Ekberg v. Sharp, 02-227.
Citation | 76 P.3d 1250,2003 WY 123 |
Decision Date | 30 September 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-227.,02-227. |
Parties | Charles A. EKBERG, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Edward C. SHARP, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Representing Appellant: Donald E. Miller of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.
Representing Appellee: John G. Fenn of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, WY.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] Charles A. Ekberg filed suit requesting, in part, specific performance of an option to purchase real property. Ekberg appeals the district court's assessment of damages. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Ekberg sets forth the following issues on appeal:
Appellee Edward C. Sharp phrases the issues on appeal as:
[¶ 3] Sharp and Ekberg entered into a "Lease with Purchase Option" on June 19, 2000. The lease provided that Sharp would lease to Ekberg the furnished upstairs apartment of a two-story residence located at 631 West Loucks Street, Sheridan, Wyoming. The agreement further granted Ekberg an option to purchase that property. In August of 2001, Eckberg notified Sharp, in writing, that he was going to exercise his option to purchase the property and enclosed a check for $5,000.00. On September 14, 2001, Sharp, through his attorney, notified Ekberg via letter that Sharp would not honor the purchase option because Sharp believed it not to be legally binding.
[¶ 4] On September 25, 2001, Sheridan County Title Insurance Agency informed Sharp, in writing, that Ekberg had tendered $82,000.00 to the agency for the purpose of paying the full amount of the purchase price. The agency suggested closing on the real property occur October 1, 2001. Two days later, Sharp's attorney reiterated Sharp's intention not to honor the purchase option.
[¶ 5] On October 1, 2001, Ekberg filed his original complaint seeking specific performance of the purchase option. Sharp timely answered the complaint. The district court then held a scheduling conference on January 11, 2002, and set the matter for trial August 9, 2002. The district court also set a dispositive motion filing deadline of February 18, 2002, and a discovery cut-off date of July 1, 2002.
[¶ 6] Subsequently, the parties both filed motions for summary judgment. Ekberg then amended his complaint, after obtaining permission to do so by the district court through formal motion, on March 15, 2002. In this amended complaint, Ekberg alleged causes of action for breach of contract, specific performance, and damages related to lost rental income. Sharp also moved for leave to assert counterclaims against Ekberg, which was granted by the district court.
[¶ 7] The district court granted Ekberg partial summary judgment for specific performance of the purchase option on June 24, 2002. Thereafter, on July 10, 2002, Ekberg filed a motion to again amend his complaint along with a proposed second amended complaint. This second amended complaint included the same causes of action as the amended complaint but added a request for damages related to loss of business income, loss of use of enjoyment of the property, and other damages. Sharp filed opposition to this motion, and Ekberg replied. The district court denied Ekberg's motion on July 22, 2002.
[¶ 8] On August 9, 2002, a bench trial was held concerning damages and the asserted cross-claims. After trial, the district court offset Sharp's expenses against Ekberg's actual lost rental income paid by tenants of the lower apartment of the property; indicated that insufficient facts were presented to support that Ekberg was required to pay additional rent to Sharp; found that Ekberg could have entered the premises and was therefore not entitled to expenses; and granted all interest earned on the $82,000.00 escrowed amount to Sharp. This appeal followed.
[¶ 9] The law in Wyoming is well settled that the decision to allow amendment to pleadings is vested within the sound discretion of the district court. That decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion shown by clear evidence. Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo.1990); Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 166-67 (Wyo.1988); Robertson v. TWP, Inc., 656 P.2d 547, 551 (Wyo.1983); Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 657 (Wyo.1980); Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 459 (Wyo.1978); Breazeale v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74, 74 (Wyo.1972).
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. In re: Worker's Compensation Claim of Shryack, 3 P.3d 850, 855 (Wyo.2000)
(quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)). An abuse of discretion has also been said to have occurred only when the decision shocks the conscience of the court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 1228, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2002); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 853 (Wyo.1998); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Wyo.1996).
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2003 WY 22, ¶ 41, 63 P.3d 887, ¶ 41 (Wyo. 2003).
[¶ 10] Our standard of review when a trial is held before the bench is also well established:
The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal.
Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d 1209, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo.1997)); see also Saulcy Land Co. v. Jones, 983 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo.1999)
.
[¶ 11] In his first issue on appeal, Ekberg asserts that under the circumstances where he had tendered $82,000.00 under the purchase option and had been denied access to the real property, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to allow him to amend his complaint so that he could claim all his legal damages. Specifically, Ekberg argues that the first time he received official notice that he had a right to enter the real property as of September 15, 2001, was when the district court granted partial summary judgment on June 24, 2002. Accordingly, he contends that this marked the first day in which he could have been able to fathom he possessed a claim of damages as asserted in his proposed second amended complaint for loss of business income and loss of use of enjoyment of the property. In addition, Ekberg argues that less than two weeks after receiving such notice and less than a week after Sharp filed his amended answer and counterclaim, he filed his motion for leave to file the second amended complaint.
[¶ 12] Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 15 addresses amendment of pleadings. That rule provides, in applicable part (emphasis added):
Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 16 is also applicable in this instance as the district court set particular deadlines in this matter. That rule authorizes the district court to set certain dates, including the setting...
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