got bucked off, Renae walked him around the arena before remounting him. Renae's parents were not present in the arena, but Gretchen had earlier asked Dawn Thomas to watch Renae's practice. After the bucking incidents, Thomas told Renae that she was not “comfortable with this” and that they needed to “find someone to help us put [Clu] away.” Appellants' App. at 322. Thomas asked Dean Datson, who was standing nearby, to help her and Renae walk Clu over to the barn, and he agreed.
After Clu was placed in a stall in the barn, Thomas found Gretchen and told her about the bucking incidents in the practice arena. The Johnsons then enlisted the help of Tim Rice, who was an experienced horseman, to help calm Clu. Rice and Renae proceeded to clip a lead rope onto Clu and lead him out of the stall. They quickly encountered “a bunch of kids and horses running around which caused Clu to speed up.” Johnsons' App. at 249. Rice “went to grab a hold of the lead rope to pull Clu back when the lead rope popped. The spring loaded clasp on the lead rope failed[,]” and Clu came loose and walked fifteen to twenty feet outside the barn. Id. Rice and Renae tried to get Clu and were three feet away from him when “kids went by with horses and began hollering and yelling ‘loose horse’ which caused Clu to trot over by the tent with other horses.” Id. Clu then “took off.” Id.
[996 N.E.2d 826]
John, who was serving as President of the 4–H Marshall County Horse & Pony Advisory Committee,1 was riding in an off-road vehicle with his son around the fairgrounds. John had parked the vehicle near the horse barn when he heard someone yell, “Loose horse!” Purdue's App. at 36. John told his son to stay in the vehicle, and John was out of the vehicle and walking when Clu galloped past him and away from the horse barn. Approximately ten seconds later, Clu was running toward the horse barn, and then John saw Clu running through the barn. John then lost sight of Clu and returned to his vehicle. A short time later, John's son reported that the horse was coming back again, and John exited the vehicle and found himself in the path of the running horse. 2 John put his arms up and said “Whoa” several times before Clu trampled John. As a result of the collision, John sustained severe injuries.
At the time of the incident, John was working as an unpaid volunteer at the 4–H Fair. Nine days later, on July 21, he was notified that he was eligible for medical benefits under Purdue's workers' compensation policy. John ultimately received $79,215.48 in medical benefits from Purdue's workers' compensation carrier even though he had not applied for those benefits.
On November 17, 2010, the Einhorns filed a complaint against Purdue, 4–H Fair Association, and the Johnsons, alleging that their negligence proximately caused John's injuries. On December 3, 2012, Purdue, 4–H Fair Association, and the Johnsons filed summary judgment motions, and Purdue filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Einhorns filed a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment and a motion to strike an affidavit submitted by Purdue in support of summary judgment. The trial court granted Purdue's motion to dismiss and all three summary judgment motions and denied the Einhorns' motion to strike the affidavit. This appeal ensued.
The Einhorns first contend that the trial court erred when it concluded that their complaint against Purdue is barred as a matter of law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed with Purdue that John's acceptance of workers' compensation benefits triggered the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (“the Act”). But the Einhorns maintain that John was not Purdue's employee and, therefore, he is not precluded from bringing this civil action against Purdue. We must agree with the Einhorns.
Our supreme court set out the applicable standard of review as follows:
A review of the case authority shows that the standard of appellate review for Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motions to dismiss is indeed a function of what occurred in the trial court. That is, the standard of review is dependent upon: (i) whether the trial court resolved disputed facts; and (ii) if the trial court resolved disputed facts, whether it conducted an evidentiary hearing or ruled on a “paper record.”
[996 N.E.2d 827]
[W]here the facts are in dispute but the trial court rules on a paper record without conducting an evidentiary hearing, then no deference is afforded the trial court's factual findings or judgment because under those circumstances a court of review is “in as good a position as the trial court to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” MHC Surgical Ctr. Assocs., Inc. v. State Office of Medicaid Policy & Planning, 699 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). See also Farner v. Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251, 257 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (agreeing with the proposition that “where a case is tried wholly upon documents or stipulations, the appellate tribunal is in as good a position as the trial court to determine the force and effect of the evidence.”) Thus, we review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss where the facts before the court are disputed and the trial court rules on a paper record.
GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind.2001). Here, the facts before the court were disputed and the court ruled on a paper record. Accordingly, we review the trial court's grant of Purdue's motion to dismiss de novo.
The Act provides for compensation of injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Estate of Smith v. Stutzman, 964 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Compensation under the Act is the exclusive remedy for employees under Indiana Code Section 22–3–2–6, which provides:
The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to IC 22–3–2 through IC 22–3–6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except for remedies available under IC 5–2–6.1.
Indiana Code Section 22–3–6–1(b) defines “employee” to mean “every person, including a minor, in the service of another, under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of the employer.”
Here, there is no allegation or designated evidence showing that John was under any contract of hire or apprenticeship with Purdue. Indeed, Purdue makes no contention that John was an employee. Purdue's sole argument on this issue is that John is bound by the exclusivity provision of the Act because he accepted medical payments from Purdue's workers' compensation carrier. In support of that contention, Purdue cites Stutzman, where this court held that, “[o]nce an injured employee accepts or receives compensation under the Act, she concedes that the injury was accidental in nature and that it arose out of and in the course of employment.” 964 N.E.2d at 906 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the employee may not later sue her employer in tort based on the same work-related injury. Id.
The undisputed designated evidence shows that John was an unpaid volunteer at the time of the accident with Clu. Further, there is no evidence that John applied for the medical benefits or that he agreed to be bound by the exclusivity provision of the Act by accepting the benefits. We hold on these facts that John's acceptance of medical payments from Purdue's workers' compensation carrier does not change his status from volunteer to employee for purposes...
To continue reading
Request your trial