Eissler v. Hoppel
| Decision Date | 06 February 1902 |
| Docket Number | 19,726 |
| Citation | 62 N.E. 692,158 Ind. 82 |
| Parties | Eissler v. Hoppel et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Vanderburgh Superior Court; J. H. Foster, Judge.
Suit by Johanna Eissler against John Hoppel and others to contest a will. From a judgment for defendants on their answer plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
H. M Logsdon and J. G. Owen, for appellant.
A. W Funkhouser and A. F. Funkhouser, for appellees.
Suit by appellant to contest the will of her mother, Lena Hoppel. The appellees, being the other heirs and beneficiaries under said will, answered that the plaintiff (appellant) had no interest in the estate of her mother and no right to maintain the action. Judgment on the answer for the appellees, from which the plaintiff appeals.
The substance of the answer is: That on the 21st of June, 1893, during the life time of her mother, a cause was pending in the Vanderburg Circuit Court, wherein the appellant and her husband were plaintiffs, and her mother, Lena Hoppel and other named beneficiaries under the will of her father, John Hoppel, deceased, who are also legal heirs of her mother, were defendants; that in said suit appellant was attempting to establish certain rights and interests in the estate of her said father in contravention of the terms of his last will, which will had been admitted to probate; that the claim alleged by appellant was adverse to the claims and interest of all the defendants in said suit; that by the will of her father, John Hoppel, appellant was bequeathed $ 2,500, payable after the death of her mother, Lena Hoppel, with the condition that, if appellant should die without children, $ 1,000 of said legacy should be paid to her husband and $ 1,500 divided between the defendants in said suit other than Lena Hoppel; that by way of compromise and settlement of all differences between the parties to said suit then and there pending, and as a settlement and compromise of all disputed rights under the will of said John Hoppel, said parties, after issues joined, agreed in open court to an order, judgment, and decree in these words: "Comes now the defendant Lena Hoppel, by her attorneys, and come now the plaintiffs in person and by their attorneys, and come now the defendants John Hoppel Jr., Henry Hoppel, George Lintz, and Christian Lipper in person and by their attorneys, and the issues being joined, this cause comes on to be heard before the court without the intervention of a jury, and now upon hearing of this cause, and by the consent and agreement of all the parties, made in open court, as a compromise and settlement of all the differences existing between the plaintiffs and the defendants, it is hereby ordered and adjudged and decreed that the defendants pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $ 3,000 in full settlement and discharge of all liability on the part of the defendants, or either of them, to the plaintiffs, or either of them, and in full satisfaction and discharge of the share or portion to which the said plaintiff Johanna Eissler may at any time have in any estate, property, rights, credits, or choses in action belonging to the said Lena Hoppel, at the time of her, the said Lena Hoppel's death, and in full payment and discharge of all the rights, claims, demands, interest or share, legacy or bequest contained in the last will and testament of John Hoppel, Sr., deceased, and the said Johanna Eissler in open court personally renounces and releases all right, claim, title, and interest in the estate of which the said Lena Hoppel may die seized and possessed, and releases and renounces all claim under the mortgages and deeds described in the plaintiff's complaint, and all rights under the last will and testament of said John Hoppel, Sr., deceased." That in January following appellant accepted said sum of $ 3,000, and in the acceptance of the same executed on the margin of the record of said agreement and decree the following acknowledgment: The overruling of appellant's demurrer to this answer is the only question presented.
On the one hand it is affirmed by appellant that the answer is bad because it shows that at the time of the compromise and settlement appellant had no interest or right in her mother's estate, who was then living, that was the subject of contract and conveyance, and, there being no warranty in the agreement, an after-acquired interest, upon the death of the mother, would not pass under the agreement and decree. On the other hand, appellees contend that the answer is good, because it shows that the decree of court was entered upon an agreed family settlement, fair in its terms, to which the ancestor and heirs...
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