Eischeid v. Dover Construction, Inc., No. C 00-4100-MWB (N.D. Iowa 8/25/2003), C 00-4100-MWB.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C 00-4100-MWB.,C 00-4100-MWB. |
| Parties | JAMES EISCHEID, Plaintiff, v. DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant, and DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. WOODS MASONRY, INC., Third-Party Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. DeLOSS CONSTRUCTION, INC., Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
In this lawsuit, plaintiff James Eischeid asserts claims arising from an accident at a construction site on March 17, 1999. Eischeid was working at the site as an employee of Woods Masonry, Inc., which was, in turn, a subcontractor for masonry work on the construction project for the general contractor, Dover Construction, Inc. Apparently because the construction project was behind schedule, Dover had also hired DeLoss Construction, Inc., to grout masonry walls as Woods Masonry completed the block work. Eischeid was seriously injured when an unbraced, ungrouted wall under construction on the project collapsed, apparently under the force of gusty winds. Following this court's June 2, 2003, ruling on motions for summary judgment regarding claims by and against Woods Masonry, the claims remaining in this action are Eischeid's "direct" negligence action against defendant Dover, and the third-party indemnity claims by and between Dover, Woods Masonry, and DeLoss. Trial in this matter is set to begin on September 8, 2003. However, this matter comes before the court on four motions filed by Eischeid on July 29, 2003, which, if granted, would radically alter the issues and procedures for trial.
The four motions filed by Eischeid on July 29, 2003, are both "substantive" and "procedural" in nature. In light of the short time remaining before trial, the court entered an order on August 1, 2003, accelerating the deadline for resistances to Eischeid's motions to August 11, 2003, and the deadline for any reply from Eischeid to August 15, 2003. The court also set oral arguments on the pending motions for August 21, 2003. The motions now before the court,1 and the parties' various responses, are as follows:
The first motion now before the court-logically, if not by docket number — is Eischeid's Motion For Extension Of Dispositive Motion Deadline (docket no. 106), in which he seeks an extension of the dispositive motion deadline from May 2, 2003, to July 29, 2003, so that his motion for summary judgment on the liability of defendant Dover can be considered by the court before trial. Dover resisted this motion on August 4, 2003. Third-party defendant Woods Masonry also filed a response to this motion, on August 11, 2003, stating that it neither resists nor joins in Eischeid's request. Eischeid filed a reply to Dover's resistance on August 15, 2003.
The second motion now before the court is Eischeid's Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 105), which seeks summary judgment on the issue of liability on Eischeid's "direct" negligence claim against Dover. If this motion is granted, it would leave for trial only the damages portion of Eischeid's "direct" claim against Dover. Dover resisted this motion on August 11, 2003, and Eischeid filed a reply on August 15, 2003. Obviously, whether or not the court entertains Eischeid's belated Motion For Summary Judgment depends upon whether or not the court grants his Motion For Extension Of Dispositive Motion Deadline.
The third motion now before the court-again, logically, if not by docket number — is Eischeid's Motion To Sever Third-Party Claims (docket no. 108), and the last motion now before the court is Eischeid's related Motion To Intervene In Third-Party Actions (docket no. 107), in which he seeks leave to intervene in the third-party action if that action is severed for a separate trial. Eischeid asserts that both of these motions are premised primarily on the assumption that the court will grant his motion for summary judgment on Dover's liability. Third-party defendant DeLoss resisted both Eischeid's Motion To Intervene and his Motion To Sever on August 8, 2003, as did defendant Dover on August 11, 2003. However, on August 11, 2003, third-party defendant Woods Masonry joined in Eischeid's Motion To Sever and stated that, assuming the court grants Eischeid's Motion To Sever, Woods Masonry has no objection to Eischeid's intervention in the third-party actions, provided that a jury verdict in excess of one million dollars has been obtained against defendant Dover.
