Eischeid v. Dover Construction, Inc., No. C00-4100-MWB (N.D. Iowa 9/6/2001)

• Decision Date: 06 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. C00-4100-MWB.,C00-4100-MWB.
• Parties: JAMES EISCHEID, Plaintiff, v. DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., WOODS MASONRY, INC., and OTIS, KOGLIN, WILSON ARCHITECTS, INC. f/k/a OTIS ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants, and DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. WOODS MASONRY, INC., Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 1

JAMES EISCHEID, Plaintiff, v. DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., WOODS MASONRY, INC., and OTIS, KOGLIN, WILSON ARCHITECTS, INC. f/k/a OTIS ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants, and DOVER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. WOODS MASONRY, INC., Third-Party Defendant.

No. C00-4100-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

September 6, 2001.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT OTIS ASSOCIATE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS

MARK W. BENNETT, Chief District Judge.

On September 15, 2000, plaintiff James Eischeid ("Eischeid") filed this tort action against Dover Construction ("Dover") for personal injuries sustained while working at a Dover construction site in Spencer, Iowa. At the time of his injuries, Eischeid was employed by a subcontractor, Woods Masonry, Inc. ("Woods Masonry"). Eischeid asserts that he sustained severe and permanent injuries in the course of his employment when he fell from a wall which collapsed. The wall was designed by Otis, Koglin, Wilson Architects, Inc. ("Otis"). In his original complaint, Eischeid alleged that his injuries were the result of Dover's negligence and failure to provide a safe work environment. On December 20, 2000, Dover filed a third-party complaint against Woods Masonry, claiming a breach of contract. Dover, the general contractor, argues, inter alia, that under its subcontract agreement with Woods Masonry, Woods Masonry agreed to defend and indemnify Dover for any injury claims arising out of their relationship and, furthermore, agreed to carry workers' compensation liability coverage prior to beginning work at the Dover construction site.¹ Woods Masonry answered Dover's third-party complaint on December 21, 2000.

After Woods Masonry was added as a third-party defendant and after Eischeid learned that Woods Masonry's workers' compensation liability carrier would deny coverage of his injuries, Eischeid moved on March 16, 2001, for leave to amend his original complaint to add Woods Masonry and Otis as defendants in this personal injury action. The court granted Eischeid's motion on March 19, 2001 and ordered the Clerk of Court to file Eischeid's amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Eischeid alleges his injuries were caused by the negligence of Dover, Woods Masonry, and Otis. Woods Masonry answered the amended complaint on March 21, 2001, and Dover, after this court granted an extension, answered on April 13, 2001. On June 27, 2001, counsel for Otis appeared pro hac vice and, in lieu of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Specifically, Otis argues that Iowa's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims expired on March 17, 2001-two days before Eischeid filed his amended complaint, joining Woods Masonry and Otis as defendants.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must "accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]." Whitmore v. Harrington, 204 F.3d 784, 784 (8th Cir. 2000); Anderson v. Franklin County, Mo., 192 F.3d 1125, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999); Gross v. Weber, 186 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1999). A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if, taking the allegations as true, "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Knapp v. Hanson, 183 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 1999) ("A motion to dismiss should be granted only if `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.'") (quoting Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986), and citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

The Iowa Supreme Court recently explained:

Generally, the defense of statute of limitations is affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading. Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989); Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970). However, the statute of limitations bar may be raised by a motion to dismiss. Clark v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1993). "[W]hen it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts shown on the face of the challenged petition that the claim for relief was barred when the action was commenced, the defense may properly be raised by a motion to dismiss." Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 708.

Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 289 (Iowa 2001). Consequently, if Eischeid's personal injury claims against Otis truly are time-barred, an order dismissing Eischeid's complaint against Otis would be appropriate.

Iowa Code § 614.1(2) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. Because Eischeid's lawsuit is such an action, it is subject to the two-year limitations period. Eischeid's accident occurred on March 17, 1999. Otis contends that the statute of limitations barred Eischeid's claim on March 17, 2001. The thrust of Otis's argument relies heavily on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 69(e),² which governs the relation back of amendments to pleadings. Otis contends that pursuant to Iowa's relation back principles, an amended complaint will not relate back to the filing of the original complaint unless added defendants receive notice within the statutory time period. According to Otis, notice in this context means nothing less than the actual filing of the amended complaint. Otis claims that, because Eischeid's amendment was not filed until March 19, 2001, Otis did not receive notice of the complaint within the limitations period. Consequently, Otis contends that Eischeid's amended complaint against Otis is time-barred. Moreover, Otis argues that the limitations period on Eischeid's claim was not tolled when Eischeid filed his motion for leave to amend his complaint.

Eischeid, on the other hand, argues that the limitations period on his claims had not run and that, even if it had, because Dover consented to Eischeid's motion to amend his original complaint, the amended complaint should have been filed as a matter of course with the motion for leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides that a plaintiff may amend his complaint by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Thus, Eischeid argues that because Dover was the only adverse party of record and because Dover consented to the amendment, March 16, 2001 should be considered the date of filing of the amended complaint.

While the court could go into an exhaustive discussion of the parties' arguments,³ it need only address Eischeid's argument that he filed his amended complaint within the limitations period. If the amendment was indeed filed within the statutory time period, relation back principles are not implicated because all parties received notice within the limitations period at the time the amendment was filed.

Under Rule 69(e), a defendant must have notice of an amendment "within the statutory time period." IOWA R. CIV. P. 69(e); see also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (interpreting identical language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(c) and refusing to permit relation back when the party being added did not receive notice of the institution of the action until after the statute of limitations expired); Alvarez v. Meadow Lane Mall Ltd. Partnership, 560 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa 1997) (affirming lower court's dismissal of complaint on ground amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint because added defendants did not receive actual notice of the action within the two-year period); Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1993) (strictly construing plain language of relation back rule as requiring notice within the statutory time period in order to satisfy relation back rule); Grant v. Cedar Falls Oil Co., 480 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing anomaly that the notice language of Rule 69(e) gives added defendants the right to receive notice within the statute of limitations, while a properly named defendant has no similar right to be served within the statute of limitations); Butler v. Woodbury County, 547 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) ("[N]otice to the party to be brought into the action must be notice of the institution of the action, not simply notice of the possibility of the lawsuit) (citing Jacobson v. Union Story Trust & Sav. Bank, 338 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 1983)). Moreover, under Iowa law, the filing of the complaint is the document that serves to notify a defendant of a claim for purposes of the statute of limitations. Kuhns, 620 N.W.2d at 494. Read together, these rules indicate that a plaintiff must file amendments that add defendants within the statutory time period in order to satisfy Rule 69(e)'s requirement that added defendants receive notice of the institution of an action "within the period provided by law for commencing the action." Alvarez, 560 N.W.2d at 592. Accordingly, if Eischeid filed his amended complaint within the period provided by section 614.1(2) of the Iowa Code, Otis also had notice of the action within the limitations period because the filing of Eischeid's amended complaint served the dual purpose of instituting an action against the added defendants, Otis and Woods Masonry, and of providing the added defendants with notice of the action. See Kuhns, 620 N.W.2d at 494 ("A petition is the document that serves to notify the defendant of the claim for the purposes of the statute of limitations.").

Otis's argument that it did not receive notice within the meaning of Rule 69(e), however, is incomplete. The Iowa Code provides that when a statutory deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, "the time shall be extended to include the next day which the...