Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc.

Citation868 P.2d 893
Decision Date08 February 1994
Docket NumberINC,No. 92-43,K-MAR,92-43
PartiesBeverly J. EISELEIN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v., Appellee (Defendant).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Thomas E. Lubnau II and Daniel B. Bailey of Lubnau & Bailey, Gillette, for appellant.

J. Stan Wolfe and C. John Cotton, Gillette, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

In this outdoor slip-and-fall case, appellant Beverly Eiselein appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to K-Mart on appellant's claims of negligence and premises liability. The district court determined appellant's claims were barred by the obvious danger and natural accumulation rules.

We reverse and remand for a new summary judgment hearing.

ISSUES

In her initial appeal, appellant raised the following issues for our review:

I. The District Court erred in resolving the following fact questions as a matter of law:

A. Whether the hazardous condition was open and obvious;

B. Whether the Plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition;

C. Whether the hazardous condition was a natural accumulation.

II. The District Court erred in applying the "Known and Obvious Danger" rule, thus negating Defendant's duty, and barring recovery, in contravention of Wyoming's Comparative Negligence Statute Section 1-1-109.

After considering these issues, this court determined that resolution of the case would In her supplemental brief appellant presented the following issue for our review:

be benefitted by additional briefing and argument. Consequently, the parties were ordered to submit additional briefing to address the continued viability of the obvious danger and natural accumulation rules.

The District Court erred in applying the "Known and Obvious Danger" rule, thus negating Defendant's duty, and barring recovery, in contravention of Wyoming's Comparative Negligence Statute Section 1-1-109.

Appellee K-Mart responded with this statement of the issues:

A. Did the enactment of the comparative negligence statute, W.S. Section 1-1-109, modify the long standing rule of law that there is no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow?

B. Should current law regarding the natural accumulation rule be changed, regardless of the intended effect of the comparative negligence statute?

C. Even if long standing precedent regarding the natural accumulation rule is rejected, and the law argued by Appellant adopted, should the summary judgment granted by the trial court be reversed?

FACTS

At approximately 8:27 p.m. on December 18, 1987, appellant drove her truck to the K-Mart store in Gillette, Wyoming, to purchase a strand of Christmas lights. She parked her truck in the K-Mart parking lot in a space near the front of the store. As she exited her vehicle, her left foot slipped, she heard a crack like "splitting wood," and she fell to the ground, ending up on her bottom. She severely fractured her left ankle and has required extended medical treatment including surgery.

Appellant never actually saw what she slipped on; however, as she tried to push herself up off the ground, she felt something slippery. When asked in her deposition to describe the substance in more detail, she explained that "[i]t was solid. It was raised. It was cold so I deduced that it was ice." Appellant's husband returned to the K-Mart parking lot the following day and inspected the area surrounding the truck. Near the driver's side door of the truck he discovered a patch of ice which he described as "black ice." In his deposition, he testified the ice appeared to have formed when chunks of snow and ice melted and accumulated in a low spot in the parking lot.

Appellant subsequently filed a complaint and amended complaint against K-Mart to recover for her injuries on the basis of negligence and premises liability. She claimed K-Mart had negligently maintained its parking lot, allowing depressions to form where water could accumulate, freeze and create a safety hazard. She further contended that K-Mart was negligent in its failure to inspect its parking lot, warn its customers of the icy condition, and place salt or sand on the icy spots.

Following discovery K-Mart moved for summary judgment on the ground it owed no duty to appellant. The district court agreed and granted K-Mart's motion for summary judgment, declaring that "the plaintiff must show an unnatural accumulation of ice, snow or water." The district court determined no genuine questions of material fact existed concerning whether the ice appellant slipped on was a natural accumulation, whether the defendant had taken steps to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and whether K-Mart had actual or constructive knowledge that an unsafe condition existed. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lynch v. Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo.1993); Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Wyo.1993). "When reviewing the propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts." Lynch, 861 P.2d at 1097; Miller v. Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo.1993). "If no issue of material fact is found to exist, summary

judgment is appropriate, even in a negligence case." Lynch, at 1097 (quoting Brown, 850 P.2d at 614).

DISCUSSION
1. Viability of the Natural Accumulation Rule

As a general rule, a possessor of land owes a duty to his business invitees to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition. Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Wyo.1987). However, this court has adopted the rule that an owner or occupier of a premises will not be liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of ice or snow. Petersen v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp. Dist., 760 P.2d 992, 994 (Wyo.1988); Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo.1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo.1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo.1976); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo.1963).

This appeal presents us initially with the question whether the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence abrogated the natural-accumulation rule. In Sherman, in which the plaintiff slipped on an obvious patch of ice in a sheriff's parking lot, this court specifically rejected such a claim. Writing for the court, Justice Raper succinctly stated:

Comparative negligence only abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff's own negligence in bringing about his or her injuries. However, it did not impose any new duties of care on prospective defendants. Since the law of this state is to the effect that there is no duty to remove or warn of an obvious danger or one that is known to the plaintiff, no change was accomplished in that law by the adoption of comparative negligence.

Sherman, 642 P.2d at 790 (citation omitted).

Closely related to the natural-accumulation rule is the open and obvious danger rule which provides that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its existence. In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Wyo.1985), this court held that "[a]n inflexible rule that a known and obvious danger is an absolute bar to recovery is not compatible with the doctrine of comparative negligence." We did not conclude, however, that the comparative negligence statute completely abrogated the rule; rather, we indicated it modified the known and obvious danger rule, restricting its application to known and obvious dangers resulting from natural causes. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1282.

We find support for the Sherman and O'Donnell decisions in the language of Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, WYO.STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). We construe this statute according to our well established rules of statutory construction, as recently summarized in Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo.1993). "[T]he intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law * * *. Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute * * * under consideration." Parker, 845 P.2d at 1042 (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897)). "The initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." Parker, 845 P.2d at 1042 (quoting Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 135, 50 P. at 823). "[I]f the statutory language is unambiguous, the court may not resort to application of rules of construction"; the court must apply the plain meaning of the statute. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1043. Finally,

[t]his court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence.

Parker, 845 P.2d at 1044 (quoting Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).

The language of WYO.STAT. § 1-1-109 is unambiguous. The relevant portion reads:

(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his The plain language of the statute cannot be read to impose new duties of care on prospective defendants. Since we presume the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to it, we must assume the legislature understood that there exists no duty to warn of or remove natural accumulations of ice and snow. Therefore, had the legislature intended to impose that duty upon prospective defendants, the legislature would have expressly provided for...

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