The court did, indeed, hear oral arguments on these four motions on August 21, 2003, as scheduled. At the oral arguments, plaintiff Eischeid was represented by N. Richard Willia and Steven J. Andreasen of Willia, Stahle & Andreason, L.L.P., in Sioux City, Iowa. Defendant and third-party plaintiff Dover Construction, Inc., was represented by Paul D. Lundberg of the Lundberg Law Firm, P.L.C., in Sioux City, Iowa, and John C. Gray of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra & Prahl, L.L.P., also in Sioux City, Iowa. Third-party defendant and third-party plaintiff Woods Masonry, Inc, was represented by Matthew T.E. Early of Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco, Killinger, Ellwanger, Jacobs & Mohrhauser in Sioux City, Iowa. Third-party defendant DeLoss Construction, Inc., was represented by Stephen F. Avery of Cornwall, Avery, Bjornstadt & Scott in Spencer, Iowa.
The court makes the general observation that the flurry of last-minute or just plain untimely motions now before the court, on substantive as well as procedural issues, which distracts both the court and the parties from trial preparation, is precisely the sort of thing that its Scheduling Order was designed to prevent. Nevertheless, recognizing the possibility that there may be some benefit, in the form of prompt, economical, and coherent presentation of the present matter to jurors, the court will entertain the motions on the merits, at least to the extent that disposition of one motion does not also moot or dispose of the next.
In support of his motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline from May 2, 2003, to July 29, 2003, Eischeid argues that his motion for summary judgment on Dover's liability is based partly upon depositions taken by the parties during the last week of May, 2003, and partly in response to the court's disposition on June 2, 2003, of the motions for summary judgment regarding claims by and against Woods Masonry. As to the last point, Eischeid argues that the court's June 2, 2003, order resolved on a final basis the status of the respective claims proceeding to trial in this matter and the manner in which they would be decided. In light of the depositions and the court's ruling, Eischeid contends that it is apparent that summary judgment is not only appropriate on Dover's liability, but that judicial economy would be served by allowing Eischeid's cause of action against Dover to proceed to trial only on the issue of damages, while severing the third-party indemnity claims for separate trial. Eischeid also argues that the issues on his motion for summary judgment are straight-forward, so that there will be no undue delay of the trial as presently scheduled.
Although Woods Masonry responded that it neither resisted nor joined in Eischeid's motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline, Dover responded with a resounding "No!" Dover contends that Eischeid's motion for summary judgment was filed well past the dispositive motion deadline of May 2, 2003. Dover also contends that it is inappropriate, when the parties are now engaged in trial preparations, to interrupt those preparations to deal with a belated motion for summary judgment, which the court could not hear or decide until shortly before trial. Moreover, Dover contends that Eischeid offers no adequate explanation for why either the discovery obtained in late May or the court's ruling on summary judgment motions regarding claims by and against Woods Masonry justify such a belated motion. Dover points out that Eischeid waited nearly sixty days after these two events before filing his summary judgment motion and has not explained why such a delay is excusable. Although Dover recognizes the necessity of the order accelerating the schedule for responding to Eischeid's motions, Dover also objects to having to resist Eischeid's motion for summary judgment at the same time that it must resist his motion for extension of the dispositive motion deadline without a demonstration of good cause for extending the dispositive motion deadline.
In reply, Eischeid contends that there is no indication that his motion for summary judgment or the motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline has interrupted Dover's trial preparations, where Dover has not provided Eischeid with any proposed Jury Instructions, has filed no motions in limine, and only belatedly served a Witness and Exhibit List. He clarifies his contentions that he was unable to file his motion for summary judgment before the May 2, 2003, deadline for the following reasons: depositions necessary to the motion could not be scheduled until late May; transcripts of those depositions were then delayed until late June, because the court reporter who took the depositions was injured in a motor vehicle accident; the court's June 2, 2003, summary judgment ruling, which Eischeid concedes did not provide any facts necessary to his summary judgment motion, nevertheless indicated what issues remained for trial and what procedures would be used to resolve them; and the parties were unsuccessful in attempts to mediate their claims on July 11, 2003. He also contends that good cause for an extension of the dispositive motion deadline exists, because simultaneously with his reply to Dover's...
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